S. HRG. 98-401

# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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APRIL 25, 1983

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-935 O WASHINGTON : 1983

S201-30

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# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

MONDAY, APRIL 25, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Nunn, Exon, Levin, and Bingaman.

Also present: Senator Rudman.

Staff present: Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, James R. Locher III, James C. Smith, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker and Judith A. Freedman, research assistants; Kathy L. Keyes, and Jacquie S. O'Grady, staff assistants.

Also present: Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Kathleen Callahan, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Carol Weatherly, assistant to Senator Warner; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Mary Shields, assistant to Senator Stennis.

## OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The Armed Services Committee is meeting this afternoon to hear some very important testimony on international security issues. The extent of our global commitments and the relationship between the United States and our allies in Western Europe and East Asia have always been subject to questioning and doubt in America, perhaps no more so than today

Some Members of Congress are among the most vocal advocates of scaling back the United States role in the international security arena. Various arguments are advanced in support of this position, ranging from the supposition that the United States cannot afford the cost of her overseas commitments during a period of domestic economic difficulty to the claim that our allies are not bearing their fair share of the burdens of common defense.

The essential fact remains that defense policy of the United States is based upon the coalition strategy. The United States has collective security agreements with some 42 nations. The United States presence in many of these countries and our commitment to the security of all of them are the central components to the global balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, the nature and responsibilities of the U.S. leadership of the Western system of alliances are poorly understood in Congress. As a result, Congress has taken a number of actions which have seriously troubled relations between the United States and our allies.

Today's hearing will examine important international security issues to be addressed in the fiscal year 1984 defense authorization bill, including several on which the Congress has previously taken what are, in my view, unfortunate positions.

I can think of no better group to help the committee review these matters than today's witnesses. On behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to the four witnesses—Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; Lt. Gen. Joseph Palastra, Deputy Commander in Chief, Pacific Command; Rear Adm. Jonathan Howe, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; and Dr. William Hoehn, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

By letter, I have provided the witnesses with a list of key topics for today's hearing, including the following: Appropriate U.S. troop end strengths in Western Europe and Northeast Asia; the impact of various legislative restrictions on defense cooperation with allies; allied contributions to common defense; impact of advancement in conventional weapons on the defense of Europe, ELOC's construction projects; key overseas military construction projects; the possibility of greater defense-industrial cooperation among NATO allies.

As many of these topics have also been of concern to the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, members of that subcommittee have been invited to attend the hearing. I see present from that committee Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, and we welcome him here.

I understand General Rogers will make the opening statement for our panel of witnesses. The excellent written statements that have been presented by General Rogers and the other witnesses will be entered into the record of this hearing. We will only have one statement presented, and that will be the statement by General Rogers.

We will proceed directly to questions at the conclusion of his testimony, at which time all of our witnesses will have an opportunity to present their views or comment on questions.

Before hearing from General Rogers, Senator Jackson has been detained for a time. I would like to call on one of the members of our committee who has focused very closely on NATO issues, particularly over the past few years and has made a very constructive contribution to the work of this committee on matters affecting NATO, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will make a very brief statement.

I want to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and, second, for moving it back an hour so I could join you on time, because I do believe it is an extremely important hearing for the reasons you have set forth as well as other reasons.

For the last several years, increasing congressional restrictions have been imposed in the alliance area. Under the chairman's leadership, we removed many of the restrictions in this bill, only to have them reinstated later in the overall cycle.

This flip-flop approach is confusing to our allies, counterproductive and, in my view, must be stopped. Some of the momentum for restriction stems from the fact that there is a growing perception that NATO as an alliance is not moving forward together on needed improvement to outdated concepts, especially in the conventional area, where so many improvements could be made—I know General Rogers has been expressing over and over again for at least the last several years the importance of these improvements—but where it is very difficult to see how much progress indeed is being made.

I think that is one of the perceptions here in the Congress that is driving these amendments that are very counterproductive in overall alliance matters. I think it is very important, Mr. Chairman, this year to try to put together a package approach to some of these alliance issues here in this committee, hopefully with the full cooperation of the Appropriations Committee, and I am delighted that Senator Rudman is here.

Senator Rudman has been a very strong leader in the military area and many other areas since he has been in the Senate. He is certainly one of our most capable Senators, so I am delighted to welcome him here to participate.

One last point. I am personally disappointed with the conventional improvement study which was required by amendment last year in the authorization bill and has just been submitted by the Department of Defense in response to last year's bill.

This was designed to be a vehicle for the Department of Defense to express a commitment and a coordinated plan of action toward NATO conventional improvements. Instead, it is almost 3 months late and is merely a laundry list of where information on NATO programs can be found, with little analysis of where and how the Department of Defense is moving in the conventional improvements area.

I am going to have some questions for Dr. Hoehn on that point, as well as General Rogers. It seems to me this is the time to pull together the Department of Defense in the conventional improvements area, but instead this report is a step backward, as I see it.

So, Mr. Chairman, I will have questions, but I appreciate you having the hearing and welcome all of our witnesses here today.

Chairman TOWER. General Rogers, if you wish, you may file your statement for inclusion in the record and summarize it, or you may read it in its entirety. Having brought you this far, I want to make sure that you proceed as you see fit and say what you want to say.

Therefore, you are recognized to proceed as you see fit.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, U.S.A., SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER/EUROPE AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. JOSEPH PALASTRA, U.S.A., DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC COMMAND; REAR ADM. JONATHAN T. HOWE, U.S.N., DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DR. WILLIAM E. HOEHN, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

General ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, Senator Rudman.

Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is to read from a highlighted version of my full statement but request that the full statement be put into the record, if I might.

Chairman TOWER. It will be.

General ROGERS. I would like to begin by discussing Allied Command Europe [ACE] because the mission of the U.S. European Command is to support Allied Command Europe. I wish to try and set the scene for why so many things that have been knocked out by the Congress are important to ACE and should be restored.

So I will start on page 1, reading from the highlighted version concerning Allied Command Europe.

Despite the continuing debate within and among alliance nations over controversial defense matters, I believe we have a solid consensus in the alliance about the kind of future most of us want. It is one in which we maintain peace with our freedom and way of life intact, in an international environment with lowered tensions and reduced and balanced levels of forces.

To reach that goal, NATO must achieve two closely related security objectives. First, it must maintain a credible and robust deterrence to deter both overt aggression and to deter political intimidation. The second objective, dependent upon the first, is that we must negotiate equitable and verifiable arms reduction accords and controls for all categories of forces.

To achieve success in negotiating arms reductions and controls, we must insure that the Soviets have incentives to negotiate seriously. This, in turn, requires that our alliance be viewed as politically cohesive and militarily strong. The political imperative demands that NATO maintain its resolve to implement both tracks of its vital decision of December 1979 regarding the modernization of, and negotiation about, intermediate range nuclear forces, the INF, and we must also overcome the transatlantic alliance tensions which crop up all too often.

In addition to the political imperative, there is also a military one. We need in NATO to be perceived as militarily strong and resolute, as being able to implement NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response, which requires a traid of adequate forces.

It is with respect to the conventional leg of the triad that NATO nations have not yet shown the requisite resolve to overcome their deficiencies. As a consequence, NATO has mortgaged its defense to the nuclear response. Although Allied Command Europe gets stronger every year because of commitments that are met, the gap

between NATO's force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact gets wider each year.

Instead of possessing genuine flexibility, NATO's current military posture will require us, if attacked conventionally, to escalate fairly quickly to the use of theater nuclear weapons.

I would submit that NATO's military situation, although unfavorable, is not yet unmanageable nor beyond restoration, if we resolve to act before is it too late. As a defensive alliance, we need not match the Warsaw Pact one-for-one in any area of force comparison. The alternative is to develop an adequate conventional capability by the end of this decade which will bolster our deterrence by providing a reasonable prospect of successful defense utilizing NATO's preferred response, "direct defense to defeat an attack or place the burden of escalation on the enemy."

To achieve such an adequate conventional capacity, NATO must, as a first priority, do better with the forces already committed to Allied Command Europe. We must also modernize our forces and, as we do, exploit the superior Western technology to provide us the means to locate and target, and to delay, disrupt and destroy with conventional weapons the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they can reach the battle area.

Our technology can also give us the electronic warfare means to disrupt the highly centralized control and direction of Warsaw Pact operational military units.

A conventional capability such as I have described can generally be achieved by the end of this decade if nations will fulfill their agreed NATO force goals on the time scale established.

Achieving such a conventional force would result in enhancing our deterrence and raising the nuclear threshold. The aggressor—should he attack conventionally and be frustrated—would then be faced with two options: Either to withdraw or to be the first to make the agonizing decision to escalate to nuclear weapons. They are not more anxious than we to cross the nuclear threshold because of the uncertainty and risk of further escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange.

I am in no way implying that NATO should declare a no first use policy for nuclear weapons, eliminate nuclear weapons from its inventory, or change its strategy. We would always want to preserve the possibility of a nuclear response, to include a first use option, in order to convince a potential aggressor that the risks of aggression outweigh any potential gains.

The basic challenge to achieving a credible conventional deterrent is convincing the peoples of our nations that the menace to their freedom and way of life is real and eliciting their willingness to make the sacrifices necessary to meet that threat.

The question we must keep before us in NATO is: How long can we let the trend of the ever-widening gap between force capabilities converge with the trend of the growing counterproductive nature of the attitudes and beliefs of some of our peoples before the situation does truly become unmanageable and we experience, especially in Western Europe, political and economic intimidation, coercion and blackmail from the East? Then the Soviet Union would have obtained its long-term goal of dominating Western Europe without having to fire a shot.

This year, 1983, will test the political will and resolve of our alliance. Our first priority must be the deployment of the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe by the end of 1983 unless a satisfactory agreement is reached at the arms talks. The prudent but demanding path which leads to the future we all want—peace with freedom at lower levels of armaments—passes through Geneva and Vienna where success at the negotiating table must be achieved.

Let me now turn to U.S. European Command, EUCOM, and discuss the role it plays in Allied Command Europe and the areas in which we need the assistance of Congress.

The United States has always taken the lead in NATO affairs, a lead which is as necessary today as at any time in NATO's history.

With its national interests inextricably linked with Western Europe, the United States has always agreed that part of its share of NATO's collective security burden would be the forward deployment of well-trained forces in Western Europe with the concomitant commitment to reinforce them rapidly in time of crisis, and to provide the alliance with a capability which it alone among Western nations possesses—a strategic nuclear umbrella for NATO.

Since the alliance began, the relative capabilities of other NATO countries have increased significantly. As a consequence, so have their military and economic contributions to the alliance. At the present time, if NATO were attacked, 90 percent of its ground forces and 75 percent of its air and naval forces would be European.

After 30 days of mobilization, our European allies would still provide 75 percent of the ground forces, 50 percent of the air forces, and 30 percent of the naval forces. Many costs to our allies are not readily apparent, such as the human and social costs of relying on conscription to man their forces and the hidden costs of using scarce European real estate, with no reimbursement, for stationing and training allied forces.

When all factors are weighed, I believe that our European allies as a group are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the common defense burden. What is needed is for all nations to do more.

Let me now turn to those major areas which need the close attention and support of Congress if EUCOM is to be able to perform adequately its priority mission of supporting Allied Command Europe.

The priorities of EUCOM are identical to those of Allied Command Europe: (1) appropriate and adequate support of our men and women in uniform; (2) doing better with the forces in being, (3) essential modernization, to include exploiting our potential to target and destroy the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces with conventional weapons; and (4) adding to our force structure.

The first priority—taking proper care of our troops—is a national responsibility within the alliance. I solicit your continued assistance in improving the living and working conditions of our troops, providing adequate support to their families, furnishing wholesome and affordable recreational opportunities, insuring equitable pay and benefits, and providing proper medical facilities.

The second priority—doing better with our forces in being—as I mentioned earlier, involves meeting the standards set for Allied Command Europe.

Our units must be fully manned at peacetime standards with skilled and trained personnel. Manning requirements are growing with the introduction into theater of such new systems as the GLCM, the TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft, NATO airborne warning and control system—AWACS; the division air defense gun the Bradley fighting vehicle, the tactical fusion center, and the multiple launch rocket system.

The recently imposed congressional troop strength ceiling for EUCOM may force us to change substantially our current programs to deploy badly needed systems or cause us to reduce EUCOM force structure, or both. Between 1983 and 1988, these new systems and other necessary management actions will result in a programed growth of 36,000 troops in Europe.

If the strength ceiling remains in effect, we will be faced with making troop reductions which will directly affect our ability to counter the Soviet threat. Substantial combat unit deactivations will likely occur as well as deferring the deployment of some of those modern critical systems I mentioned.

Such reductions would be counterproductive to our efforts to get other nations to improve their conventional forces. In my opinion, it is naive to believe that by reducing our U.S. commitment to NATO we will cause our European allies to increase theirs. Just the opposite will occur, in my opinion.

The investment of such funds for adequate training—flying hours, steaming days, battalion field days—pays great dividends through attainment of a high degree of individual and unit skill, motivation, and morale, which in turn are vital components of combat confidence.

There is a continuing need for military construction funds to improve troop living and working conditions in Europe. The current year budget request for European MILCON, including family housing and schools, totals $1.1 billion; a significant portion of that amount is to improve living and working conditions.

A part of the European MILCON request, including some family housing, is for base support facilities at ground-launched cruise missile locations. These facilities are essential if we are to field the GLCM on time without causing extreme personal hardship. European MILCON requirements warrant strong congressional support in order to improve retention and thereby the readiness of qualified service personnel.

For Congress to take the attitude "if it is in Europe, let NATO build it" solves nothing, inasmuch as the construction requested for MILCON support does not—almost without exception—qualify under the criteria agreed by nations for the use of NATO infrastructure funding, most of which I manage as SACEUR. And who is caught in the middle when Congress, on the one hand, will not fund the construction and I, on the other hand, cannot fund it under NATO criteria? It is our troops.

The readiness of our forces also depends upon whether commanders have the secure and survivable communications necessary to control their units. The theater command, control and communica-

tions programs in the President's budget are essential to improving force readiness and defeating the significant Soviet electronic warfare capability.

For the deterrent to be fully credible, the enemy must know that he would face not only a highly capable force in the initial battles but also a force capable of sustaining its combat capability with manpower, munitions, and other necessary materiel.

One critical requirement is to reinforce Western Europe with U.S. combat units prior to the time Warsaw Pact reinforcing echelons reach the battle area. Due to the anticipated warning time and the severe shortage of strategic lift in this country, the only viable solution to this problem is to pre-position equipment in storage in Europe.

We have four division sets of equipment in Europe which we are finishing filling. But we are two full sets short of what is believed to be the minimum risk requirement and with which to meet the commitment this country made in 1978 to the Alliance to have six additional divisions in Europe by D-Day.

POMCUS division sets five and six are essential if these units are to reach assigned locations on time. Without such timely reinforcement, early use of nuclear weapons by Allied Command Europe would be unavoidable. In view of its shortage, we must continue to acquire—at an accelerated pace if possible—additional strategic and intratheater lift resources.

Reinforcements are also necessary for our air forces. In recent years, agreements have been reached with our allies which enable reinforcing U.S. Air Force units to use existing host nation airfields, called Colocated Operating Bases, COB's, immediately upon landing. However, the units deploying to COB's cannot be combat effective or meet wartime sortie generation rates without certain minimum essential facilities.

Minimum essential facilities consist of dispersed parking for aircraft and on-base storage for essential supplies. Only a few of the COB's have the necessary facilities today.

At present, the United States has severe shortages in deployed support forces for our ground units. Moreover, we lack the transport resources necessary to move these support forces to Europe in time. The U.S.-German Host Nation Support Agreement of April 1982 represents a breakthrough. For the first time an ally has agreed to furnish substantial support for U.S. combat units. Germany has agreed to provide 93,000 reservists organized into combat service support units to assist U.S. Army and Air Force units as they arrive in theater.

The United States part of that agreement is to procure the relatively small quantities of unit equipment peculiar to the support mission and not available from the German civilian sector in wartime. Much of this equipment will be purchased in the United States and will be retained under U.S. ownership. This wartime host nation support is a most cost effective addition to the combat capabilities of our forces in Europe.

It does seem inconsistent of the Congress to insist continually that we get our allies to do more and then, after we have achieved this breakthrough in allied support, to eliminate the funding of our

part which, if continued to be denied, will result in the Germans withdrawing from the agreement.

Another inconsistency on the part of Congress which is difficult to fathom is the current restriction on purchasing equipment from abroad which contains specialty metals. At the same time, we have current legislation sponsored by some on this committee, which requires that we look to our allies for systems to standardize. The Congress cannot have it both ways. It cannot insist on allied industrial cooperation and also insist on "Buy American."

The third European Command priority is essential modernization. Modernization of theater nuclear forces, together with the provision of support and survivable command and control systems for those forces, is essential to bolster our deterrence and convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously toward desired reductions in nuclear weapons, beginning with the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

NATO needs an improved capability to locate and target and to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy's follow-on forces before they can join the battle. Programs essential to this effort are: Improved all-weather reconnaissance and timely target acquisition systems; intelligence fusion systems with communications connectivity; all-weather on-board systems to enable our aircraft to locate and attack targets at night and in bad weather; and improved conventional air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles with longer ranges, improved accuracy, and high rates of kill against both fixed and mobile targets. We must also exploit fully our capability to wage electronic warfare.

Our current fielding of equipment needs to continue. Congressional support for these programs is well founded. Support of the military construction funds associated with modernization and efforts to correct malpositioning are also warranted.

The fourth priority in European Command is adding to its force structure. The growing Warsaw Pact threat justifies the additional planned forces. Certainly, we should not unilaterally draw down our troop strength in the face of this threat. We need authorization for additional manning to do better with the forces we have and to permit us to modernize those forces.

So, Mr. Chairman, let me summarize briefly the specific areas where European Command needs your support and the support of Congress: Continue in your efforts to permit us to take proper care of our most important resource, our troops, and their families. Provide your support for filling POMCUS division sets five and six, they are essential for timely reinforcement.

It is essential that Congress fund the U.S. portion of the U.S.-German Wartime Host National Support Agreement. I solicit your support for U.S. prefinancing for minimum essential facilities at air force colocated operating bases.

I urge early action by Congress to waive the specialty metals constraint so that the two-way street will not be blocked.

I also need your assistance in providing the all-weather target acquisition, $C^3$ and conventional weapons systems with which to make our defense against an enemy attack manageable by striking his follow-on forces deep in his rear area.

Your continued support is needed for deploying the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's at the end of this year, barring a breakthrough in the Geneva talks.

And, finally, I solicit your support for removing the ceiling on EUCOM's end strength so that we can absorb into its defenses the new and important weapon systems which we need without having to withdraw units which are also essential to its defense and deterrence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to responding to the questions.

[The prepared statements of General Rogers, General Palastra, Admiral Howe, and Mr. Hoehn follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear again before your committee in role of Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, forces which comprise the forward deployed commitment of the United States to NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE). Their role, along with the forces of our allies, is to deter war or, should deterrence fail, to conduct a successful forward defense of Western Europe. At the outset, I would like to offer my perspective of NATO strategy and some of the current security issues facing the Alliance before turning to our forces in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE)

Despite the continuing debate within and among Alliance nations over controversial defense matters, I believe we have a solid consensus in the Alliance about the kind of a future most of us want. It is one in which we maintain peace with our freedom and way of life intact, in an international environment with lowered tensions and reduced and balanced levels of forces and arms. It is on the question of how can we achieve that goal where we encounter divergent views.

It is my conviction that to reach that goal NATO must achieve two closely related security objectives. First, it must maintain a credible and robust deterrence to deter both overt aggression and political intimidation that could develop if our capability and resolve to resist aggression are doubted by the Soviets.

The second objective, dependent upon the first, is that we must negotiate equitable and verifiable arms reduction accords and controls for all categories of forces. Only such accords can halt the arms growth and provide balanced reductions; only such controls can inject a greater degree of predictability into the military situation, thereby making it more manageable and stable. Moreover, successful negotiations must surely be just as much in the Soviets' interest as they are in our own.

To achieve success in negotiating arms reductions and controls we must ensure that the Soviets have incentives to negotiate seriously. This, in turn, requires that our Alliance be viewed as politically cohesive and militarily strong. The political imperative demands, among other things, that NATO maintain its resolve to implement both tracks of its vital decision of December 1979 regarding the modernization of and negotiation about intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). We must also overcome transatlantic Alliance tensions which crop up all too often and which are caused, in the main, by differing perceptions as to how to deal with the military, political and economic issues affecting East-West relations. I believe these tensions can be reconciled if we are patient enough to listen to each other and wise enough to take account of the problems and interests which are peculiar to individual nations within our Alliance.

In addition to the political imperative, there is also a military one. Put succinctly, we need to be perceived as militarily strong and resolute, as being able to implement NATO's deterrent strategy of Flexible Response which requires a triad of adequate forces: strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional.

It is with respect to the conventional leg of the triad that NATO nations have not yet shown the requisite resolve to overcome their deficiencies. By nations' continued failure to meet fully their commitments to improve conventional forces, NATO has mortgaged its defense to the nuclear response. Although ACE gets stronger every year because of commitments that are met, the gap between NATO's force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact gets wider each year. Instead of possessing genu-

ine flexibility, NATO's current military posture will require us—if attacked conventionally—to escalate fairly quickly to the use of theater nuclear weapons. The plain fact is that, if war comes, we will simply be unable to sustain ourselves for long with manpower, ammunition, and war reserve stocks to replace battlefield losses and expenditures. Therefore, we face the serious risk of having no recourse other than the early use of nuclear weapons to defend the Alliance.

This assessment, which I believe to be accurate, presents a sobering view of the Alliance's current military posture. But it is by no means hopeless. I would submit that NATO's military situation, though unfavorable, is not yet unmanageable nor beyond restoration, *if* we resolve to act before it is too late. As a defensive Alliance, we need not match the Warsaw Pact one for one in any area of force comparison. The alternative is to develop an adequate, conventional capability by the end of this decade which will bolster our deterrence by providing a reasonable prospect of successful defense utilizing NATO's preferred response, "direct defense to defeat an attack or place the burden of escalation on the enemy." That is the objective we have set for ourselves in Allied Command Europe (ACE).

To achieve such an adequate conventional capacity NATO must, as a first priority, do better with the forces already committed to ACE. This means bringing them up to ACE peacetime standards for manning, equipping, training, maintaining, sustaining, and reinforcing. We must also modernize our forces and, as we do, exploit our superior Western technology to provide us the means to locate and target, and to delay, disrupt, and destroy with conventional weapons the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they can reach the battle area. If we will exploit it, our technology can also give us the electronic warfare means to disrupt the highly centralized control and direction of Warsaw Pact operational military units.

A conventional capability such as I have described can generally be achieved by the end of this decade if nations will fulfill their agreed NATO Force Goals on the timescale established. SHAPE calculates that to meet these commitments to force improvements, as set out in the current Force Goals for 1983-88, would require an annual average 4 percent real increase in defense spending per nation. This increase would represent an additional sacrifice in the first year, 1983, of an average of 23 dollars for every man, woman, and child in the nations of the Alliance. Despite the economic problems with which all NATO governments are struggling, I believe this amount is affordable and reasonable, and that our Alliance citizens would be willing to pay this small additional premium on an insurance policy for maintaining peace with freedom.

Achieving such a conventional force would result in enhancing our deterrence and raising the nuclear threshold. The aggressor—should he attack conventionally and be frustrated—would then be faced with two options: either to withdraw or to make the agonizing decision to be the first to escalate to nuclear weapons. Faced with that prospect, I do not believe Soviet leaders would attack. They are no more anxious than we to cross the nuclear threshold because of the uncertainty and risk of further escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange, an exchange which they—like we—abhor.

In calling for an adequate conventional capacity which will reduce our dependence on the nuclear response, I am in no way implying that NATO should declare a "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons, eliminate nuclear weapons from its inventory or change its strategy. On the contrary, it is persons who resist improving our conventional capacity who would change the strategy by denying it the flexibility it should have. Improving our conventional capability will not allow us to forego an adequate and appropriate spectrum of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes. We would always want to preserve the possibility of a nuclear response—to include a first use option—in order to convince a potential aggressor that the risks of aggression outweigh any potential gains.

The basic challenge to achieving a credible conventional deterrent is convincing the peoples of our nations that the menace to their freedom and way of life is real and eliciting their willingness to make the sacrifices necessary to meet that threat. They must understand that the situation is not yet beyond restoration. But the question we must keep before us is: How long can we let the trend of the ever-widening gap between force capabilities converge with the trend of the growing counterproductive nature of the attitudes and beliefs of some of our peoples before the situation does truly become unmanageable and we experience—expecially in Western Europe—political and economic intimidation, coercion and blackmail from the East? Then the Soviet Union would have obtained its long term goal of dominating Western Europe without having to fire a shot. People of our Alliance must believe that our best posture is to demonstrate patience, strength, resolve, solidarity, and

consistency of purpose, a posture which will, more than anything else, give the Soviets incentive to seek arms reduction accords.

This year, 1983, will test the political will and resolve of our Alliance. Despite the pressures—external and internal—which will be exerted upon us, the Alliance must be perceived as being politically cohesive and militarily strong. Our first priority must be the deployment of ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II's in Europe by the end of 1983 unless a satisfactory agreement is reached at the arms talks. We must convince our peoples, the young and the old, the vocal and the silent, that the prudent but demanding path which leads to the future we all want—peace with freedom at lower levels of armaments—passes through Geneva and Vienna where success at the negotiating table must be achieved. The gateway to that patch is consensus within the Alliance on the political and military imperatives which I have presented, and which must and can be met if we resolve to do so.

### U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND (EUCOM)

Let me now turn to U.S. European Command and discuss the role it plays in ACE and the areas in which we need the assistance of Congress.

The United States has always taken the lead in NATO affairs, a lead which is as necessary today as at any time in NATO's history. But it is a leadership of an Atlantic coalition which is much stronger and more effective than when NATO was formed some 34 years ago. No longer can the United States expect an unquestioned response from its European allies. The challenge that faces this nation today is to exercise the type of coalition leadership which causes our NATO allies to want to follow. This fact requires firm, positive direction by the United States so that we are viewed as being consistent of purpose. Further, as I mentioned earlier, it requires this nation to be cognizant of the problems and interests peculiar to other individual allied nations and to take serious account of differences between our views and those of our allies.

With its national interests inextricably linked with Western Europe, the United States has always agreed that part of its share of NATO's collective security burden would be the forward deployment of well-trained forces in Western Europe with the concomitant commitment to reinforce them rapidly in time of crisis. Moreover, the United States has always agreed to provide the Alliance with a capability which it alone among Western nations possesses: The strategic nuclear shield for NATO. In addition, the United States, with its national technical platforms, provides the major share of NATO's capability for intelligence collection.

Each of the Allies should meet its NATO obligations in accordance with its capabilities. These capabilities are not fixed. Over time they evolve as societies, governmental policies, and economic conditions change. Since the Alliance began, the relative capabilities of other NATO countries have increased significantly; as a consequence, so have their military and economic contributions to the Alliance. At the present time, if NATO were attacked, 90 percent of its ground forces and 75 percent of its air and naval forces would be European. After 30 days of mobilization, our European allies would still provide 75 percent of the ground forces, 50 percent of the air forces, and 30 percent of the naval forces. Many costs to our allies are not readily apparent such as the human and social costs of relying on conscription to man their forces and the hidden costs of using scarce European real estate, with no reimbursement, for stationing and training allied forces. (There are about 900 such military facilities in Western Europe for U.S. Forces alone.) Most of us on this side of the Atlantic do not realize that during the 1970's, while U.S. defense spending was declining in real terms, the European allies increased theirs by an annual average of 2 percent in real terms. When all factors are weighed, I believe that our European allies as a group are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the common defense burden. Rather than singling out any nation or group of nations for criticism, what is needed is for all nations to do more.

Let me now turn to those major areas which need the close attention and support of Congress if EUCOM is to be able to perform adequately its priority mission of supporting ACE.

The priorities of EUCOM are identical to those of ACE, and they are unchanged from those I presented to you last year. They are: (1) appropriate and adequate support of our most important resource, our men and women in uniform; (2) doing better with the forces in being; (3) essential modernization, to include exploiting our potential to target and destroy the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces with conventional weapons; and, (4) adding to our force structure.

The first priority—taking proper care of our troops—is a national responsibility. I solicit your continued assistance in improving the living and working conditions of

our troops, providing adequate support to their families, furnishing wholesome and affordable recreational opportunities, ensuring equitable pay and benefits, and providing proper medical facilities. Thus, I ask for your support of the military construction (MILCON) programs; the operations and maintenance (O&M) programs; the morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) programs; and the compensation programs that can ensure that our troops are adequately remunerated for the role they play in our nation's security arrangements.

The second priority—doing better with our forces in being—as I mentioned earlier, involves meeting the standards set for Allied Command Europe. We must ensure that our forces achieve their full potential if we are to compensate for the ever-widening gap between our force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact and thus deter aggression.

Our units must be fully manned at peacetime standards with skilled and trained personnel. Manning requirements are growing with the introduction into theater of such new systems as GLCM, TR-1, NATO AWACS, Division Air Defense Gun (DIVAD), Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Tactical Fusion Center, and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The recently imposed Congressional troop strength ceiling for EUCOM may force us to change substantially our current programs to deploy badly needed systems or cause us to reduce EUCOM force structure, or both. Between fiscal year 1983 and fiscal year 1988 these new systems and other necessary management actions will result in a programmed growth of 36,000 troops in Europe. If the strength ceiling remains in effect, we will be faced with making troop reductions which will directly affect our ability to counter the Soviet threat. Substantial combat unit deactivations will likely occur as well as deferring the deployment of some of those critical systems to which I alluded. These reductions would occur at a time when the U.S. commitment to NATO is coming under intense scrutiny by both our allies and our adversaries, and such reductions would be counterproductive to our efforts to get other nations to improve their conventional forces. In my opinion, it is naive to believe that by reducing our U.S. commitment to NATO we will cause our European allies to increase theirs; just the opposite will occur.

The confidence of our troops in the ability of their units to defend successfully is built through frequent, tough, mission-oriented training. Such realistic training is difficult to achieve in Western Europe. It requires frequent deployments of large units to the field, development and procurement of realistic training devices and range instrumentation and expenditure of large amounts of costly ammunition. However, the investment of such funds for adequate training (flying hours, steaming days, battalion field days) pays great dividends through attainment of a high degree of individual and unit skill, motivation and morale, which in turn are vital components of combat confidence. Combat confidence also demands that the serviceman is certain that his equipment will function properly. It is not enough simply to procure advanced weapon systems. The units receiving these weapons must also have the maintenance capabilities and necessary spare parts to keep them operational. This requires adequate levels of O&M and MILCON funding.

With respect to the latter, there is a continuing need for MILCON funds to improve troop living and working conditions in Europe. The current year budget request for European MILCON, including family housing and schools, totals $1.1 billion; a significant portion of that amount is to improve living and working conditions. This would still provide only a small portion of the approximately 50,000 family housing units of which European Command is short. There are locations in Europe where housing is so scarce that families of troops must wait longer than a year to obtain quarters. In many cases, this results in personnel deciding to leave their families behind and opt for a 2-year tour. Turnover and turbulence are increased due to the shorter tours with an adverse impact on readiness. Many of the families elect to make moves within the United States to be near relatives; thus, movement funds are often not saved. A part of the European MILCON request, including some family housing, is for base support facilities at GLCM locations. These facilities are essential if we are to field the GLCM on time without causing extreme personal hardship. European MILCON requirements warrant strong Congressional support in order to improve retention and thereby the readiness of qualified service personnel.

For Congress to take the attitude "if it's in Europe, let NATO build it" solves nothing, inasmuch as the construction requested for MILCON support does not—almost without exception—qualify under the criteria agreed by nations for the use of NATO infrastructure funding, most of which I manage as SACEUR. And who is caught in the middle when Congress, on the one hand, won't fund the construction and I, on the other, can't fund it under NATO criteria? It is our troops!

The readiness of our forces also depends upon whether commanders have the secure and survivable communicatons necessary to control their units. The theater command, control, and communications ($C^3$) programs in the President's budget are essential to improving force readiness and defeating the significant Soviet electronic warfare capability.

Obviously, readiness deficiencies must be overcome since the perceived capability to win the initial combat encounters is essential to maintaining deterrence. But for the deterrent to be fully credible the enemy must know that he would face not only a highly capable force in the initial battles but also a force capable of sustaining its combat capability with manpower, munitions, and other necessary materiel. It does little good to win the early battles if we cannot sustain our forces in combat long enough. Given our current sustainment deficiencies, we could expect to be forced into the early use of nuclear weapons.

The requirement for reinforcements has been defined in SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP). The United States has accepted the requirements of that plan and has made a commitment to work towards their fulfillment. One critical requirement is to reinforce Western Europe with U.S. combat units prior to the time Warsaw Pact reinforcing echelons reach the battle area. Due to the anticipated warning time and the severe shortage of strategic lift, the only viable solution to this problem is to pre-position equipment in storage in Europe. Then our men can fly over, draw equipment identical to that with which they normally train and be ready to defend in just a few days. That is the thrust of our program called POMCUS (Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets). We have four division sets of equipment in Europe which we are finishing filling. But we are two full sets short of what is believed to be the minimum risk requirement and with which to meet the commitment this country made in 1978 to have six additional divisions in Europe by D–Day. POMCUS division sets 5 and 6 are essential if these units are to reach assigned location on time. With POMCUS sets 5 and 6 in place, there is a good chance that those divisions would be able to reinforce in time and sustain defense of Northern Germany using conventional weapons. Without such timely reinforcement, early use of nuclear weapons would be unavoidable.

In view of its shortage, we must continue to acquire—at an accelerated pace if possible—additional strategic and intratheater lift resources. Airlift is essential in the early days of reinforcement, and we must have a greater capability than now. Additionally, we must obtain more fast sealift, as it holds the most cost effective potential for meeting lift requirements after the first 10 days of reinforcement.

Reinforcements are also necessary for our air forces. In recent years, agreements have been reached with our allies which enable reinforcing USAF units to use existing host nation airfields, called Collocated Operating Bases (COBs), immediately upon landing rather than to have to create these facilities over a period of several weeks while aircraft wait to be deployed. However, the units deploying to COBs cannot be combat effective or meet wartime sortie generation rates without certain Minimum Essential Facilities (MEF). MEF consist of dispersed parking for aircraft and on-base storage for essential supplies. Only a few of the COBs have the necessary MEF today.

Another essential element of our sustainment and reinforcement effort is the ability to use host nation assets to the maximum extent possible. At present, the United States has severe shortages in deployed support forces for our ground units. Moreover, we lack the transport resources necessary to move these support forces to Europe in time. The U.S.-German Host Nation Support (HNS) Agreement of April 1982, achieved after considerable negotiation, represents a breakthrough; for the first time an ally has agreed to furnish substantial support for U.S. combat units. Germany has agreed to provide 93,000 reservists organized into combat service support units to assist U.S. Army and Air Force units as they arrive in theater.

This program will make maximum use of equipment mobilized from the German civilian economy and existing military equipment and facilities. The United States' part of the agreement is to procure the relatively small quantities of unit equipment peculiar to the support mission and not available from the German civilian sector in wartime. Much of this equipment will be purchased in the United States and will be retained under U.S. ownership. This wartime HNS is a most cost-effective addition to the combat capabilities of our forces in Europe. It is estimated that the cost to the United States for this German HNS package amounts to about one-tenth of the cost to provide the same capability with U.S. Reserves and about one-fortieth of the cost to provide it with U.S. active duty forces. (Not included in these comparisons is the cost of the additional strategic airlift needed to move such U.S. forces overseas.)

It does seem inconsistent of the Congress to insist continually that we get our allies to do more and then, after we have achieved this break-through in allied sup-

port, to eliminate the funding of our part which, if continued to be denied, with result in the Germans withdrawing from the agreement.

Another inconsistency on the part of Congress which is difficult for the allies, and those of us who serve in the Alliance, to fathom is represented by the current restriction on purchasing equipment from abroad which contains specialty metals. At the same time, we have current legislation, sponsored by some of this committee, which requires that we look to our allies for systems which they have developed before developing our own in order to standardize. The Congress cannot have it both ways. It cannot insist on Allied Industrial Cooperation and also insist on "Buy American". If the Congress is serious about standardization in NATO and having a legitimate two-way street, then it must remove its restrictions which are preventing their achievement.

Even with the best of planning, funding needs cannot always be foreseen. Short-notice, near-term requirements often arise. It would be helpful if Unified and Specified Commanders had the ability to respond rapidly to fulfill such requirements when they impact upon the readiness of their command. The proposed CINC Readiness Fund would help provide such a capability. The CINC Readiness Fund would permit making immediate enhancement to wartime readiness and peacetime efficiency that would otherwise be deferred until they could be accommodated within the programming and budgeting cycle. Instances for which I might have requested or would request such funding from the Chairman, JCS, are: commercially contracted aircraft to tow targets; the running of bombing exercises in Sardinia when aircraft carriers were unexpectedly in the vicinity with training time available; language proficiency training for intelligence linguists; and commercial towing of target vessels for naval surface warfare training.

The third European Command priority is essential modernization. Modernization of theater nuclear forces, together with provision of support and survivable command and control systems for those forces, is essential to bolster our deterrence and convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously toward desired reductions in nuclear weapons, beginning with the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

To increase deterrence and to manage better our defense against a conventional attack, NATO needs an improved capability to locate and target and to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy's follow-on forces before they can join the battle. Programs essential to this effort are: improved all weather reconnaissance and timely target acquisition systems, such as the TR-1; intelligence fusion systems with responsive, reliable, and survivable communications connectivity; all-weather, onboard systems to enable our aircraft to locate and attack targets behind enemy lines at night and in bad weather; and improve conventional air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles with longer ranges, improved accuracy and high rates of kill against both fixed and mobile targets. To improve our conventional capacity, we must also exploit fully our capability to wage electronic warfare against a potential aggressor's eyes and ears.

Additionally, our current fielding of equipment, such as the M-1 tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 attack helicopter, the F-16 and new ships, needs to continue. Congressional support for these programs is well founded. Support of the military construction funds associated with modernization and efforts to correct malpositioning are also warranted. The Master Restationing Plan for some of the U.S. Army units in Europe, currently the subject of talks between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany is a step in the proper direction.

The fourth priority in European Command is adding to its force structure. The growing Warsaw Pact threat justifies the additional planned forces. Certainly, we should not unilaterally draw down our troop strength in the face of this threat. We can neither afford to cut our existing force structure nor reduce current manning levels if we are to keep readiness high. Instead, we need authorization for additional manning to do better with the forces we have and to permit us to modernize those forces.

Using the above as a general guideline, let me summarize briefly some specific areas where European Command needs your support.

Continue in your efforts to permit us to take proper care of our most important resources—our troops—and their families. Here I underscore the importance to our endeavors of the O&M, the MILCON, the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) and the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs.

Provide your support for filling POMCUS division sets 5 and 6; they are essential to timely reinforcement. NATO infrastructure funds have been committed, the two host nations, Belgium and the Netherlands, have acquired the land (not easy in such small, populous nations) and warehouse construction is underway; they are de-

signed specifically to store and maintain combat equipment for extended periods. The United States should fulfill this important commitment.

It is essential that Congress fund the U.S. portion of the United States-German Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement. It is a breakthrough and is cost-effective. Further, your support for that agreement may well determine our progress with other European allies on host nation support negotiations and programs, such as the Master Restationing Plan.

I solicit your support for U.S. prefinancing for minimum essential facilities (MEF) at air force collocated operating bases (COBs) in order to get this critically important program moving. As additional NATO Infrastructure funds become available, I will program what part I can for MEF and will continue recouping funds for U.S. prefinancing of this highly cost-effective means to ensure that deploying U.S. air forces can operate at their full capacity.

I urge early action by Congress to waive the specialty metals constraint so that the two-way street will not be blocked.

I also need your assistance in providing the all-weather target acquisition, $C^3$ and conventional weapon systems with which to make our defense against an enemy attack manageable by striking his follow-on forces deep in his rear area. Your support for electronic warfare programs is solicited.

To ensure better nuclear deterrence, your continued support is needed for deploying GLCM's and Pershing II at the end of this year, barring a breakthrough in the Geneva talks. Not only will these systems close a gap in NATO's spectrum of deterrence, but our continued resolve toward their deployment is also the key to motivating the Soviets to negotiate seriously at the arms talks.

I solicit your support for removing the ceiling on EUCOM's end strength so that we can absorb into its defenses the new and important weapon systems which we need without having to withdraw units which are also essential to its defense and deterrence.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I wish to assure you that the commanders and troops of United States European Command are fully cognizant that our nation is in a period of fiscal constraint and we support the efforts of Congress and the Administration to reduce government expenditures. But we, who have the privilege of bearing the responsibility to defend the lives, freedom and territory of our citizens, also are convinced that security must have first priority in the allocation of national resources. We believe that Sir John Slessor was right when he stated so aptly: "It is customary in a democracy to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with social services. There is a tendency to forget that the greatest social service a nation can provide its people is to keep them alive and free."

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. ROBERT L. J. LONG, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC, DELIVERED BY LT. GEN. JOSEPH T. PALASTRA, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I have especially appreciated the support which we in the Pacific have received from you and the Congress. Our defenses, as I near the end of my tenure as Cincpac, are significantly stronger than when I began, and we owe the progress we have made to your backing and your understanding of the problems we face. I have found my exchanges with you over the years, both individually and collectively, to be useful and productive, and I always look forward to our meetings, whether here in Washington or as you visit our bases and our people in the Asia-Pacific area.

### OVERVIEW OF PACIFIC COMMAND

When I assumed command in the fall of 1979, there were many trouble spots in the Asia-Pacific area. The Sino-Vietnamese war had accompanied the Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea. The Iranian problem was in full bloom, followed soon by the hostage crisis. The Soviets would soon invade Afghanistan, and the Korean Peninsula remained a troubled area. Ethiopia and Somalia were experiencing border problems, and there were numerous externally supported insurgencies in various nations throughout the area.

Today, over three years later, many of these problems persist. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is conducting dry season combat operations in Kampuchea, some of which directly threaten the area near the Thai-Kampuchean border. The Afghan occupation by battle-seasoned Soviet forces continues, and the resulting large refugee problem may pose a long-term threat to the security of Pakistan. The Iran-Iraq war is in its third year, and continues as a potential threat to the flow of Arabian

Gulf oil to world markets. North Korea continues an unprecedented military build-up far beyond its defensive requirements, and its leadership remains committed to the reunification of Korea under Communist rule.

We have seen other political forces at work in the Asia-Pacific area during the last several years. Soviet military power has steadily increased, as I'll discuss in detail later, and that growth of power impacts on the attitudes and policies of nations throughout the region. Vast cultural and economic differences remain between the many nations in the region.

Various insurgencies continue, as well as differing perceptions of the threat. When added to the considerable cultural differences inherent in this vast area, we see little prospect now or in the future for establishment of a large, cohesive alliance system, such as that found in Europe.

### IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA

To the United States, the Asia-Pacific region represents a region of vital economic importance. Our trade last year continued to outpace that of any other region, both in terms of its total dollar value (some $136 billion) and as a percentage of all U.S. foreign trade (30 percent). These figures do not include the additional $106 billion of oil which transitted the Indian and Pacific Oceans last year enroute to world markets.

The region is also an important source of critical strategic resources, including oil, minerals and rubber, to name a few. Of equal or greater importance are vital sea lanes which link sources of supply to our U.S. and allied markets.

The result is that the Asia-Pacific region represents our single largest economic area of interest, and it continues to grow in importance each year. The ever increasing U.S. demand for strategic resources, when combined with the region's increasing marketing skills and newly emerging interest and capability in the manufacture of high technology products ensures that U.S. economic interest in the area will continue to grow.

And as our economic and political interests increase, so must our interest in its security. Maintenance of economic ties for the health and viability of our U.S. economy is important for the reasons I have detailed, but we also need to ensure that this vast industrial and technological capability remains oriented to the free world and does not come under the domination or influence of the Soviet Union or other unfriendly powers.

### SOVIET FORCES FACING PACOM

The Soviet military capability in the Asia-Pacific region continues to grow. The Soviet Pacific fleet now totals over 700 ships, including more than 120 submarines, an ASW aircraft carrier, over 80 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, and over 300 amphibious ships/craft, mine warfare ships, and patrol boats. This very large, modern fleet is homeported in the Sea of Japan at Vladivostok, and at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the past, the vast majority of fleet operations were seldom conducted outside these Northwest Pacific areas.

However, the Soviet Pacific fleet now operates routinely throughout much of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These out-of-area operations, which include modern, capable submarines, have been facilitated by increased use of Vietnamese facilities for forward staging bases. Operations from Cam Ranh Bay provide the Soviets with the capability to react rapidly to U.S. presence and world events in this region, and afford them the least costly and most efficient way to maintain their presence in the region. Military planners must now consider that in the early stages of a general war, U.S. Forces in the area may have to cope with Soviet ships and aircraft staged from Cam Ranh Bay at the expense of other critical mission assignments.

In October 1982, the Soviet aircraft carrier *Minsk* sailed from Vladivostok in Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, on its second out-of-area deployment. This Indian Ocean deployment of the *Minsk* underscored the enhanced Soviet naval capability in the Pacific Command area of responsibility, and served notice to littoral countries of the Soviet Union's capability to project its presence when desired.

The already significant Soviet air threat in the Far East continues to increase. Deliveries during 1982 raised the total of Backfire bombers to about 70. This bomber fleet, when combined with other assets such as Bear, Badger, and Fencer aircraft, provides a formidable long range strike potential in the region. During September and October of last year, naval aviation Backfires conducted simulated strikes for the first time against two U.S. carrier battle groups operating in the Northern Pacific. After three years of intensive modernization, the Soviet Far East-based fighter force is almost completely comprised of new generation aircraft.

The Soviets continue to build their Far East ground forces. In the last 15 years, they have more than doubled to a present strength of about 50 divisions. Furthermore, the Soviets have the mobilization capability to rapidly increase this force to over a million men. These Far East ground forces, primarily motorized rifle divisions, possess modern equipment, high mobility, an excellent air defense capability, and heavy fire-power . . . including nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions.

This steady buildup has not been limited to conventional forces. Modern and capable SLBM submarines regularly patrol the Pacific, providing an impressive strategic nuclear threat. Also, Soviet theater nuclear capability was markedly improved this past year by the continued deployment of SS-20 mobile IRBM's to the Far East. There are now approximately 100 SS-20's (with a total of 300 warheads) based in the region.

This Soviet military actitivy sharply enhances the U.S.S.R.'s ability to project power throughout the entire Pacom area. The concentration of air and naval forces in such close proximity to the United States and to our vital interests in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific is particularly disturbing. In addition to Japan and Korea, these interests include the strategically important Aleutians and the vital lines of communication between the U.S. mainland, Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, all of Asia, and the South Pacific.

The recent reintroduction of a Soviet division and upgrading of Soviet air assets in Japan's northern territories increase the threat to Japan. The powerful Soviet Pacific fleet, with Soviet naval infantry, the growing bomber fleet . . . all based in the region . . . are clear indications of Soviet understanding of the importance of this area, and we expect the steady Soviet buildup and modernization of its far east military forces to continue.

But we also cannot forget that the Soviets do not pose the only threat in Northeast Asia. North Korea continues to expand its offensive military capabilities well beyond any reasonable assessment of its defensive requirements. This well-exercised military machine, which is increasingly less dependent on Soviet or Chinese support, poses a constant threat to the Republic of Korea. North Korea's leader, Kim Il-Sung, has a long-established goal to reunify the peninsula under his control, and can be expected to pursue that objective with military force should he perceive a lack of U.S. resolve to enforce the United Nations Armistice and support the Republic of Korea.

In Southeast Asia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam maintains the largest armed force in the region with over one million men under arms, and contributes to regional instability through its continued aggression in Kampuchea and Laos. Near-term projections are that Vietnam will remain the predominant military power in Southeast Asia, and its aggression in Kampuchea and Laos will continue in order to consolidate its domination over Indochina. Thailand is particularly vulnerable to the potential threat posed by Vietnamese forces massed along its border with Kampuchea.

### STATUS OF PACIFIC COMMAND

As I look over my tenure as Commander in Chief, Pacific, I can point to many important improvements that have been made in our ability to carry out our assigned missions in the Pacific Command. We have received considerable quantities of new equipment for all the services, including some of the newest, most technologically advanced combat aircraft and warships in the U.S. arsenal. More are scheduled for delivery in the near future, and I can assure you that our overall modernization effort is well underway.

Budget increases have improved our war reserve stocks, spare parts, fuel inventories, and ammunition supplies, and reduced our backlog of depot maintenance and readiness-related construction projects. Increases in funds for training and exercises have also contributed to the readiness of our forces. Overall, the approximately 333,000 military personnel assigned to the Pacific Command today are better trained, better equipped, and more ready for combat than at any other time in my tenure as Cincpac.

Much remains to be accomplished, of course. We are only part way down the road toward adequate defense for the region. However, I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to applaud the vision and courage displayed by the members of this committee and of the Congress as a whole in seeing the need for a strengthening of our defenses and for making the painful decisions necessary to allow the rebuilding process to begin.

I realize that even more difficult decisions lie ahead, and I can only stress the pressing need that we see, in the face of the continuing Soviet buildup in the Far East, not to slow the pace of rebuilding our own defense in the Pacific.

In addition to service-sponsored improvements in the Pacific command, we have undertaken several significant initiatives to improve our capability and demonstrate our commitment. These include increasing the near term pre-positioned force (NTPF) in the Indian Ocean to 17 ships. We have also concluded agreements with the Republic of Korea to make use of its national sealift and airlift capability if necessary in a contingency, and we are continuing to push for expanded airfield and port access in the Asia-Pacific region in order to increase our regional response capability.

We continue to emphasize bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve our readiness, and that of our allies and friends, as well as to further demonstrate our resolve. Another initiative is underway to support the freedom of the seas concept. This involves recurring operations, including multiple carrier battle group operations which have taken place in the Sea of Japan and Northwest Pacific.

But there are concerns. Our stocks of war reserves are still not sufficient, and, in some cases, are not pre-positioned in geographic areas where they are most likely to be needed in response to a contingency. This could result in increased competition for scarce strategic lift assets. Further, the Lebanese crisis has had its effect on carrier battle group availability for our Indian Ocean operations. We are also concerned that any future reductions in strategic lift exercise funding would reduce our joint/combined exercise schedule at a time when it needs increased emphasis.

### RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS

We are continually analyzing interactions among our allies and friends. Some of these factors include how base negotiations with one country affect those with others, and the differing perceptions as to the threat. While we, for example, speak to a Soviet threat and therefore the need for greater participation by Japan in its own defense, other nations express concern about a buildup in Japanese military capability. We continue to stress, therefore, that our encouragement of Japan in this regard is confined just to defensive capabilities, to defense posture improvements that would make possible more adequate protection of the Japanese home islands and of vital sea lanes in the 1,000-mile area around Japan. In this respect, we are encouraging Japan to do those things that Japan has set forth as goals for herself.

Further to the South, the nations of Asean are defining the needs and limits of their special relationship. It is our hope that these five Southeast Asian nations can continue to develop their relationship and thereby enhance regional stability through increased cooperation and stability in that key area.

The Anzus relationship is another in which we have a special interest. Australia and New Zealand are two of our oldest and staunchest allies. Both play key roles in the South Pacific region, and Australia, located close to Southeast Asia and at the easternmost edge of the Indian Ocean, plays an active and important role in maintaining the security of those areas as well. We value their contributions highly.

I would also like to note the increasing importance of the democratic Southwest Pacific island nations. I believe we must not overlook the concerns and needs of these particular friends in the Pacific Command area. We should be seeking means to be responsive to their aspirations and to support them in their search for economic development and security.

Our goal is that each country be able to meet its own security needs, which will have the effect of promoting overall regional security. Japan is moving in the right direction. Its cost sharing contribution to our forward presence is some one billion dollars, and we are urging them to do more. Our staunch ally, the Republic of Korea is continuing in its impressive effort for its own defense. Our forces combined with those of the republic have been an effective deterrent for many years.

We continue to enjoy good relations with the Republic of Philippines, and we are hopeful that the forthcoming military bases agreement review will be concluded in a manner which is beneficial to both nations. Our ongoing bilateral logisitics planning initiative with Thailand is another example of regional cooperation and mutually beneficial interaction.

### STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

The steadily increasing qualitative and quantitative nature of the threat requires a realistic and global war fighting capability. History has proven that conflict often begins in the least likely or most remote geographic area, as the British found in

the South Atlantic campaign. Moreover, any localized conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces is likely to expand rapidly, both in intensity and geography, due to the resource and projection capabilities which the Soviets possess. Other Communist countries, on their own or through Soviet encouragement, could enter the conflict to further stress our overall capability or to achieve their own regional aims.

For the U.S., this means that we must have a strong, balanced, forward-based force structure with sufficient lift and sustainability to assure our allies of our commitment, to deter conflict, and to react rapidly. In the Pacific Command area of responsibility, I view the Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific area as exceptionally important.

A polar projection map displays how close Soviet forces are to Alaska and the Aleutians, and to the North American land mass in general. We also have to consider the strategic importance of air and sea lines of communication in event of a conflict, such as those from the oil port of Valdez to the ports on our west coast.

Defending far forward is a crucial factor in our strategy of defense for the U.S. Therefore there is a need to move rapidly to remedy some of our deficiencies in this strategic area.

### FORWARD BASING

The Pacific region is important, the Soviets by their actions have demonstrated a clear understanding of that importance, and we, in having elements of our forces in Northeast Asia and afloat in the region, have also recognized its vital place in the free world. More than the recognition of the importance of Japan and Korea is involved in basing decisions and levels of forces in the area. Our most important defense priority is the defense of the United States. How best to accomplish this may be a matter of debate, but the underlying priority is unquestioned.

U.S. territory stretches far into the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. The Hawaiian chain stretches nearly to the international date line. The Aleutians are just miles from the Soviet Union. The territory of Guam is in the Eastern Hemisphere. We also have obligations to our trust territories.

We have asked ourselves how we can best defend United States territory. The answer has been unambiguous—the best defense is a forward defense.

Reinforcing this answer is the requirement to defend not only territory, but our way of life. Americans enjoy an unsurpassed way of life which depends on a variety of things, among which is free trade among nations. Two of our most important trading partners are located in Northeast Asia, Japan, and Korea. The former is an industrial and technological giant. The latter is a burgeoning regional example of the free enterprise system. The continued existence of these industrial countries as independent nations is important to the U.S. and the free world.

The forward based forces we maintain in the area are modest, given the task which they face and their purpose. Our forces in Korea are important to our forward defense and daily demonstrate our resolve to protect our mutual interests in Northeast Asia. Though our forces in Japan contribute to the defense of that nation, under our treaty agreements, they are equally devoted to the defense of United States. The Marine Forces in the area are mobile and they can go anywhere our vital interests take them. Similarly, our tactical air power is capable of rapid deployment. Thus, our forward deployed forces are counter weight to potential Soviet adventurism in the Northwest Pacific and to any Soviet attempts to coerce our allies.

### ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

Our presence in the area leads logically to the next point I wish to make, allied contributions to Western defense.

Korea spends 6 percent of its growing GNP on defense which aids in the defense of the entire region. Additionally, Korea makes contributions to U.S. defense capabilities through the Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) or "Host Nation Support" as it is known elsewhere. There are significant annual cost avoidances from this program which range from construction of major military facilities to morale enhancing programs for U.S. service members.

We are also working with the Japanese so that they can do more to protect their own country and their vital interests. Increasing sustainability is high on the list, but so is an increase in their self defense force capabilities to counter the buildup of Soviet forces which can threaten them. It is in their self interest to acquire the forces and training necessary to protect their own sea lines of communication out to 1,000 miles. In this area we are conducting a joint study with Japan to determine what such a mission would entail.

Meanwhile, we do not overlook the contributions the Japanese are making to our forward presence. For the coming year, Japan has budgeted over $1 billion for support of U.S. forces. Over $550 million in facilities projects were funded through Japanese fiscal year 1982. Direct improvements in U.S. readiness are being derived from $141 million worth of operational and environmental facilities. The Government of Japan also pays about 15 percent of the labor cost for our 21,000 person Japanese work force. This amounts to $68 million annually.

In short Japan has accepted some of the burden of forward stationing of U.S. forces. It has made a contribution to its own defense and in the long term is planning to do more. We are actively encouraging them by participating with Japan in studies and planning efforts designed to create significant improvements in Japanese capability to conduct the defense of their own country and vital interests, and where these interests are congruent, to aid us in defending our own.

### MILCON

I mentioned in my remarks on both Korea and Japan that they each have undertaken programs to provide military facilities for U.S. forces. Military construction in overseas areas funded by the United States is also needed to support our forces.

Construction in Northeast Asia is designed to provide facilities from which to conduct the forward defense of the United States and our treaty partners. In Korea, for example, projects to upgrade airfields will provide improved force survivability and ensure our capability to sustain air operations. In Japan, the proposed construction at Misawa Air Base, in conjunction with that provided by the Japanese, will permit us to introduce a new airpower element into our forward defense posture. The F-16 will provide greater capabilities for the United States while simultaneously complementing Japanese defense efforts. We have been careful to explain how these aircraft are a complement to Japanese efforts, and must not be construed as a substitute for Japanese improvements.

Thus, as we urge our allies to provide for their own defense, we also recognize that our construction overseas contributes to the preservation of our vital interests and to the forward defense of the United States.

In the Indian Ocean, we are a long way from the bases in the Philippines. The Indian Ocean is a major highway for the world's oil, and is important to the U.S. and its allies.

The United States, through the Pacific Command, maintains a major naval presence in this ocean. Continued access to southwest asian oil is one of our vital interests. The nations in and surrounding this ocean have differing perspectives of the threat to the area. As you know, some nations are supportive of our policies and presence, others are not. If we are to maintain a presence in the part of the Indian Ocean in which our interests lie, bases such as Diego Garcia must be improved. The military construction program there is designed to provide operating capabilities we feel are prudent and necessary to maintain our presence in the area and to respond to contingencies should the need arise.

### CINC'S READINESS FUND

As for the Cinc's readiness fund (CFR), I fully support the creation of such a fund. No effective means currently exists by which the unified Cinc's can rapidly respond to emergent readiness issues that require funds as part of the corrective action.

The normal PPBS process is a very deliberate cycle which embodies long lead times, and which therefore, does not permit rapid reaction to critical unforeseen requirements. Currently, the only alternative is seasonal reprogramming, a very tentative process which competes with many other single service requirements for limited funds. On the other hand, annual CFR allocations would provide the resources to allow each operational Cinc to quickly resolve unanticipated readiness problems, thereby increasing war fighting capability.

The Cinc's readiness fund would provide a totally new capability for the Cincs. I believe that our highest funding priority must be to continually maximize our readiness to fight and strongly support the proposed CRF in fiscal year 1984.

### DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

I believe that anytime United States benefits outweigh the disadvantages which may be associated with cooperative production, industrial cooperation with allies is beneficial.

Several considerations lead to this conclusion. The first is in the interoperability area. It is to our benefit to have allies using common weapon systems which will then permit us to develop common tactics and procedures.

A second benefit occurs, when through cooperative research and development, costs for a program are shared. Both we and our allies benefit.

A third consideration is that without coproduction agreements, certain sales of equipment may not occur. In this light, the increased sale of components and spares aids our production base.

I am well aware of the pitfalls in industrial cooperation. The export of technology, the potential for commercial industrial competition which may result, potentially higher unit costs, and the difficulties encountered in monitoring technical transfer are among the most important.

I still believe that in many cases these difficulties can be overcome. When they are, industrial cooperation is in our best interest.

### MAJOR CONCERNS UPON LEAVING

The progress we have made in training and exercising . . . which directly affects our combat readiness . . . is encouraging. I believe we are making better and more effective use of what we have now than at any time in my 40 years of service. As a result, our people are more ready, more disciplined, and better led than ever before. But again we must sustain our emphasis in these vital areas and provide sufficient flying and steaming hours, air and sea lift funds for exercises, and training munitions and equipment to assure readiness.

As I approach the end of my military career and my tour as Commander in Chief, Pacific, I urge you, the Congress, to continue the momentum. We must not forget that people are our most valuable military asset. We are emerging from a difficult period of too few with too little experience. Thanks to a catchup pay raise over a year ago and to various economic factors, we're currently enjoying substantial improvement in recruiting and retention. But an upturn in our economy or a perception that the military community is not receiving equitable treatment could result in the same problems all over again.

In my opinion, we can provide the kind of deterrence and contingency response capability which we need despite current budget difficulties. Technological advances will likely help in this regard as we receive modernized systems. Innovation can be important as well, and we should investigate new ways to accomplish traditional missions. Standoff missiles, improved conventional munitions, remotely operated aircraft and sensors . . . all seem to indicate that sweeping changes are on the horizon. Some of these innovations may reduce both direct and indirect costs of procurement, employment and attrition.

And as a fundamental tenet, I believe that we should continue to think globally in developing a coherent national military strategy. Focusing on one part of the world may prove detrimental if conflict erupts elsewhere. Our capability must be rapidly deployable and sustainable. These factors should drive our weapons acquisition and planning purposes.

### CONCLUSION

In summary, the U.S. military position in the Pacific has been strengthened over the last 4 years. This is a welcome achievement because the size and scope of the threat has increased dramatically. The Asia-Pacific region has become an area of vital strategic, economic and political importance to the global defense strategy for the United States and our allies. We recognize these factors in our planning.

I'm optimistic about the future if we continue the momentum we have established. Our relationships with our friends and allies in the Pacific are, overall, in excellent shape. But we must continue to tend the garden, if we are to prevent weeds from sprouting. The men and women of the Pacific Command have the highest morale and esprit d'corps I have seen at any time in my tenure as Commander in Chief. It's important that we continue to show them our support, and also demonstrate to our allies and friends that our commitment is strong and unswerving. Thank you.

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### PREPARED STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. JONATHAN T. HOWE, DIRECTOR OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I welcome the opportunity to testify on defense expenditures that support our overseas national security requirements. You have asked Administration witnesses

to comment on eight important international security issues to be addressed in the fiscal year 1984 Defense Authorization Bill. In my testimony, I shall focus on several issues which have important implications for our foreign policy. They are:

Legislative restrictions on defense cooperation;

The allied contribution to Western defense;

U.S. troop end strengths in Western Europe and Northeast Asia; and overseas military construction.

To place these issues in perspective, I should like to preface my testimony with a general comment.

Our strategy of collective defense is a necessity, not a luxury. We simply do not have available a real world choice of "going it alone." It is self-interest, not benevolence, which involves us in a network of security relationships with friends and Allies. Our future security as well as global stability depend on the ability of free societies to make the sacrifices required to ensure our common defense. Because of the growing threats we face, it is essential that our Allies join us in doing more for our collective defense; it is equally imperative that the U.S. follow through on the commitments we have made to this common purpose.

The U.S. performs a unique leadership role—a role which no other Western country can play. It is perhaps inevitable that this role brings with it a disproportionate share of the burden of defending the free world. But we must never forget that our friends and Allies around the world are on the frontlines of our mutual defense. In Europe, our NATO Allies are face-to-face with the forces of the Warsaw Pact. In the Middle East, friendly countries are faced with the threat made tangible by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its increased military presence in Syria. In Asia, our Allies throughout the region also must contend with significant threats in close proximity.

Obtaining the collective defense we need will require continued American leadership and tangible evidence of our commitment. In a time of economic austerity, it will require a special scrutiny by the Executive Branch and the Congress to ensure that the required sacrifices are worth the price we must pay.

Whether or not intended, Congressional action on defense sends signals to both our friends and potential adversaries. The Congress, like the Executive Branch, therefore faces a dual responsibility: evaluating proposals both on their isolated merits and with respect to the foreign policy messages which are communicated. If we reduce an Alliance commitment with no equivalent substitute and no diminishing of the threat, or if we somehow create the mistaken impression that America has lost its resolve or ability to act decisively, we invite questioning about our reliability and firmness as an Ally.

### LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEFENSE COOPERATION

In the past year, we have sent several negative signals to our European Allies concerning our commitment to NATO. These include:

The prohibition on funding for the transportation of equipment for POMCUS Division Sets five and six;

The deletion of funds for the U.S.-West German Wartime Host Nation Support program that provides German units dedicated to the logistic support of U.S. reinforcements; and

Restrictions on U.S. purchases of defense equipment containing foreign-produced specialty metals.

Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) and Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) are two burden sharing programs designed to support U.S. wartime reinforcement of Europe. Withdrawal of funding for U.S. participation in these programs affects precisely those areas in which we have been most successful in obtaining greater Allied financial contributions. To be blunt, these actions may well be self-defeating. These programs are part of the Long-Term Defense Program agreed at the NATO summit in 1978. The Belgians and Dutch, after much urging by us, have spent more than $50 million to acquire real estate for storage warehouses for two POMCUS division sets. NATO has allocated more than $180 million for construction at these equipment storage sites. This program allows the U.S. to reinforce Europe with six divisions soon after mobilization. This capacity is essential to a credible conventional deterrent and is a critical requirment in the event of conflict.

The Wartime Host Nation Support Program represents a precedent-setting exception to the rule that each Alliance member is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces. The Germans would pay slightly over half the implementation costs of this program which commits more than 90,000 German reservists to support U.S. units in wartime. By this innovation, the U.S. is able to send a greater proportion of

combat forces in the initial reinforcement wave by decreasing the requirement for U.S. support forces in the early days of hostilities. It also is substantially more cost-effective to the U.S. than if we had to provide equivalent support forces ourselves. The chances for implementing this program will fade unless the Congress acts promptly and positively. The Germans have said they must know by May 31 if the U.S. will have funds available in FY 83. If not, the FRG will slip the scheduled 1983 activations to 1984. Moreover, the German Bundestag budget cycle requires that the FRG receive some indication from the U.S. by September 1 as to whether we will have funds available in 1984. U.S. failure to fund its share of implementation costs could place the program in jeopardy.

The POMCUS and WHNS programs represent a tiny fraction of the U.S. defense budget. Yet the alternatives are either to forego the needed capability to reinforce Europe in wartime—and thereby weaken deterrance—or to replace POMCUS with a prohibitively expensive increase in air and sea lift capability and replace WHNS with U.S. logistics troops at significantly increased costs. Neither alternative would be an effective use of our limited defense resources. Continued failure to meet our commitments to these programs could jeopardize cooperative efforts on other burden sharing programs.

Congressional restrictions on the importation of foreign specialty metals threaten to disrupt trade in defense items among NATO Allies. They threaten our security by limiting our ability to expand the defense industrial base of the Alliance, increase the standardization and interoperability of NATO equipment, and reduce weapons costs. They also hurt the U.S. because they are eroding defense trade relationships with our Allies that have run heavily in our favor. It is clear from the strong Allied reaction that U.S. companies face an even greater loss in their sales in Europe if the restriction is not repealed. Moreover, the reinstatement of a less restrictive provision, such as the one in effect through 1981, is essential if we are to establish the cooperative defense-industrial relationship with our Allies encouraged by the Congress. Repeal of the present provision would help to overcome European concerns that we may not be prepared to enter into a cooperative relationship benefiting European defense industries as well as our own. This European anxiety is also a potential obstacle to our efforts to interest the Allies in improved conventional weapons and munitions.

These restrictions call into question our commitment to collective defense at a time when we face an unprecedented political and military challenge. They send the wrong message about Alliance unity to a new Soviet leadership. They coincide with continued repression in Poland and Afghanistan and could unitentionally contribute to a Soviet campaign to divide us from our Allies on European arms control and INF missile deployment. They come at a time of intensified Soviet and proxy activity throughout the globe—from Southeast Asia to Central America.

Seemingly punitive measures are likely to undermine, rather than support, the U.S. objective of inducing the Allies to do more. Moreover, it is particularly counterproductive to curtail precisely those programs—such as POMCUS and Wartime Host Nation Support—to which our Allies have pledged resources. Such restrictions, involving a relatively small proportion of the defense budget, cripple some highly cost effective programs.

### ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN DEFENSE

Clearly, the U.S. continues to shoulder the largest share of the burden of common defense. However, in real terms of NATO Allies are increasing their contributions to mutual defense. This is not a recent phenomenon; they have been doing so ever since the early seventies—a period in which our military spending declined in real terms. Both our Allies and ourselves must respond with even greater efforts to meet effectively the common threats we face. We shall continue to urge them—on the grounds of equity, and in the face of a growing threat—to do more.

Defense spending is not, however, the only measure of the defense burden. Many do not realize that our European Allies maintain a greater proportion of their manpower in military service than does the U.S. Over the past ten years, the European share of total Allied manpower has grown. Let me be more specific:

U.S. manpower in Europe is less than 10 percent of the total NATO force there. European active military strength has increased from 3,039,000 in 1979 to 3,221,000 in 1981, an increase of 182,000.

About 3 million European men and women are on active duty as opposed to 2 million for the U.S.

Moreover, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Europeans have been more responsive to our urging that they should share the burden of defending

Western strategic interests in areas outside Europe where we are challenged by a more aggressive Soviet stance.

The Allies are:

Identifying actions necessary to ensure the defense of Europe should U.S. forces be diverted to defend Western interests in other areas of the world, particularly Southwest Asia;

Developing their own intervention forces, for contingency use should Western interests be threatened outside of Europe;

Participating in the multinational force in Lebanon with troop levels twice our own;

Contributing significant forces to MFO in the Sinai;

Maintaining a military presence in the Indian Ocean-Southwest Asia area including a large French garrison in Djibouti, French and British naval forces in the Indian Ocean and British support to the Omani Armed Forces;

They also have:

Deployed forces in certain African countries;

Agreed in principle to provide en route support to U.S. and other Allied force deployments to Southwest Asia in the event of contingencies;

Provided military advisors and training to friendly Middle-Eastern countries;

Contributed significant economic assistance.

Not only our European Allies are doing more. Japan, in a decision of major consequence domestically, is picking up a larger share of the defense burden. Japan is undertaking the defense of its sea lanes of communication out to a distance of 1,000 miles. Prime Minister Nakasone's strong personal effort to raise Japan's 1983 defense budget by 6.5 percent—while most other GOJ budgets were decreased by five percent—was a difficult political decision. Japanese economic assistance has also been increasing over the last several years as japan assumes a greater share of its responsibility as a major world economic power. At the same time, we have told the Japanese that we believe that greater efforts are needed to remedy deficiencies in Japan's defense capabilities.

Our ANZUS Allies also help with out of area threats. The Australian persence in Malaysia and the New Zealand contingent at Singapore serve to support our mutual interests in Southeast Asia. Australia is an important partner in the Indian Ocean.

### U.S. TROOP END STRENGTHS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTHEAST ASIA

In meeting the threats that we and our Allies face around the globe, it is essential that the U.S. have the necessary flexibility to maintain levels of forces appropriate to the threat. The force level at any given time must reflect a dynamic assessment of the changing threat and relative military balance. Statutory ceilings on manpower remove that essential flexibility and could send signals about diminished U.S. resolve which neither the Congress nor the Administration intends. A ceiling at the fiscal year 1982 U.S. troop level in Europe could necessitate withdrawals, a move which our NATO Allies might view as unilateral troop reductions. A ceiling sends negative signals to European publics about the importance of a strong defense, at a time when NATO and U.S. leaders have been warning Europeans that the Soviet threat is growing. Placing a limitation on U.S. troops in Europe gives such warnings a hollow sound and could result in lowering the support of European publics and parliaments for defense expenditures.

Setting an end strength for U.S. forces in Japan would also be unfortunate. First, U.S. forces in Japan are already at minimum strength. These forces not only help defend Japan, they also meet contingencies elsewhere, from Korea to the Middle East. One could argue that defense of Northeast Asia begins over 7,000 miles away in the Gulf where oil tankers begin their journey. Our efforts to convince Japan to increase its defense expenditures would be undercut by any signal that we might be reducing our own force levels in Japan. The prospect of U.S. cuts would dismay other countries in Asia as well. Moreover, alternative basing elsewhere in the Pacific would not provide the forward positioned power required for deterrence.

In view of the continuing arms buildup in the North and North Korea's belligerent posture toward South Korea, a ceiling on U.S. forces there would be equally inadvisable. Such a limit would give a potentially misleading signal to Pyongyang. It could imply some qualification of our commitment or loss of flexibility and would undermine the credibility of deterrence in a still dangerous arena. Once before, we learned the hard lesson of ambiguous signals concerning Korea.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Our worldwide defense strategy rests upon a combination of these forward deployed forces and reinforcement capabilities from the U.S. Deterrence in these regions is enhanced by the ready capabilities represented by prepositioning and access. The alternative to this strategy is "Fortress America"—a concept discredited in two world wars in this century and clearly not relevant in the missile age. In order both to forward deploy and to employ U.S.-based reinforcements effectively, we must have access to front line facilities which are adequate for effective use by U.S. forces. Our facilities access and military construction policies are designed to ensure we can move flexibly.

A number of critical construction project are underway. In Japan the deployment of two USAF F-16 squadrons to Misawa air base in northern Japan will help counter the increased Soviet Far East threat. The Japanese Government has already agreed in principle to fund the expansion of Misawa to accommodate the F-16s. Thus, while this program is designed to fill a military security need, it also reflects our determination to support Japan as it assumes a greater share of the security burden.

Modernization of NATO's INF is necessary in the absence of an equitable arms control agreement to redress a serious imbalance in these forces—an imbalance caused by the heavy Soviet buildup in SS–20 missiles. The Soviets presently have nearly 1300 warheads deployed on longer-range INF missiles, while th U.S. has none. In amassing these forces, the Soviets presumably seek military and politicial advantages. By threatening European Allies they apparently are attempting to decouple the U.S. from Europe's defense. NATO's resolve to modernize its forces and redress the imbalance will strengthen the Alliance's deterrent. It will also give the Soviets strong incentives to negotiate toward meaningful arms reductions. However, the threat is not European alone; the Soviets continue to deploy SS–20s to Asia and to threaten our friends there.

Our military construction in Southwest Asia will facilitate rapid deployment to this volatile region where the Soviets enjoy a significant geographic advantage with much shorter lines of communications. At Ras Banas in Egypt, for example, we have undertaken a construction program to build a basic capability. Improvements will include upgrading the airfield and port facilities and constructing an austere cantonment. Once construction is completed, access to Ras Banas in time of crisis will allow us, following agreement of the Egyptians, to deploy forces near a potential conflict area.

Agreements on access and construction extend to a number of other countries in the region. For example, our agreements with Morocco, Kenya and Somalia give us valuable access rights to airfields and port on the way to Southwest Asia. Our programs involving military construction and access with Oman are in a vital strategic location. Diego Garcia also plays a key role in our prepositioning strategy. This web of agreements and military construction projects gives us credible capabilities in the region, and makes clear to the Soviets that we are serious about deterring and defending against aggression.

Potential adversaries must realize that our defense would be effective. In that way, we can best preserve peace and stability.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we can greatly increase the effectiveness of our own forces and our own security through cooperative arrangements with our security partners. While these relationships grow out of shared values and interests, they are, at the same time, a practical military necessity. As two world wars have shown, maintaining strong alliances is critical to our survival. Unity in peace is an essential element of deterrence. If deterrence fails, that same cooperation is a critical precondition to a successful military defense. No conceivable increase in American money and manpower could substitute for the additional forces, weapons and base facilities provided by our friends. That is why, despite the frustrations of working out an equitable division of labor within Alliances, pulling back cooperation is not a satisfactory alternative. This is why defense cooperative programs have an importance out of all proportion to their relatively small demands on the defense budget. Restrictions on these programs are cause for serious concern. Not only do they decrease the overall military capabilities of our collective defense arrangements, they also undermine Alliance cohesion.

The programs I have mentioned today are essential to our national defense. They are also essential to a credible defense across the entire spectrum of conflict we seek to deter, conventional to nuclear. They are equally essential to our foreign policy

whose principal objective is to preserve peace and the fundamental values we cherish.

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY WILLIAM E. HOEHN, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate. I wish to express my appreciation to this Committee for inviting me to appear in support of the Fiscal Year 1984 Budget Request of the Department of Defense.

This statement offers some initial observations on issues addressed in the Chairman's recent letter. I will, of course, also welcome any questions which the Senators may have on these or other areas covered by our legislative proposals.

To start from a broad perspective, our defense policy is based on the need to protect the security interests of the United States, and, as leader of the Free World, to collaborate with Allies and friends to maintain peace, freedom and security in areas of vital interest. The primary threat to our interests is posed by the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power—growth across the spectrum of strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear, and conventional forces. To deter Soviet aggression and intimidation and, if necessary, defend against an attack, we are pursuing a number of initiatives designed to redress the imbalances and vulnerabilities we face. The initiatives include enhancements to our military posture and efforts to achieve militarily significant, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions and control. Congressional support for these programs is critical.

In the strategic area, we have initiated a comprehensive and integrated modernization program that includes more survivable and effective C3, modernization of all three legs of the Triad, and strategic defense initiatives. At the same time we have proposed strategic arms reductions that would stabilize the US–USSR strategic force relationship at significantly lower levels.

In the non-strategic nuclear area, we and our NATO Allies are pressing ahead in accord with NATO's 1979 decision to modernize the Alliance's intermediate range nuclear forces while seeking at the same time a significant and verifiable arms control agreement with the USSR.

We have also taken steps to enhance the capabilities of conventional forces to help deter and defend against aggression wherever it threatens our interests. We have increased the capabilities and flexibility of US conventional forces to defend not only in Europe but in other important areas of the world. We have increased security assistance to help Allies and friends defend themselves.

More specifically on the subject before us today—NATO defense—we have moved forward on many initiatives. We have sought to enhance conventional defense through improvements that add to deterrence through denial of objectives to potential enemies and raise the threshold at which NATO would have to resort to use of nuclear weapons in defense against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. We are improving the readiness, sustainability, and modernization of our forces and are progressing in a number of cooperative programs for prepositioning for US reinforcements, host nation support, other initiatives for better sharing of defense burdens, and armaments cooperation. The US played a key role in NATO putting forward last year a new proposal in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, where our objective is to achieve a more stable balance at lower levels of forces.

IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Improving the conventional defense capabilities of NATO, including exploiting emerging technologies as part of this effort, is an objective that is strongly shared by the Administration, Congress, and our allies.

Upon the initiative of the US, Allied leaders at the NATO Summit meeting in June 1982 agreed that the military posture of the Alliance should be strengthened, particularly with respect to conventional defense. In addition to agreeing to fulfill NATO force goals to the greatest extent possible, continuing to implement the Long Term Defense Program measures, improving defense planning and cooperation, restricting the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact, and cooperating more effectively regarding developments beyond the NATO area that may threaten vital common interests, they agreed that NATO should explore ways to take full advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies, especially to improve conventional defense.

At the same time, strong Congressional interest has been demonstrated by, among other things, inclusion in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 1983 DoD Authorization Act of a statement of views and a directive that the Secretary of De-

fense provide a study on NATO conventional capability improvement, with special emphasis on development and fielding of systems for defense against second echelon or follow-on Warsaw Pact forces and for counter-air. Secretary Weinberger has recently forwarded the response to that Congressional request. The response includes a report that outlines selected US research and development concepts germane to the air-land battle in the European Central Region, including intelligence and target acquisition, command and control, and weapons delivery systems.

The Secretary has also provided separately to Congress copies of the paper entitled "Taking Advantage of Emerging Technologies to Improve Conventional Defense" that he provided to NATO Allies in December as a follow-up to the NATO Summit initiative. This paper puts forward concepts for exploiting emerging technologies to improve conventional defense and calls for a coordinated, coherent, programmatic plan of action in NATO leading to fielding of equipment in the 1980s. The paper focuses on the NATO Center Region; the Department of Defense is now at work preparing two additional papers for NATO that will address the application of emerging technology to maritime operations and to the Northern and Southern Regions. This will ensure coverage across all the regions of the Alliance.

Four key mission areas are emphasized in the US paper: Defense against first echelon Pact forces and operational maneuver groups, interdiction of Pact follow-on forces, improving NATO counter-air capability, and improving NATO C3I and disrupting Pact C3.

The US paper discusses requirements and possible programs and systems in these mission areas. In an annex, it illustratively lists requirements, relevant technologies, and systems being acquired or of interest to the US and to Allies.

The paper was well received in NATO and is serving as a stimulus for policy level attention on exploiting emerging technologies. The Executive Working Group of NATO's Defense Planning Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary General, is coordinating and harmonizing this effort in NATO. The NATO Military Authorities are providing their views on the subject, and the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), their representatives at NATO Headquarters and the NATO Staff are working this initiative from the armaments standpoint. The whole initiative, of course, is taking into account studies and work that have already been underway in NATO, such as the SHAPE study on attack of follow-on forces and CNAD priority work on armaments and equipment. We expect to review progress in these areas at the Ministerial level during the 1-2 June NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting.

Our approach in NATO has been one emphasizing cooperation among Allies in planning and in development, production, and acquisition, with involvement of industry and military commanders in testing.

We hope that the information provided to Congress will reinforce the strong interest and support Congress has demonstrated in this important area.

### U.S. TROOP STRENGTHS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTHEAST ASIA

As the Secretary has made clear, we strongly oppose any extension of the ceiling on US troop strengths in Europe beyond fiscal year 1983. Despite the President's waiver authority, the ceiling does not allow us sufficient flexibility to respond rapidly to changing conditions and to the needs of our forces in Europe. The build up of Soviet military strength shows no signs of abating, and the US must proceed with high priority programs for force modernization and enhanced readiness. The personnel increases which these programs require cannot be absorbed by offsetting reductions without damage to US military capabilities. Rather than place a ceiling on US troop levels, we need to improve our military effectiveness—not as a favor to Europeans, but in defense of our own vital interests.

In fact, the troop ceiling sends precisely the wrong signal to both the USSR and our allies. For effective deterrence—as well as for successful negotiations on arms control—we need to convince the USSR of our determination to maintain a strong and effective military posture in Europe. The troop ceiling tends to undercut this effort by conveying the unfortunate impression of a reduced US commitment to force improvements. The ceiling also complicates US efforts to encourage greater burdensharing by our NATO allies. We should lead by example, and not by appearing to pull back from programs to enhance NATO's defense. Continuing US force improvements are especially important during the coming year. With crucial milestones ahead on INF deployments, we must show steadfastness of purpose and policy.

Similar considerations lead us to oppose any ceilng on US troop strengths in Northeast Asia. Growing military power of the Soviet Union and North Korea

threatens stability in that area also, and we need flexibility to pursue force improvements when needed in response to changing situations.

LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEFENSE COOPERATION

Recent actions by Congress have raised concerns both here and in Europe about America's commitment to critically needed improvements in NATO's defensive capabilities and to increased defense industrial cooperation to meet NATO modernization objectives. Congressional failure to include funds for the Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement with the FRG and POMCUS Division Sets 5 and 6 in the fiscal year 1983 continuing resolution, and the outright prohibition of funding for POMCUS 5 and 6 in the legislation's General Provisions, threaten the revitalization of NATO's military posture. The Continuing Resolution's restriction on Specialty Metals procurement is not only a roadblock to greater industrial cooperation with allies, but threatens to erode existing defense trade relationships which have run heavily in our favor.

We strongly urge that the Congress reconsider these decisions, and we have proposed remedial language both in our fiscal year 1984 Budget Request and in the fiscal year 1983 Supplemental Appropriations Request which the President submitted on March 23.

Under the terms of the Long Term Defense Program adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government in 1978, the United States agreed to provide a ten-division D-Day force if the allies provided increased levels of support to US forces in Europe. The WHNS and POMCUS programs are integral elements in these reciprocal commitments.

The US-German WHNS program will provide critically-needed wartime logistics support to US forward-deployed and reinforcing troops, without further straining inadequate US air and sea lift and support resources. It is designed to strengthen deterrence and improve NATO's conventional defense capability. This program represents burdensharing at its best. Under the cost-sharing arrangement associated with the program, Germany will assume a larger share of the defense burden. While there is general agreement that our allies need to do more, I believe we will fail in that objective if we unilaterally withdraw from this program.

The prepositioning of heavy equipment for two additional US divisions in the Central Region, for a total of six division sets of "POMCUS" (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) is of comparable importance. POMCUS is necessary to enable the US to implement its pledge of a ten-division D-Day force, in exchange for increased allied support. Here again, our allies have kept their part of the bargain. Belgium and the Netherlands have spent more than $50 million to acquire the real estate for storage warehouses for POMCUS Division Sets 5 and 6. Moreover, the NATO Infrastructure Program has allocated more the $180 million for warehouse construction at these sites. Failure to comply with our undertaking to transport POMCUS 5 and 6 equipment to the warehouses could seriously affect our negotiations with the allies on other burdensharing issues of importance to the US—such as the Master Restationing Plan and host nation support for GLCM basing.

The current restrictions on procurement involving foreign specialty metals are not only a source of politcal strains with our Allies, they threaten trade arrangements beneficial to the U.S. economy. The limited exception for "weapons and weapons systems" provided in the fiscal year 1983 Continuing Resolution is inadequate to cover weapons systems components and general defense items, which are what most allied nations must sell to us to help offset major defense purchases from us. It also excludes raw stocks and bar stocks, which impacts paticularly on Canada, an ally which forms part of our defense industrial base. There are already indications from allied leaders that the present restrictions will seriously impede future procurements of US-made systems and equipment. We believe it essential that existing specialty metals language be modified to allow us to resume defense trade ties with allies which are clearly in the economic, as well as the security, interests of the U.S.

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN DEFENSE

There is no single indicator which can serve as an adequate basis for the assessment of equitable burdensharing. Allied contributions to defense can best be understood by examining and comparing a variety of indicators of ability to contribute, on the one hand, and actual contribution, on the other. Ability to contribute is assessed by such measures as gross domestic product, population, and an index that takes into account standard of living and economic development. Actual contribution is measured by such indicators as total defense spending, total defense manpower and major force holdings.

The NATO allies, of course, make important contributions to defense that are not directly measured by the quantitative indicators mentioned above. Examples of such contributions are allied host nation support, FRG support for Berlin, earmarking of civilian assets for defense, etc.

Allied defense efforts must be viewed in historical perspective. On the basis of historical trends for a variety of major burdensharing indicators, our NATO allies have gradually taken on more of the common burden. This pattern holds both for the current situation compared with the early 1970's, and the current situation compared with the early 1960's i.e., prior to the US buildup in Southeast Asia.

The US is now engaged in an effort to redress some of the deficiencies that occurred during the years when US real defense expenditures were steadily declining. Thus, the burdensharing pendulum is beginning to swing in the opposite direction for some indicators. For example, US increases in real defense spending have exceeded the increases of our NATO allies in recent years.

A summary evaluation, on the basis of various quantitative burdensharing measures, suggests that the US contribution to the NATO and Japanese total defense effort is somewhat more than its fair share. The contribution of the allies varies widely from nation to nation. Among the non-US NATO nations, some measure up extremely well, while a few do very poorly. Japan, by most measures, is doing considerably less than its fair share.

We are especially concerned about the projections for 1982 and 1983 which indicate that the NATO allies will fail to meet the alliance's aim for a 3 percent annual increase in real defense expenditures. Although the NATO allies achieved real increases of 2.7 percent in 1980 and 1981, current estimates indicate a real spending increase of only 1.0 to 1.6 percent in 1982. For 1983, these increases are tentatively projected to be only in the range of one percent. These trends, if they continue, threaten to undermine the progress achieved during the 70s. The US, in contrast, increased its real defense expenditures by 4.1 percent in 1981 and by 7.5 percent in 1982.

### OVERSEAS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

For fiscal year 1984, we are requesting $2.0 billion for military construction overseas. The budget proposes a number of important projects in support of our worldwide strategy and commitments. Of the total, the largest part—some $1.3 billion—will be construction in Europe to support our NATO-assigned forces. These efforts are needed to continue to improve living and working conditions in Europe in addition to supporting major weapons system deployments such as the Ground Launched Cruise Missile, the M–1 tank, the Patriot Missile, and NATO-assigned tactial air reinforcements. Although there are no funds for the Master Restationing Plan in the 1984 request, this initiative, which would relocate 20,000 troops from malpositioned installations to sites that are near Germany's border with the Warsaw Pact, remains a high priority issue with the Administration. We are continuing to meet with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany to work out an equitable cost sharing agreement.

A construction program in Southwest Asia totalling $265 million is needed to support contingency operations and to improve the readiness of our naval units in the Inidan Ocean. Our fiscal year 1984 construction proposals in the Pacific total $349 million and complement construction funding for US forces by the governments of Japan and Korea. Key projects required for forward basing in the Pacific include an ammunition wharf and avionics facilities in Guam, airfield and POL improvements on Okinawa, airfield upgrades in Japan to support new tactical aircraft deployments, and tactical equipment shops and unaccompanied personnel housing in Korea.

For fiscal year 1984, $148 million is requested for base support facilities at five GLCM sites. An additional $60 million is also requested for family housing at the site in Greenham Common, England, and for dependent schools at the sites in England, Sicily, and Belgium. All operational facilities are being funded through the NATO Infrastructure program.

It has been suggested that, because of ongoing arms control discussions, we may be able to scale back some of our construction. Quite to the contrary, maintaining the current construction schedule is the only way of convincing the Soviet Union that we will continue with deployment unless an equitable and verifiable INF agreement is reached in Geneva. The prospect of US GLCM and Pershing II deployments is the only reason the Soviets are at the bargaining table to begin with, and we must not suggest by our actions that we are now less serious about proceeding.

One of our important issues in the Pacific is the new mission beddown of F-16 aircraft at Misawa Air Base, Japan. The introduction of first line tactical aircraft at Misawa begins to address a growing disparity in the balance of forces in the Pacific Theater. In the last three years, the Soviet Union has deployed three times as many third generation fighters to the Far East as the US has in its entire Pacific Air Forces. The introduction of the F-16 will complement current Air Force, Naval and Marine air units in the Pacific. Misawa was selected to base the aircraft because, as the northernmost USAF base in Asia, it best balances the Soviet Far East air threat. In the near term we are requesting $30 million in fiscal year 1984 and planning for $24 million in fiscal year 1985, primarily for operational facilities such as munitions storage and aircraft maintenance. A total of $153 million has been requested from Japan in the fiscal year 1984/1985 period for construction of family housing, unaccompanied personnel housing, maintenance, and base support facilities. Under current arrangements, Japan will be paying some 73 percent of the total long term costs of beddown.

In Southwest Asia, U.S. interests focus on assuring Western access to oil, preservation of regional stability and restriction of Soviet influence in the area. Construction is required in fiscal year 1984 for additional contingency facilities in Egypt and Oman, and for completing operational facilities on Diego Garcia. The additional construction in Egypt, combined with improvements funded in fiscal year 1983, will provide the initial staging capability at Ras Banas that is essential to our Southwest Asia strategy.

### GENERAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Two of the general provisions affecting foreign countries—those on specialty metals and POMCUS sets 5 and 6—are of critical importance. I have singled them out for special attention above. There are a few other provisions, however, which also hamper our effectiveness and detract from beneficial relations with allies and other friendly countries. We would like to see these deleted or modified.

One of these is the prohibition in Sect. 761 against providing in-patient medical care in US military hospitals to foreign military and diplomatic personnel and their dependents in the US on the same basis as provided by their countries to US personnel, i.e., nominal cost. This provision, requiring us it obtain full cost reimbursement, is contrary to two NATO-wide agreements. We objected when this provision was first written into law in 1980, and the problems and protests have only increased since then. Other NATO nations have continued to provide medical care to US personnel stationed away from US facilities at nominal cost, but some of them have indicated they may reciprocate soon and demand full cost reimbursement. Our best estimate is that recovering full cost from all foreign personnel in the US earns less than $2 million per year, of which only a portion is attributable to foreign NATO personnel. We believe the provision should be deleted or, at least, modified to exempt NATO personnel in accordance with prior agreements.

Another provision which restricts our ability to fulfill prior arrangements is the Sect. 766 prohibition against transfer of technical data on manufacture of large caliber cannons. A number of allied and other friendly countries, among them Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany, are manufacturing or have manufactured US-designed large caliber cannons under earlier agreements and have now encountered technical problems or desire to upgrade their weapons by modernization, which would be in our security interests. We have been unable to assist them with technical data since this provision became law in the fiscal year 1982 Defense Appropriations Act. We would like to see the language modified to permit us to provide data on revisions and updates only, but not for initial production.

Finally, we do not believe it desirable to include Sect. (770) 764, requiring advance notification to the Committees on Appropriations of waivers of nonrecurring cost recoupment charges under Sect. 21(e)(1)(c) of the Arms Export Control Act. None of the funds appropriated by the Defense Appropriations Act are affected by such waivers, which are already being reported to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as requested by the House Government Operations Committee in 1981. To date there has been no reaction to the advance notifications already being provided, and there is no apparent need for further duplicative reporting.

### NATO DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

We share the expression of the sense of Congress in the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment for improvement of NATO's conventional defense posture and greater defense

industrial cooperation among the NATO allies. As you know, at the NATO Summit in Bonn, we were successful in obtaining from our allies publicly stated commitments in this general area. The vast preponderance of the 1984 Defense Budget is devoted to the operation, maintenance, and improvement of our conventional forces.

We continue to work within NATO on improving defense industrial cooperation. Reciprocal arrangements have been negotiated with our allies which facilitate both trade in armaments and the joint development and production of new weapons systems. Efforts continue on a daily basis within NATO to further increase defense industrial cooperation and to improve cost-effectiveness. It must be recognized, however, that our European allies will need to organize their defense research and development and their defense industries on a larger scale if there is to be effective trans-Atlantic cooperation in these areas. In our ongoing trans-Atlantic dialogue with countries individually, within NATO forums, and with the Independent European Program Group, we are encouraging the allies to develop a larger and more efficient defense production base in Europe. We are also encouraging US industry to take more initiative and play a greater role in establishing cooperative arrangements and collaborative armaments programs. Congress can play a crucial role in furthering progress in this regard by resisting parochial pressures against broadening the two-way street between the US and NATO Europe, and by eliminating some of the Congressional restrictions I discussed elsewhere in this statement.

CONCLUSION

This concludes my written statement. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee and look forward to your questions.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Rogers. It was a very good statement, a very candid statement. I think we in the Congress ought to be prepared to accept a little criticism from time to time.

I might say, to a large extent you are preaching to the choir here. We had a saying when I was in the Navy: It did not happen on my watch. I think you know this committee and the Senate reacted somewhat differently to these proposals than the House did.

At this point we will go to questions. Senator Nunn, we will let you lead off today.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, I too join the chairman in commending you on an excellent statement. I agree with most of what you have said.

One thing that is puzzling to me, however, is the question of ammunitions stocks and overall supplies. Is it accurate to say that our own U.S. forces now have considerably more staying power in Europe than most of the European forces, or is that inaccurate?

General ROGERS. No, from the standpoint of ammunition that is an accurate statement. We have set a particular standard, 30 days ammunition prestockage for all of Allied Command Europe nations. The United States meets that in almost every type of ammunition. But it has set itself a higher level to be met, because it has to contend with the longer lines of communication to get it over there.

Senator NUNN. What I always have difficulty figuring out is why it would do us any good to be able to last for 35 days if all of our allies—and you have said very clearly, they supply 90 percent of the ground forces at the first outset of a conflict, and 30 days later they are still supplying 75 percent. I think everyone would agree that if that 75 percent after 30 days gave out of ammunition, what good would it do for the other 25 percent to still be supplied with another 15 or 20 days of ammunition?

I fail to follow the logic of that.

General ROGERS. Well, I do not think I have offered the logic for that, Senator Nunn. The fact is that great effort must be expended to try to get the forces to the ACE standards I mentioned, not just in that area, but in manning, training, equipping, maintaining, and reinforcing as well as sustaining.

No nation meets Allied Command Europe's standards, agreed by nations, including the United States although we certainly come closest. We and Germany come closer than any of the others.

Congress provided the capability, I think in 1980, whereby allocation of resources could be made to allies as necessary as and if a war progressed, and I am very grateful to have that reallocation capability. There have been some constraints placed on me by the Department of Defense, but since, for example, 65 percent of our artillery in Central Europe is 155 millimeter in size, I would anticipate reallocating some of our 155 millimeter ammunition to other nations if necessary.

And we do have efforts under way to insure the compatibility of those rounds with the weapon systems of other nations. Most of them are weapon systems provided by us.

Now, I know that there is a point beyond which one should not emphasize this reallocation with his allies during peacetime, because that would tend to cause them not to meet the standard in my opinion; so we do not talk much about it.

Senator NUNN. That is the point. As long as we are going to fill the gap, a lot of people legitimately ask the question, what incentive are we providing for our allies? And the statistic about 75 percent of the forces on the ground in Europe being allied after 30 days is relatively insignificant or meaningless if they do not have anything to shoot.

General ROGERS. I would also say that, although we will be fighting a coalition war—and we must never forget that we will be fighting under Allied Command Europe plans, not U.S. plans—the United States will have two corps among the eight in the central region.

It is also very important we provide the ammunition to our own forces to whom we have made a commitment, in order to at least assist them in fighting, particulary in the CENTAG area.

Senator NUNN. Let me shift to another area. In your statement on page 3, in talking about conventional force capability, you state:

> We must also modernize our forces and as we do exploit our superior weapons technology providing us with a means to locate, target, delay, disrupt and destroy with conventional weapons the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they reach the battle area.

I completely agree with that. How important is this concept of second echelon attack to your ability to deter and if necessary fight a conventional war in NATO?

General ROGERS. It may well be the determinant, Senator Nunn, as to whether we will have to use nuclear weapons, or at least how early we would have to use them.

Senator NUNN. Do you assign this high priority in the overall budget, this capability of second echelon attack, both in intelligence and ammunitions?

General ROGERS. Let me go back to its being not just a U.S. concept, but an Allied Command Europe concept of operation. I assign it a high priority, not only for support by the United States but also the support by all of the other 12 nations who have forces committed to Allied Command Europe.

Senator NUNN. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest priority, where would you rate these capabilities?

General ROGERS. After this year, 1983, since this year's No. 1 priority must be putting the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's on our soil, next would come taking care of our people; third, doing better with forces we have and this concept for attacking follow-on forces. That would be about seven on your scale.

The technology exists. We can exploit it if we wish to. I would put that about No. 7.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Hoehn, you were involved in Secretary Weinberger's presentation to NATO ministries on emerging technologies to improve conventional defense, were you not?

Dr. HOEHN. That is correct, I was chairman of the working group in the Department of Defense and other agencies.

Senator NUNN. And was not the thrust of that report that we had a whole series of munitions and intelligence capability and so forth that could be fielded before 1990, within the next 7 or 8 years?

Dr. HOEHN. That is correct. I believe there are a number of promising munitions, submunitions, and subsystems available that can substantially improve the capabilities of our conventional force posture.

Senator NUNN. Of course, you helped, I suppose, prepare that emerging technologies paper for Secretary Weinberger's presentation?

Dr. HOEHN. That is correct, it was done under my direction.

Senator NUNN. Have you read the conventional munitions study mandated under the authorization bill last year?

Dr. HOEHN. The report recently submitted?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Dr. HOEHN. The 10-page report?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Dr. HOEHN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Were those two reports both prepared by the same Defense Department?

Dr. HOEHN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Or was there a foreign defense department involved?

It seemed to me they were not even on the same wavelength, so different in thrust, tone, priority, and sense of urgency, that it seems to me it came from a different Department. It was not a Commerce Department report, was it?

Dr. HOEHN. No, sir, it was a Defense Department report.

Senator NUNN. How many of these emerging technologies did you identify in the emerging technologies report Secretary Weinberger submitted? How many in the fiscal year 1984 budget?

Dr. HOEHN. Basically, sir——

Senator NUNN. Let me give you four choices: a large number, a moderate number, a small number, or a miniscule number?

Dr. HOEHN. I think that is a little difficult to answer, if only because we have developed in the Department a number of rather large joint programs. So counting each of the joint programs as one each, the number would certainly be small.

But within each of those program elements, we are talking about the development, for instance, in JTACMS, of a missile and a number of associated munitions to go with it; in the JSTARS program, about a collection of technologies to permit surveillance activities and so forth; in the joint fusion program, developing what I regard as the key missing link currently in our ability to adequately exploit emerging technologies—the ability to handle the information flows that will be generated.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you this question, then. I assume—maybe I should not assume. Do you share General Rogers' sense of priority for these emerging technologies, you individually?

Dr. HOEHN. Indeed I do.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe Secretary Caspar Weinberger shares this priority?

Dr. HOEHN. I not only believe it, I have firsthand evidence he does.

Senator NUNN. Are you satisfied that this emerging technology area in NATO has indeed in the 1984 budget and in the 5-year plan has received the kind of priority General Rogers has assigned to it and Secretary of Defense Weinberger has assigned to it?

I am asking your personal opinion now. Are you satisfied that we have in this year's budget and in the 5-year plan given these programs the kind of priority you believe they should have.

Dr. HOEHN. I believe the programs, as they are currently structured and funded in the 5-year defense plan, will lead to significantly enhanced capabilities late in this decade. The only area where I might wish for some better progress, I believe, would be to see whether we could not exploit what we have already been able to demonstrate in, for instance, the assault-breaker technology demonstration program, so as to provide capability that would probably not be the technical equal of what we will get from the current programs, but to make at least some capability available earlier than the IOC's in the current program.

So if anything, I would prefer to see some additional money devoted to technological capabilities that I believe could be in hand somewhat earlier than the collection of programs in the administration's current budget.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean you are saying you are not satisfied with the 5-year plan as it relates to these technologies?

Dr. HOEHN. That I believe is a question of priorities for the expenditure of what will surely be very limited defense funds this year. There are a number of things we would like to do.

Senator NUNN. But you and Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the head of NATO forces have assigned this area a very high priority. It seems to me it is falling behind a lot of other areas that do not have that kind of priority.

Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired. I will come back.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, colleagues, we welcome you again. Some of us were detained at a meeting with your principal deputy commanders from each of the NATO countries, and in a freewheeling discussion we talked at length about the impact of the freeze movement and particularly the resolution now being considered by the House of Representatives on the discharge of their responsibilities.

Would you care to comment on the impact of a freeze movement being adopted by one House of the Congress, the House of Representatives, of the nature now being debated?

General ROGERS. I think, Senator, if I could be just a little flip on this subject, the passage of such a resolution by either House would bring the vodka out in the Kremlin. Certainly it would be cause to do so.

If one believes, as I do, that a major objective we must achieve in NATO is the successful negotiation of arms reduction accords and control measures, and therefore must provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously, any freeze is a step in the wrong direction in my opinion.

It sends the wrong message, not only to the Soviets, but it certainly sends the wrong message to our allies as well. And it plays right into the hands of those movements we have in Western Europe that I spoke of whose attitudes and beliefs, although sincere in most instances, and held by thoughtful people searching for a solution to prevent war, still are counterproductive to our efforts if our efforts are to increase the incentives of the Soviets to negotiate seriously.

Senator WARNER. Well, General, I think my colleagues would agree with me here that there is very little likelihood that type of resolution would receive favorable consideration in the Senate. So it may well be that we will soon be taking up this matter.

On the doctrine of first use, has there been any rethinking on your part on the annunciation of our policy on that doctrine?

General ROGERS. No, sir. I still believe that even if we reach the level of conventional capability which we have set as our objective in Allied Command Europe for this decade, we should retain an appropriate spectrum of nuclear weapons from the short range to the long range with a first use option and the uncertainty associated therewith, so we can maintain our deterrence.

Senator, it is the first use option, plus the uncertainty whether or not we will use it, which is in fact our deterrent today.

Second, there is a tactical advantage. The Soviets need to mass their forces to attack; that is their doctrine. They have to ask themselves: Do we wish to mass since NATO has a first use option and we cannot be certain about their exercising it?

Third, I am concerned about giving up the first use option because I think that would be read, certainly, by the Europeans, as a reduction in our commitment to West European defense and a beginning of the decoupling between the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the umbrella they provide to Western Europe. And we should never let that happen.

So there are a number of reasons I believe we should keep the first use option, even if we had a high level of confidence in our conventional forces by the end of this decade.

Senator WARNER. General, we have in this year's budget again the binary chemical system. Has there been any change in your support for the need for that system?

General ROGERS. No; there has been no change.

Senator WARNER. What about the receptivity to that system in the European theater?

General ROGERS. It is much too sensitive to discuss. We certainly would not wish to engage our allies in a discussion on that subject during 1983. That would be dragging a red herring across the path we are on heading down toward deploying the missiles on our soil in December.

It is a very sensitive subject under any conditions with our allies. But the military authorities of NATO have recently provided to the political authorities a list of questions that must be answered, because under current conditions if we are attacked with chemical weapons the political authorities have not decided whether or not they wish a dialog, a consultation, or what have you, should a request be made by SACEUR through CINCEUR to the U.S. President to release those chemical weapons we have in theater.

As I have said to the political authorities, the Ambassadors, they are abdicating their responsibility to me to make that decision, because I would drop off with them just an information copy of my request for the President. That is not good enough.

So I am hopeful, once we have resolved the question of the ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II's going on our soil, we can, in fact, look at that subject of whether or not SACEUR is permitted to carry out the mandate he has, which is, if attacked with chemical weapons, retaliate in kind.

We need political input into that equation. We have not had it yet.

Senator WARNER. Perhaps this next question you would care to answer for the record. Perhaps we should examine the use of some language in this bill which would restrict those weapons to CONUS for the foreseeable future and inject them into the NATO environment only after certain parliamentary considerations by member nations.

General ROGERS. Sir, that is what I have recommended for a number of years. It will be sufficient for deterrent purposes for the Soviets to see the United States demonstrating its resolve to provide two types of modern binary chemical weapons, one short-range round for artillery and one long-range bomb to be carried by aircraft to reach into the enemy's rear to strike key installations.

We do not even need to face the question of whether or not to deploy them onto European soil. That action I described will be sufficient, in my opinion, their just seeing us produce those weapons, to send the message to the Soviets: You use them and we are ready to retaliate.

Then perhaps two things can happen: Each side would be deterred from using them, as happened in World War II; and second, we provide ourselves for the first time a blue chip at our negotiations in trying to wipe chemical weapons off the face of the earth, which ought to be our long-term objective.

From 1977 to 1980 as we negotiated with the Soviets for the elimination of chemical weapons, she held all of the blue chips.

Why should she give up what she has when, if you assume as I do, she knows everything about us that we know about ourselves. She knows we have not built any chemical weapons since 1969 and that we are running into a wall of obsolescence with the chemical warheads and the projectiles with which to propel them to target. Knowing that, she has no incentive to negotiate seriously, in my opinion.

Senator WARNER. One last question, a people question. It is my understanding that foreign service and civil service personnel serving in Europe are authorized to have their dependent children who are in school in the United States fly on a space-required basis to and from Europe. Military dependents I understand are not accorded the same right.

Is this an important factor in your retention?

General ROGERS. It is certainly important for everyone who has a college-age student, and there are a lot of them in U.S. EUCOM. What happens is, they have to fly space available, and in many instances Military Airlift Command aircraft do not go to some of the places we have throughout the European Command. You know the command includes more than just continental Europe.

We estimated that about 63 percent of our students last year had to pay or their parents had to pay for their flights when their colleagues in the foreign and civil services did not. So we are hopeful that the Congress will remedy that.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first questions are to Secretary Hoehn. I am wondering whether or not we will be receiving our report on allied contributions to the common defense one of these days. We know that the allies are falling below what annual real defense spending increases they committed to each other in 1978. That much is clear already. They are going in the wrong direction.

But there was an amendment which I authored a number of years ago which requires this annual report. It does permit the Congress to analyze what our allies are doing in terms of carrying out their commitments.

I agree with the General, there are a number of measures—I think the General made this point. Perhaps you did also, Dr. Hoehn. There are a number of measures of participation in defense. We have a very specific commitment of 3 percent real growth each year. It was entered into in 1978 at the highest levels of NATO. We are keeping it. The other allies are not.

My first question is, When will you get us the report, which was due March 31?

Dr. HOEHN. We hope to have that within a few days. It is in the final stages of completion.

Senator LEVIN. I take it it will show that our allies are not doing what they committed to do, that their average real growth in defense spending is something like 1 percent this year. Is that accurate?

Dr. HOEHN. I expect the average will be a little higher than that, but it is disappointingly low.

Senator LEVIN. You have said in your statement that the U.S. contribution to NATO total defense effort is somewhat more than its fair share.

Dr. HOEHN. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Would you expand on that?

Dr. HOEHN. I beg your pardon?

Senator LEVIN. Would you expand on that?

Dr. HOEHN. Yes, sir. I think that as one looks at the record of defense spending in a number of regards over the last few years, one would see that at the same time that we have been increasing our contributions to the collective defense, the contributions on the part of a number of our allies have gone down. In other cases, where they have managed to produce some modest increases, the increases come from a very low base, as in the case of Japan.

And this is an area which I think all of us try to work in a variety of ways as we go along. I think that the record in the report that will be provided to you is, in fact, likely to present a somewhat bleaker picture for the preceding year than for the years preceding that, when indeed only a few of the NATO countries were, in fact, meeting the agreed 3 percent level.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying the picture this year is better than previous years?

Dr. HOEHN. Bleaker.

Senator LEVIN. Bleaker. Fewer of the countries are meeting their commitments than in prior years?

Dr. HOEHN. That is true, and some of the countries have not managed as substantial an increase as they did in preceding years.

Senator LEVIN. When I asked the Defense Department a year ago what the prediction was, they were much more optimistic than what really happened. I guess Deputy Secretary Carlucci projected about a 2-percent increase. And you say we are going to get something a little over 1 percent.

Dr. HOEHN. Our current estimate is it will be somewhere in the range of 1.2 to 1.7. Some of the numbers are still subject to some change.

Senator LEVIN. General, would you agree with Dr. Hoehn that the U.S. contribution to the NATO total defense effort is somewhat more than its fair share?

General ROGERS. Well, I do not see it quite the same way he does with respect to what I ask nations to do.

As I said in my statement, Senator, I think it is a fairly equitable share that they are bearing in NATO, when one looks at all of the things they are doing, to include the hidden costs of conscription, to include those 900 U.S. military facilities on West European soil for which they get not one dime in return as revenue or taxes, what it costs Germany to support allied forces in Berlin, the support she gives to Turkey and Portugal, and a number of other such items.

But having said that, as I pointed out in my statement, all nations need to do more. In the NATO force goals we have the only instrument that calls upon nations to reach out and do more, to commit themselves to additional force improvements. And in those force goals for 1983–88 the United States has assumed an obliga-

tion of 3.9-percent real increase for defense expenditures for each of those years.

There are other nations that have assumed over 4 percent, because for all nations, if they were to fulfill their 1983–88 force goals fully, would require an average 4-percent real increase per year for those 6 years.

I am much more sanguine that the United States is going to come closer to its 3.9 percent commitment to force improvements related solely to NATO, than I am about some of our West European nations.

Senator LEVIN. Does it not send a very mixed signal to our friends in Europe when our Defense Department agrees, somewhat reluctantly but finally agrees with many of us in Congress that a 3-percent commitment ought to be reached by our allies—a commitment that was made at the highest NATO level in 1978, and when our NATO commander in chief says, when you say that you think the burden-sharing is equitable?

You are telling our European allies we have got to consider all those other things they are doing, the hidden costs. They were all included in 1978, when the President of the United States and the other NATO allies reached a agreement on 3 percent on real growth. That was all considered, conscription, hidden costs in making that 3-percent commitment.

Do you mean the President of the United States did not consider all of that when he reached an agreement with them?

General ROGERS. Well, if he did, it does not show on the record, Senator. What I am saying is there is no utility to the 3-percent input in my opinion. There is utility in measuring a nation's performance by output, that is, did a nation in 1983 fulfill its force goals.

It is output we should measure, not the so-called 3-percent input, because you can skew those input figures in a number of ways and they can have a 3-percent real increase but much of that increase may not be related to what we need in NATO. A nation might be building some projects or facilities for themselves that have no applicability to NATO.

My belief is that the performance of a nation should be measured by output; that is, having agreed to its force goals, did it fulfill them on the time scale laid out. And if all nations do that it will cost an average of a 4-percent real increase for 1983–88. My plea to them is to meet the force goals as agreed.

The point I made in my text is that we have to convince our peoples there is a real threat to their freedom in the future and if we resolve to act before it is too late the situation is not yet unmanageable. If you take 1983, the first year of the current force goals, it will only cost an additional sacrifice of $11 average for every man, woman, and child in the West European nations to meet their nation's force goals.

Senator LEVIN. I am not arguing with you on force goals. I am arguing about when the President of the United States entered into an agreement on 3 percent real growth, you say it does not make a difference. That is where I have an argument with you.

I think you are letting our allies off the hook. I am not arguing about the force goals. Let us hold them and us to the goals.

But the President of the United States and the top leaders of our NATO allies entered into agreement in 1978, and we are trying to enforce that agreement in Congress. The Germans have zero real growth this year. We will have somewhere between 5 and 10 percent real growth.

And you are saying that is not what counts, it is an important measure.

General ROGERS. You will also find, Senator, that at the heads of government meeting last year in Bonn they addressed themselves to meeting force goals.

Senator LEVIN. I am not criticizing force goals.

General ROGERS. You see, where you and I differ is, I do not think 3 percent makes any sense as a goal.

Senator LEVIN. The President did.

General ROGERS. In 1978 he did.

Senator LEVIN. And this President does not?

General ROGERS. I do not know if this President does or not.

Senator LEVIN. Well, until a change of public policy is announced should you not be bound by it?

General ROGERS. I am not bound, sir, since I serve 16 nations. At the NATO heads of government meeting last year in Bonn they addressed themselves to meeting the force goals, and if they do, it will cost them an average 4 percent real increase per year.

So, if the Congress is going to find a figure, Senator, I would ask that the position of the United States be that expressed in Bonn: that nations should meet fully their force goals. That is what I would like to have done.

Senator LEVIN. I have no quarrel with that. I do think you are undermining an effort when we also try to hold them to another type of fugure, another measure. You may think there is a better one, but until the President says we are giving up on a 3-percent real growth commitment I do not think it makes sense for you to be saying that one does not really make much difference. I just think it is running in the wrong direction.

Senator LEVIN. Let me go on to another subject.

General ROGERS. No; I must set the record straight, sir. the President is 1 leader of 16 in the allied heads of Europe, and it is a decision that will be taken later this spring in the political guidelines that will determine the objective that will be set, and it will be set by consensus, which requires unanimity among all European nations.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Rudman?

Senator RUDMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me thank you on behalf of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for extending this invitiation. I think it is very useful that we have a chance to participate in this hearing since we did, in fact, on our watch, do some of the things I know the chairman disagrees with.

General Rogers, I just have a brief question. I had the opportunity and privilege of meeting with you in your headquarters this past year. It was about that time that you made a policy speech to NATO in which you discussed your doctrine of strengthening our conventional forces to escalate that point at which, if you will, to

make it more difficult to introduce nuclear weapons on the part of both sides, certainly a goal we can all agree with.

In that light, I have this question for you, because the POMCUS sets tend to be less exciting to talk about than some of these strategic concepts, but they are something we will have to deal with in a forthright way in the coming weeks.

It is my understanding that your doctrine would hope for aggression, if it came, to be in a conventional form, and to meet it with a conventional form. That is the doctrine you spoke about last fall. Am I correct?

General ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator RUDMAN. That being the case, I want to ask you a simple question of tactics for which you have more experience than anyone in this room. Does it concern you at all if you were a Soviet military commander and you were going to start aggression in Western Europe with conventional forces, looking at that tactical air capability, which is rather enormous, looking at our air defense capability, which is adequate but certainly not foolproof, that putting those POMCUS sites where they are—I have visited them in Europe—that the first thing that a Soviet commander would do if they were launching this attack against Western Europe would be with tactical forces to wipe out those POMCUS sites. They are all gone. We can bring all the troops in we want, but there would be nothing left.

I would like you to respond to that, because it is a grave concern to me, after visiting those sites in Europe.

General ROGERS. Oh, sure, Senator. We are betting that a number of things will happen. You see, should tension arise, the first thing I am going to do as a SACEUR is request the United States return to Europe the Reforger forces package that we withdrew a number of years ago which are committed to me in peacetime.

Now, if there is any hesitancy on the part of the United States it will be bothersome, because it is important that we send a message to the other side, that is, we know something is going on, we do not like it, and we are going to start reinforcing. I would very shortly ask the political authorities to reach that level of alert that would permit us to have the other reinforcements come to Europe to marry up with the equipment we have stored and get into an initial assembly area before that equipment could be destroyed.

Now, if you take the worst case scenario of 48 hours' notice on our part before an attack, we will not get to the general defense position. We will not get those forces over there to marry up with POMCUS. But if you take what I consider to be—and I will not give it in open session—the most likely warning time that we will get, then if I can get decisions on a timely basis from the political authorities of NATO, and if this country continues to pursue its enhancement of air and sealift, I can get our U.S. reinforcements over there in time, marry them up with their equipment, and get them prepared to transfer to me as SACEUR.

So, the short answer to your question is, yes, it concerns me. Second, the two important factors in the equation are, one, warning time, and two, timely and appropriate political decisions to do the things necessary.

Senator RUDMAN. I understand your answer, and it is certainly a good one. It gives us the two scenarios going back to my very basic military training at Fort Benning. We were not supposed to put three mortars together within 20 feet. But when I visit the POMCUS sites, I find a whole division in the space occupied by the complex of the Capitol.

That is of great concern if we are going to put more and more equipment in there, brand new M-1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and all of the equipment other than ammunition and POL in the area. It is certainly an awful target for tactical air.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. Keep supporting airlift, sir, and sealift enhancement.

Senator RUDMAN. It would certainly be nice if we had enough to bring it all over overnight. I agree with you.

The second question is a brief one, having to do with troop strength. Unquestionably, looking at the manning requirements of the GLCM's, the Pershing II's, and if, in fact, we go forward and deploy, there is no question that there is an increase in that number. My question is, General Rogers, with the climate here in the Congress at this time, is there any way you could make any reductions in other forces without affecting your mission to reduce at least part of that 33,000 to 36,000 increase which you must have if we go forward and deploy if we have no treaty?

General ROGERS. The component commanders on the U.S. side have been directed by me to seek functions that we could give up. For example, there is a manpower cost related to our drug and alcohol abuse program. That is a function we might cut out. Congress would not permit me to do that, and rightly so, but that is what we are looking for entire functions we can give up. We have not found any yet, but we are trying to develop this information by the end of June to report back what our tradeoffs would have to be.

There are some in Congress who think there is "fat" in our system in Europe. Well, if there is, I do not know where the hell it is. And we are looking for it. But, you know, the Congress already has control over end strength. Congress controls the end strength of every service every year, how many each can have.

My plea is, go ahead and control the end strength of the services in the manner you have, but then let the services send those personnel where the missions are, where the functions are that have to be performed. Here we are, trying to enhance our conventional capability by doing better with the forces we have and trying to bring into theater the kinds of modern weapon systems that will permit our defense to take care of the Warsaw Pact initial echelon and to reach back to hit those that are following, and we get a ceiling slapped on.

In fact there is no way that I can absorb a 36,000 manpower cut without having to send units home, and that sends the wrong message to both sides.

Senator RUDMAN. Let me ask this quick follow-on question, then. It is certainly anathema in the armed services, but I will ask it anyway. An enormous percentage of the cost of maintaining our forces overseas is, of course, the support of the activities for dependents which we understand is necessary. There is some talk that in a time of stringent controls and in necessity of fulfilling a

mission, both strategic and tactical in nature, that we reduce the length of the tour and we have a number of people with some incentive pay go overseas for a shorter period of time without dependents, thus eliminating all those infrastructure costs. Any response to that?

General ROGERS. Well, be sure you have your billfold ready, Senator, to pay for the readiness costs that would result since eliminating dependent would require shorter overseas tours. You will have people going back and forth and back and forth, in and out of Europe. You would have to have a big sustaining base here in the United States to support that constant turnover overseas, and you will have the high costs associated with PCS—Permanent Changes of Station. Your transportation costs will go up, as will the training costs. But the major impact will be on the readiness of our forces, Senator, on which it would be difficult to put a price tag.

You know, it takes replacements 2 months to get acclimated to the system that we have over there. Then they are looking forward to going home in the last 2 months. And that is with the professional soldier as well, not just recruits—I use those figures loosely; the service chiefs might not agree with me, or my EUCOM commanders—but there is a period of adjustment. So the amount of utilizable time you get out of them is not too great. But you are going to pay a price, and it will be in the readiness of our services, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. In short, you think that is a bad idea.

General ROGERS. I always have, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Bingaman?

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask just a couple of questions here. On page 8 of your testimony, General Rogers, you make a couple of references to the need for those of us in Congress to support compensation programs that can insure that our troops are adequately remunerated for the role they play in the Nation's security arrangements. Is it your view that the pay freeze the president has announced for the military is going to be acceptable to the troops we have stationed in Europe, and it will not hurt our readiness or morale over there?

General ROGERS. There is no way I can guarantee that, Senator. I do not think you will find many leaving the reservation on account of this year's pay freeze, but do not do it again next year, because 2 years in a row, Senator, will, I think, have the impact to which you alluded.

Part of what is involved is the perception of the individual soldier as to what his country thinks it is worth for him to be in uniform, prepared to risk his life to defend his Nation overseas. Over the past several years, the impression has been created that the Congress "gives a damn" and the administration "gives a damn" and therefore the country "gives a damn" about his service. The Chiefs probably would not agree with me on this, but I do not think you will find many leaving the reservation this year. But it raises questions in the troopers mind, there is a nervousness generated, the pigeons start to flutter, and he asks: Will we have this freeze again next year? Should I reenlist, because I might not get

compensated fully? That is the impact that it has, the nervousness among those about to decide whether or not to stay with us.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask you also, about a subject that Senator Levin got into a little bit. On page 9 you have a statement that it is naive to believe that by reducing our U.S. commitment to NATO we will cause European allies to increase theirs and that just the opposite will occur. I am hard pressed to understand why the opposite would occur.

General ROGERS. Because they would see the United States reducing its commitment, and they would say, "Well, if the United States, whose vital interests are intertwined with ours here and which has said so many times that its defense lie along the inter-German and Czechoslovakian border, can reduce its commitment, they must know something we do not know, and why should we not reduce ours?"

Senator BINGAMAN. On the other hand, when we increase our commitment, we do not see us saying they must know something we do not know, let us increase ours.

General ROGERS. It is my opinion, Senator, that the only way to get them to increase is for the United States to continue to set the example this Nation has set for the last 2 years. I am on the stump most of the time speaking to any forum I can, because my mission is the deterrence of war. That means trying to convince the people, especially in nations which have coalition and minority governments whose leaders cannot or do not lead, that there is the threat to their future freedom and elicit their willingness to convince their parliaments to do more for defense.

On those occasions it has been with great pride that I have pointed to the United States over the past 2 years and said: "There is a nation which has economic difficulties just like the rest of you, and yet, look what it is doing in enhancing its security arrangements at the expense of other programs." I remind them that in the United States for every dollar spent on defense, it spends about $2.50 on social programs; whereas in Western Europe, for every dollar spent for defense, about $7 are spent for social programs.

I maintain that if we can convince the people so they will convince their parliamentarians that they want to do something about security arrangements, that ratio will change. But it will only change after they, the people, have been convinced and their parliaments have heard their voice.

I hate to see this Nation, as it appears likely, reduce or lower the glide path it has been on the past 2 years in improving our security arrangements and in the allocation of national resources to defense.

Senator BINGAMAN. Am I confused? I understood the Secretary to testify in answer to Senator Levin's question that the other countries have, in fact, lowered their glide path in the last couple of years, at least in the last year, and that the report that will be delivered will indicate less of a commitment on the part of some of our allies than we have seen even in previous years. How do you explain that?

General ROGERS. Well, as I say, I am trying to continue to point to some nation—the United States—that also has economic restraints but that can still set the model for the rest of the Alliance,

so that I can say to the other nations that they don't have to reduce defense expenditures, that they do not have to be so satisfied with social gains since World War II, they do not have to be so satisfied with their prosperity as to not enhance their contribution to the common defense, because look at what is happening in the United States.

It is very important to have that kind of model. The frustrating thing is that one does not see the results with that approach one would like. But we cannot quit. If the day comes when the Soviet Union dominates Western Europe without having to fire a shot—which is the greatest concern I have right now—I want some of us, when asked, "Why didn't someone tell us of the menace we faced," to be able to stand up and say, "We did, but you were not listening."

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask you on a somewhat unrelated subject, I was just in my home State of New Mexico this last weekend, and there are many people there who believe that we could effect some very substantial savings by putting greater emphasis on the use of Air National Guard units and properly equipping them, and shifting some of the resources to Air National Guard units, because many of those can be made combat ready without a great deal of additional attention. I would like your reaction to that.

General ROGERS. I really would prefer to have a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff respond to that, Senator, other than to say that I am very impressed with the apparent readiness of the Air Guard units, and those that we see coming to Europe on a periodic basis. Those with whom I deal, I am very impressed with, but I would ask that the question be directed toward a member of the service chiefs.

Senator BINGAMAN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, on page 5 of your testimony, you addressed the intimidation, coercion, and blackmail of our allies. You are concerned about what you see as a trend, a negative trend, apparently, in the attitudes and beliefs of some of our people. Can you expand upon this statement? I sense that this is a considerable worry on your part. It is on mine.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you give us the European perspective? What are you seeing over there in response to deployment of more and more SS–20's, for instance, and other evidences of the ability of the Soviets to intimidate our allies?

General ROGERS. We have been buying our defense of NATO on the cheap because NATO nations have been permitting the United States to underwrite the costs of defense through its providing the theater nuclear forces and the strategic nuclear protection, with the exception of what contribution the United Kingdom makes. We had made our defense dependent on the nuclear response. Then, when this current administration came in, very frankly, the rhetoric of our foreign policy, the tone, the stridency, the militancy of that rhetoric caused considerable problems in Western Europe.

Now, I understand that it was important that this administratin show the Soviets they were going to be dealing with an administration that was tough. We know that. But the language about the use of nuclear weapons and an apparent misunderstanding that a nuclear war might be confined to Europe all led to, in my opinion, the growth of great concern on the part of a lot of West Europeans.

They became fearful of two things: One, war, and second, that that war might be nuclear. They had the impression until November 18, 1981, when the President made his speech on the zero outcome and it was beamed to Western Europe, they had the impression that this was a nation that would rather confront than negotiate, and they were frightened. They worried about nuclear weapons and trying to find a way to maintain the peace. Many of them turned to pacifism, ignoring the fact that the ultimate fate of a pacifist is peace at any price, including his freedom.

Second, you had a large group that turned to the unilateral disarmament movement, and it started again after a period of quiescence in England, as you know, believing that unilaterally disarming was the answer because the other side would follow.

I point out the latest example of a nation unilaterally disarming being the United States in the backwash of Vietnam, when we were on a real decrease per year in the 1970's, yet that had no impact at all on the continual growth of Soviet military might. History will confirm that if you disrobe in the presence of a giant that is armored, you are placing yourself at his good will and good graces.

Others—not many—are attracted to neutralism over there. Yet you would think with the history at the end of the 1930's, they would know that if you are going to be neutral, more is required than just declaring yourself a neutral country. You must be prepared to defend your neutrality from whichever direction it is violated, and second, geography plays a part.

You find others whom I classify as wishful thinkers. They believe that the Soviet Union, because of its internal problems—and they are very severe—will reduce the slope of its glide path of military growth and put some of that funding on internal problems; but there is no evidence that will confirm that.

There is a complacency among some who believe that NATO's having been successful for 34 years in keeping a war from starting, it can do it for the next 34. They ignore the fact that in that period the balance has shifted against us in NATO to the Warsaw Pact in all categories of forces.

It is those kinds of beliefs and attitudes which have grown over the past few years which are counterproductive to our efforts. I think these people want the same thing the rest of us want; I believe we have a solid consensus among that group as well as all of the rest of us that our goal is peace with freedom, with lowered tensions and reduced and balanced forces. How we get to our goal is where we have divergent views. It is my conviction, however, that any time those people take a position which detracts from providing incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously, they are, in fact, being counterproductive to our efforts, and pacifism, neutralism, and unilateralism do so detract.

This year the Soviet Union will not be convinced that she cannot have a veto over the weapon systems we deploy on our soil to deter the use of those weapon systems she has already deployed until she sees us starting to put the GLCM's and Pershing II's on our soil. It may well be we will have to wait until December until she starts to negotiate seriously in the INF talks.

Senator HUMPHREY. You suggest that the Soviets feel they have a veto over our weapon systems at present. Is that what you have just said? Or at least the Pershing II and GLCM's?

General ROGERS. They are hopeful to have that. That would be among the results of their having prevented us from putting those weapon systems on our soil. There are other results, too, but I will not get into them now.

Senator HUMPHREY. The original intention of my question was to get to the effect on our allies of this shift in balance in favor of the Warsaw Pact, as you put it, the deployment of the SS–20's, and so on, the growing conventional superiority. Can you tell us about that? What effect is that having, and to what extent is intimidation in fact taking place from your point of view?

General ROGERS. Well, when one hears some of our allies criticize our negotiating position at the INF talks solely because the Soviets will not accept it, then by some strange logic they come to the conclusion that the position is therefore unrealistic and unfair and they put pressure on us to change the position because the Soviets will not accept it.

Now, that, to me, is tending to play into the hands of the Soviets who have caused us to be in the position in which we have to deploy weapons to deter the use of those systems she has deployed. Those critics tend to feel sorry for the Soviets asking, "Why should we expect them to have to destroy their 351 SS–20 launchers and the two missiles for each?" "Why should we demand something like that?" That is playing right into the hands of the Soviets and is a step toward intimidation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has it? That is my question. Has it led to intimidation at this point?

General ROGERS. Oh, Senator, I still have to be optimistic that we have the guts in Western Europe to do what is necessary.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am asking about our allies.

General ROGERS. When I say we, that is who I am talking about. I am sorry; I speak, we as NATO and United States as United States. I am sorry.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are saying that what appears to me to be a growing pacifism is not the result of intimidation.

General ROGERS. What appears to be growing pacifism or to our not putting them on our soil will lead to intimidation.

Senator HUMPHREY. But it has not yet occurred?

General ROGERS. There are some areas, Senator, where if the people were here, they would say to you, let us do away with all of our Armed Forces and turn our attention to how we can harass the occupying power. So that exists in some areas, but it is relatively small.

Senator HUMPHREY. My colleague, Senator Rudman, mentioned the vulnerability of our POMCUS sites. I myself have toured those sites and noted their vulnerability. In the event we did not antici-

pate soon enough an attack, I assume we would, but in the event we did not, much of that materiel would be destroyed, I would think, and not only that, of course, we are minus two of the sets which you and other commanders consider minimum essential

In what condition are our allies? I realize they do not pre-position, but in what condition are they with respect to war reserves and things of that nature? Are they better off than we? Just in terms of sustainability beyond, let us say, 30 days.

General ROGERS. We have two pre-positionings there, Senator. I just want to be sure I am addressing the appropriate one. We have the pre-positioning of war reserve materiel to replace losses on the battlefield, such as tanks and howitzers and so on. Then we have the POMCUS sites, pre-positioned equipment, and we fly our troops over and marry them up with POMCUS stocks. In respect to pre-positioned war materiel reserve stocks, there is none of our nations, to include the United States that has adequate numbers, although the United States has been improving in the past 2 years.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Rogers. The last time I had a chance to visit with you was at the Wehrkunde Conference. I believe not only our chairman but yourself and, as a matter of fact, all of us were talking about political will. I noticed in your statement you say 1983 will be a determining year on political will between ourselves and our alliance, and just sitting here and listening to your responses to the questions, I think you have really put your finger on the key aspect of what we will face in 1983, and that is political will.

Whether it was an answer to Senators Humphrey, Rudman, Levin, Bingaman—everyone has brought this up, whether we are going to do it. I wondered if you might put it in perspective for us. I really detect—perhaps I am not as optimistic as you—that there is an emergency of the lack of political will. You can look at the contributions of the allies. We can go back to the 1978 agreement, 3 percent real growth, or you can take your force goals, which translates into about 4 percent real growth, and although the 1982 report is not out, I am sure it will be disappointing.

Dr. Hoehn pointed out that Germany is about zero. The United Kingdom has done probably the best job. But at least from a defense aspect, the political will is not there. The defense budget so far in this Congress has been reduced from the suggested 10 percent to 5 percent, and if we are on this type of roll, I just wonder where the reduction in defense spending will come from.

From my perspective it certainly looks—when you look at the modernization from a strategic point of view, which has to be the No. 1 priority, when you look at the readiness the personnel, and the people problems you have to deal with, if you look as far as restraints, it will probably come down in the conventional area, but everyone says we have to build up conventional forces to raise the nuclear threshold. I just wonder if I am correct—and we are looking at a 5-year program of 5 percent rather than a 5-year program of over 7 percent—that some of the restraint will come out of the area of the conventional tactical area, and if so, what does that say for the alliance, and what does that say for the stability of the

world, and where are we going from here to there if that scenario is perhaps not too far off base?

General ROGERS. I would say that it will come from conventional, and if we have to make a cut anywhere, I just have to say to you, Senator Quayle, that among the triad of forces that we must have, the priority must go to the strategic nuclear forces in the final analysis. So, it did not bother me when I was Chief of Staff of the Army that we were spending about 10 percent, I think, on the strategic, and we are now up to 16 percent or maybe a little higher in the 1984 budget.

But what will be cut on the conventional side will not be those things for which there is a big constituency in the Congress—tanks, A-10 aircraft. [Laughter.]

Senator QUAYLE. I notice Chairman Tower is not responding at this time because it is my time. [Laughter.]

General ROGERS. Helicopters, aircraft carriers, submarines, those kinds of things.

Where the cut generally comes from is where you can make the greatest savings in the year, and that is in operation and maintenance funds and in personnel, because those are immediate savings. And yet, I have pleaded every opportunity I have before any committee in the Congress for I do not know how many years, that the operation and maintenance [O&M] fund is the very guts of our business.

You see, from the O&M account we get the steaming hours and the flying-hours and the battalion man-days in the field. There we get the funds to maintain the equipment we have. We get funds to take care of our people, a whole series of the major aspects of our business of deterrence is in that O&M fund.

But if we continue to cut in conventional forces, someone will have to tell the SACEUR someday, Senator Quayle, we are happy, SACEUR, that you have a delayed tripwire that is delayed by $x$ number of days, and though a relatively short delay, we are satisfied with that condition. Push that revolving door just a little further and the next thing you know you are right back at the strategy we had in NATO before 1967, the tripwire, massive retaliation strategy, which we found became bankrupt as the Soviets built their nuclear forces.

That is the message that will be sent by continuing to cut conventional forces. If we cut our forces in Europe, I can tell you there are other nations ready to use us as an example to cut their conventional forces.

I just do not think that this Nation or NATO can permit itself to get back into that posture of responding to threats with the old massive retaliation strategy.

Senator QUAYLE. That is precisely where we would be. If you look at the scarcity of resources, and given the political considerations, along with the strategic considerations, when you start going down the budget, and you have strategic modernization, you have your personnel costs and what you can get by with in O&M, it is going to get cut out of conventional.

And conventional is precisely where you have to build up to elevate the nuclear threshold. You say we can revert back to the pre-1967 policy of a tripwire plus the massive retaliation doctrine, and

I just believe that as we explore this, we would have a far less stable world—I am sure you agree with that—by not building up the conventional forces.

General ROGERS. Absolutely.

Senator QUAYLE. I am not talking tank for tank or artillery force for artillery force. I am just looking at it in a conventional mode.

We heard last year a lot of talk, or at least it got a lot of publicly, on this no first use of nuclear war. Has anyone seriously entertained that as a possibility in Europe? I am not speaking of the United States. I am talking about the European people, in the European military community.

Has anyone seriously considered that a possibility?

General ROGERS. None who bear any responsibility to his nation or NATO. There are a lot of persons out there who do not have any responsibility for the deterrence of war or the defense of Western Europe who speak very freely on the subject.

But among those in uniform with whom I speak and among those in positions of authority in defense structures with whom I speak, I do not find anyone in the vanguard calling for a no-first-use policy, because it does not make any sense. We cannot have a no-first-use policy. We must keep the first-use policy now, because that is all that is deterring the war.

Let me just add a footnote to something you just said, Senator Quayle. You mentioned the United States going to a 5-percent real increase. I do not see how the United States, having taken unto itself the obligation to protect the collective vital interests of itself and its allies, wherever they may be challenged in the world, I just do not see how the United States can do that on a 5-percent real increase in a year. In fact, just to meet the commitments to force improvements included in the U.S. force goals from 1983 to 1988, we in SHAPE calculate will require a 3.9-percent real increase.

So if there is that 4-percent real increase to meet the commitments to NATO, to which must be added what is necessary for U.S. commitments to the rest of the world, a 5-percent real increase will fall far short, in my opinion. Thank God there is a nation that is prepared to accept that global responsibility; if the United States did not do it, no one else would or could.

Senator QUAYLE. I am not saying that is the ideal level of fiscal year spending. My preference would be for a higher fiscal year figure. But I am just telling you honestly, that is probably where it will come out. There may be others who dispute that, which means we will have to rethink our whole strategy. The scarcity of resources is going to be here.

I would like to ask that we talk about the strategies. You got into this a little bit with Senator Nunn, and that is that, given the fact that we are not going to be able to pursue a static numerical balancing with the Soviet Union, it probably would be questionable whether it could do the job, that we are looking at this possibility to integrate and extend the battle to the so-called second echelon.

Do you think we can get the IOC of JTACMS, the joint tactical missile for the Army and the Air Force, by 1987?

General ROGERS. I would have to defer to Dr. Hoehn on that. I would just say that by the end of this decade, which is the objective in Allied Command Europe, I am convinced that we can get the

kind of weapons system that we need to target and destroy follow-on forces, if we make a decision pretty soon to do so.

The first piece of equipment coming into the inventory for NATO is the German MW-1. It will be attached to the bottom of the Toronado aircraft and will have 600 to 700 submunitions which will cover an area target. That is the first one coming along.

Another one coming in is the Durandal runway destruction missile that the United States is purchasing from France. But with respect to that specific one, I would have to refer to Dr. Hoehn.

Senator QUAYLE. Dr. Hoehn, can we get JTACMS IOC by 1987?

Dr. HOEHN. I have considerable confidence that if it is funded at the rather robust levels we are talking about we should have a rather good chance of doing that, provided the program is carefully structured to build up on what we have already demonstrated in the Assault-Breaker technology demonstration program.

If in fact we do not go forward with what we have already shown there, but instead start over with the development of a new different-sized missile, with different guidance system, different front end and so forth, in order to meet sets of requirements as between Army and Air Force users that may drive us in that direction, then I am more skeptical that both the funding and the time currently envisioned would allow you to reach an IOC that soon.

And I think it is very important the program be structured appropriately to draw upon what we have done thus far.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I wonder if I could ask Dr. Hoehn for the record to submit a further explanation on the funding of the Assault-Breaker technology and this joint tactical missile for the Army and the Air Force, to lay out the options we may have as we get into the funding.

Chairman TOWER. Yes, Senator, that question can be submitted in writing for response in the record.

[The information follows:]

Over the period 1978 to 1982, approximately $281 million was spent on the program leading in 1982 to the Assault-Breaker technology demonstration. For fiscal year 1983 funding is estimated to be $9 million. Two programs have emerged—the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS). The fiscal year 1984 Defense Budget request includes $159.4 million for JSTARS ($68.9 million Army and $90.5 million Air Force) and $60.1 million for JTACMS ($50.2 million Army and $9.9 million Air Force). (Related programs support RDT&E on tactical fusion systems that will provide near real-time processing of sensor and intelligence data so commanders can make expeditious decisions on targets to be attacked.) If these programs continue to be funded at these levels or somewhat above these levels, and if the program is carefully structured to build on the past demonstrations, an IOC of [deleted] should be possible. Lower levels of funding or program changes would likely delay the IOCs.

General Rogers, you have answered a lot of the questions I would have raised. Now, given this business of finite military dollars, there are some who are suggesting that to maintain expensive programs we are punishing readiness, and that tend to hold the O&M accounts sacrosanct, proceeding from the apparent premise that readiness is solely the function of the O&M account.

And it is my belief that it is not only the function of the O&M account, but of modernization as well. If we are going to have a state of readiness that will enable us to stay on the same battle-

field as our potential adversaries, we are going to have to have modern equipment as well.

It occurs to me that, particularly in the Army, we have pushed the wave of modernization ahead of us for too long, and it seems to me that we have got to have some balance in allocating our military dollar.

Could you comment on this? And then I would like to ask General Palastra to comment on it from his perspective.

General ROGERS. From the perspective of readiness of forces, the operation and maintenance account is of course extremely important. But we do want the forces armed with modern weapons that can compete on the battlefield, and I think that is what we are finding with respect to—not just with respect to the United States, but also with respect to a number of our NATO allies, that we are providing them with the kinds of weapon systems that can compete on the battlefield. So yes, modernization has to be a part of the readiness equation.

With respect to the bow wave there are tough decisions for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to make with a ceiling on the funds. That bow wave keeps being pushed ahead and programs keep being extended, and the cost of those programs therefore go up. And I know every programing and budgeting season the Secretary and the Chief go through that agonizing business of which ones of all of the modernization programs the Army has developed since we withdrew from Vietnam are the most important and which ones might be cut out.

Sometimes the decisions that they make impact on us in Europe. But I am sympathetic to the problem they face, for example, whether or not the force structure has to be reduced in order to stay both within the manpower constraints and the budgetary-fiscal restraints.

I do not have a solution for that, Senator Tower. But I could list in priority those kinds of weapon systems that are most important to us in Western Europe, recognizing that is only one part of the world in which the U.S. Army has to be prepared to fight.

Chairman TOWER. Did not the much maligned M-1 perform very well in the last three or four exercises?

General ROGERS. Senator, yes, as I have said to so many who have asked that question.

Chairman TOWER. That is one of the systems the critics say we should scrap as being a gold-plated system that does not work.

General ROGERS. Senator, when we were making the decision on the M-1 and also what weapon system to put on it, the 105- or the 120-millimeter gun, it was very obvious to me—when one looked at what the future held—that we needed to go to the 120-millimeter gun if we were going to be competitive on the battlefield.

With respect to how the M-1 is working out, I always say you really should, as you have, talk to a man who drives one, and you will find they are just delighted with its performance and its above 90-percent reliability rate, even during the time of Reforger, where it was worked very hard.

Chairman TOWER. General Palastra, do you have any additional comments on my questions on readiness and modernization?

General PALASTRA. Yes. As Admiral Long has said before the House on the subject of readiness, it has several components, and I would like to, if I could, deal with those pretty much in order. As you pointed out, quite aside from operations and maintenance, one of the primary components of readiness is people.

If you have well-motivated, experienced, well-trained troops, you then must look at the problems involved in getting the personnel that man that force to that high point and keeping them there. In my view that is probably the primary component of readiness, the people who are manning these weapon systems.

A second factor in readiness is, how well they have been trained and exercised in performing the missions for which they have been organized in the first place. There, O&M accounts play a significant part in permitting us the steaming days, flying hours, and battalion field training days in order to hone that fine edge.

Certainly, an extremely important piece of that, as General Rogers has already covered very well, is the modern equipment necessary to stand on the same battlefield with what we see the enemy fielding and testing and putting into the hands of his troops. And in that regard, not only modern equipment, but techniques, doctrine, new ways of assembling and using that equipment, such as embodied in the fight to go out to the second echelon before they spill onto the forward edge of the battle.

Those are the components we are striving for, to take care of our first priority in the Pacific Command, which is improving and maintaining the readiness of the force.

Chairman TOWER. General Rogers, have we made any substantial reduction in our troops numbers in Western Europe? Really, to realize any considerable savings in cost would we not have to dissolve those units, and would there not be substantial costs—you would know this as a result of your former incarnation—a substantial cost in relocating those troops in this country.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. I agree with the response that was provided to you by Secretary Weinberger, Mr. Chairman, when he showed with various sized increments of withdrawals the costs associated if you pre-positioned the equipment in Europe and try to fly the troops back; or brought them and their equipment home and kept them in the structure at a high state of readiness, all of that.

And it was only when you got down to, as I recall his response, the inactivation of those units and replacing them with Reserves, that you had any savings whatsoever. So if you keep the units in the structure, it will cost to bring them home, it will cost to find a place for them to be stationed, and opening up training sites that have been closed.

There is a substantial cost associated with that, particularly when you want to get them back over to Europe in a hurry. You have got to be prepared to pay the shipment cost, which is sizable.

Chairman TOWER. General Palastra, the Appropriations Committee initially recommended a ceiling on troops in Europe because it was unaware of the increase in the number of our personnel there. Has there been any increase in our numbers in Japan and Korea, and how would you deal with the issue of ceilings?

Do you have some of the same problems General Rogers does?

General PALASTRA. There has been a modest increase in force levels proposed for both Japan and Korea over the next few years, roughly on the order of magnitude of 2,000 in each country. These are primarily force structure improvements, such as the modernization of the heavy battalions of the Second Infantry Division in Korea, all are relatively modest force level improvements.

In dealing with the question of how you justify the force levels, where they are in those countries, and the impact of a reduction in those force levels, I think again you have to back up to the point to say, what is their purpose.

Essentially, they are there not only for the mutual security of two of our allies, Japan and Korea, but they are also there to provide for the defense of the United States. They are as forward as possible in the Western Pacific, where they can be much more effective in operations against any type of adventurism by the Soviets than they would be if they were in the continental United States and we were forced to deploy them in a time of crisis.

Any reduction in their level or geographical change of station would be perceived, very quickly, by both adversaries as well as allies as a reduction in the commitment of the United States not only to its role as a genuine Pacific power, but its commitment to maintain peace and stability in the entire Pacific region, in my view it would be difficult to perceive it in any other way.

Chairman TOWER. Well, you have touched on something that reinforces what I have always understood, that it is axiomatic that when confronted by a powerful adversary you maintain your defense line as far from your own shores as possible and as close to his as possible, which leads me to the statement that we are not in Western Europe just for altruistic reasons, that we are there because we regard it to be in our naticnal interest.

And therefore, General Rogers, regardless of what Europeans do, if we continue to identify our national interests in Western Europe, should we not maintain whatever capability we can to defend our interests in that region? And should we degrade that capability substantially, would we not be putting the remaining troops there in Western Europe at greater risk?

General ROGERS. There is no question about that in my mind, Mr. Chairman. It would be counter to the vital interests of this country. It would start the unraveling of NATO, and I just think it would move the Soviet Union farther down the road she has been on, which is to dominate Western Europe without ever having had to fire a shot.

We have a commitment to those forces we have over there, our own forces, not just the forces of——

Chairman TOWER. That is what I am talking about, our own forces.

General ROGERS. We have a commitment to our own forces, that is right.

Chairman TOWER. If we take some and leave some there, do we not lower the threshold of the risk for the Soviets mounting an invasion of Europe and put the troops there at greater risk?

General ROGERS. Absolutely.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. On that last point, General Rogers——

Chairman TOWER. Oh, wait, Sam. I am sorry.

Senator Wilson had left the room and has now returned. Let me recognize him.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, first let me join the others who have congratulated you on your testimony. I think it is very cogent, very candid, and I think very valuable.

Sir, I heard just the last part of your response to the chairman. Given the importance you place upon the adequacy of our troop strength in Europe—and you have argued persuasively for increasing our troop commitments—would you agree if the defense budget does not permit the achievement of all the objectives for which you have argued that we would do well to achieve the procurement that is required for modernization, both strategic and conventional and, if there must be some drawdown, that it not occur in the NATO theater, but in other less sensitive commands?

General ROGERS. Well, every commander has his problems, but when one looks at the priorities of the United States as established in our defense guidance, the security of Western Europe is second only to the defense of the homeland.

And if that is, in fact, the priority of this Nation, then it would seem that we should do what we can to retain that priority when it comes to the retention of the strength in Western Europe and when it comes to doing better with the forces we already have there, which, other than taking care of our people properly as I mention in my text, is the second priority we have, to insure we meet the standards across the board as established by Allied Command Europe.

So the short answer is "Yes," Senator.

Senator WILSON. I suppose there might be some who would accuse me of having led the witness on that. [Laughter.]

Let me ask you further, in your statement in summary, you spoke of the need to increase troop strength there and said that requirement is impelled in part by the introduction of new weapons systems such as the Bradley fighting vehicle, the M-1, the Apache.

While you think it is a poor idea to do either, if compelled to choose would you opt for the full level of procurement or for the full level of troop strength?

General ROGERS. Tough choice, Senator.

Senator WILSON. It is indeed.

General ROGERS. But the troop strength is more important to me. The maintenance of the numbers of brigades and artillery battalions, et cetera, would have to come out more important to me than the procurement.

What it means is, though, we would be fighting with lesser capability, obviously, than we would if you put in the manpower cost of—I will just give you a figure here for the U.S. Army—of about 6,472 additional strength for the multiple-launcher rocket system, additional tanks, the Patriot, the attack helicopter, the Bradley, the DIVAD. That is the 6,400.

Those are pretty good capabilities, and there are some others. I have not mentioned some on the Air Force side. But the short answer is, keep the strength. What you are saying to me is, you are

assuming we are going to keep the ceiling and within that ceiling you are also saying to me that we are going to reduce the procurement.

I do not think one has to follow the other. If you reduce the procurement and stretch out the program, I still would need to have those weapon systems in-theater some time during that timeframe.

So my plea to you is to continue to take the position this committee did before on the floor of the Senate, which was not to have a ceiling and to control the strength of the services at the service level and not at the theater level. I know that Congress bears the responsibility by the Constitution to raise and support armies. But I just do not believe Congress wants to get into the position of saying how the services are to dispose of their manpower in order to accomplish the mission which the Congress has assigned to them.

That just does not seem appropriate to me, so long as you have that very tight control, which you have every year, as to the numbers each service can have. Then the services have to figure it out, how they will solve those missions and Congress should not.

I just do not know why Congress wants in that business, Senator, but I suspect the answer does not lie in this room, at least at this table. [Laughter.]

Senator WILSON. I suspect you are right.

I also would be interested in knowing the priority you assign to a specific weapons system, the DIVAD.

General ROGERS. I was there, Senator, when we made the decision to go for the DIVAD and I still think that is a good decision. It embarrassed me, for example, in the early sixties when I was Chief of Staff of a division in Bavaria and in order to have a weapon system of that type to defend bridge sites we were using to move our troops from their billet area to the general defensive position that I had to go to the Germans to borrow those kinds of weapon systems to use.

Now it has taken us a long time to get to where we are, and that is a very important weapon system down at the division level. But, Senator, if you were giving me choices among weapon systems, I might not put that right at the top. But you are not going to ask me for a priority list of weapons systems, I suspect, anyway.

Senator WILSON. Not in this round of questioning.

I gather there is not to be a closed session, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I do not anticipate a closed session. General Rogers has to get back to work. We cannot keep him here too long.

Senator WILSON. I understand he has other things to do than entertain Senators; however, given this responsibility I would be interested given his responsibility in his prioritizing of weapons systems. It would be most informative.

I suspect my time is up.

Chairman TOWER. We will go to the second round, and we will limit the second round to 5 minutes each. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, you mentioned priorities two or three times. It would be helpful if you would furnish for the record, and it could be classified, if you so choose, your sense of priorities. I am not talking about every weapon system, but the sense of prior-

ities you have as far as NATO is concerned and U.S. forces are concerned.

We talked about it some today, but if you could give us broad categories at least, it would be helpful. You mentioned a minute ago in response to a question that on the first use—and I am not sure I heard your response correctly—but you said all we have got as a deterrent is the first-use possibility. We do not have anything else.

Do you really mean to go that far?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. It is my assessment and the one that I have provided to the Ministers of Defense, that if attacked conventionally we will have to resort to the nuclear response by D-plus-X day, and how long a period that is is contingent upon a number of variables.

I mentioned two important variables earlier today—warning time and the appropriate and timely decisions from political authorities.

Senator NUNN. Some people would conclude from that that we are really back to the tripwire theory and if we are going to have a tripwire a lot of people would say it does not make a difference whether you have 20,000 troops there or 200,000, that you have a tripwire one way and a tripwire the other.

It seems to me we are spending enormous amounts of money on conventional defense, if all we have is first-use. I am not arguing that we should do away with first-use, but if that is all we have got, you could make a strong case we are wasting a lot of money.

General ROGERS. That may seem logical, but I do not agree that that is necessarily what we ought to do or permit to happen. I mentioned earlier that the strategy I can fulfill today is a strategy of the delayed tripwire, and it is delayed by a number of days, as I mentioned. But the day comes when under the political guidance which I function I must go to the political authorities and ask for the release of nuclear weapons. We have built ourselves a short conventional war in NATO as a result of lack of sustainability—manpower, ammunition, and pre-positioned wartime material stocks.

Now as I mentioned earlier, people wring their hands about the possible use of nuclear weapons and yet you ask them if they are prepared to do something about reducing the dependence on the nuclear response, and the answer is usually no. They are not prepared to raise the nuclear threshold and enhance our deterrence by improving conventional forces.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you this way. If you get everything you want, everything you need that you have requested and is a part of a long-range NATO program, plus second echelon and so forth, at what stage would you be able to testify before this committee, in what approximately year, that you no longer have even a delayed tripwire, but a viable, credible conventional defense?

General ROGERS. At the end of this decade, Senator, if nations fulfill their force goals on the timescale laid out—knowing that we adjust those force goals every 2 years—as we push through this decade and nations fulfill their commitments on the timetable laid out, we will generally have the kind of a conventional defense

which will give us a reasonable prospect of frustrating a conventional attack.

Now there are some well-chosen words in that answer—generally and with a reasonable prospect—and I use them because no one can be sure in time of war that you have what is needed to win. You cannot even test how strong your basketball team is until you put them on the floor against the University of Georgia, for example.

So you would always be uncertain, but certainly as a minimum it would raise the nuclear threshold and delay considerably the use of nuclear weapons.

Now I think if the Soviet Union saw us with that posture, knowing that they would only have two options should they attack conventionally—one to withdraw and the other to escalate on their volition—I do not think they would attack in the first place because of their concern about further escalation to the strategic exchange.

I need to clarify one thing with you, but I do not want to do it on your 5 minutes, if the chairman would permit me.

Chairman TOWER. Go ahead.

General ROGERS. When you talked to Dr. Hoehn, Senator, you were speaking about the report as to what was being done to improve the NATO conventional capability. I need to put that in the context of Allied Command Europe. I must say to you that as far as the United States is concerned the Department of Defense has been extremely supportive of the SACEUR in his efforts to try to get the nations to look toward procuring the types of weapon systems we need for the deep attack.

For example, Dr. DeLauer made it possible to pull together sufficient resources to send over to me last year what we call the limited operational capability for Europe of joint tactical fusion center, which we are using as the means to convince our allies that this is the way we need to go.

All of our intelligence sensors feed into the center. The commander can make a decision and get the information out to an appropriate weapons system to attack. DOD has been very supportive. On the Allied Command Europe side, things are moving much more slowly. I made the decision in the spring of 1981, about the ACE concept for the attack of follow-on forces—different from the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle because there are some things in that conceptual approach that do not apply to the defense of Western Europe.

But it was not until the spring of 1982, the early spring of 1982, that we really felt we were on fairly firm ground on this concept. Now I am required by the long-term planning cycle of NATO to send forward the guidelines on this ACE concept and the mission need documents, which eventually will get to the conference of NATO armament directors, who will decide how NATO will fulfill the requirements for the targeting and weapon systems which the concept needs if is it to be used.

So it really is not the decision of the United States on this matter. The United States needs to keep pushing ahead, as it is on this joint tactical missile and on the joint strategic target attack radar, and so on, all of those kinds of systems, because it is very

important to us in Allied Command Europe for allies to see that these systems can give us the conventional capability we seek.

But meantime SHAPE has a lot of work to do, and a lot of it is my responsibility to get 16 nations to agree on the guidelines for the concept and mission need documents which lay out the requirement for the kinds of equipment we need to carry it out.

We are hopeful of having the guidelines forward in May. We are hopeful of having by this fall the mission need documents so that those armament directors can pull it all together.

What I would hope is that we could get a consortium of West European nations to exploit the technology of all of the nations—it is not unique with the United States—and pull this whole thing together, with the United States doing something or other to bear its share. A number of the European nations feel that what we are trying to do is to force upon them U.S. weapon systems.

That is not so. It is to give NATO a capability which it does not have, which I mentioned may in the final analysis be the determinant of whether or not I have to request the use of nuclear weapons. Because if we can reduce the number of the Warsaw Pact's follow-on forces to manageable sizes, we can handle them at our general defensive position.

Senator NUNN. Well, I am all for that. I know Dr. DeLauer supported this. I know Dr. Hoehn has supported this. I know Secretary of Defense Weinberger made, I think, a very good presentation. I applaud that presentation. The head of the Air Force, General Gabriel, has supported it. "Shy" Meyer, head of the Army, has supported it. The problem is it is not in the budget. That is the problem.

I am not talking about all of the papers that have been shuffling back and forth. I am talking about the 5-year defense plan. You have got the assault-breaker technology. You heard Dr. Hoehn testify the other technology depended upon exploiting that. There is very little, if anything, in the budget. It is a 5-year defense plan, not just the 1984 budget.

So everything that has been submitted to you from the Department of Defense is great, but if you take a look at that conventional munition study that was submitted to this committee—I do not know if you have seen it—that is a horse of a difference color altogether.

That does not come anywhere near laying out for the Congress, who are making the budget decisions, anywhere near the kind of vision the Secretary of Defense's paper did to the NATO allies. That is where the disparity is. I do not know whether you read that particular study, but I would certainly welcome your comments on it after you see it because it is a totally different piece of paper than what you have seen.

General ROGERS. I have read only the comments of the Joint Chiefs on it. I have not seen the final paper that came forward.

Senator NUNN. The one submitted by Secretary Weinberger to the NATO allies is, I think, a splendid paper and it does point, that is what you are talking about.

General ROGERS. That is the one I have seen and I heard him give the presentation at the defense ministers' meeting in December.

Senator NUNN. It is great. The only question is now can the Secretary of Defense, head of USD R&D, head of Army and head of Air Force; can they command the budget process and get those things in the budget? That is the question I have because the budget of the United States this year and the next 5 years simply does not reflect that sense of priority at all.

If I could just ask one other question, it seems to me at some point, particularly if we take the 5-percent growth rate which is apparently coming, at most 6 percent, at some point we have got to decide whether we are willing to trade off future platforms for some of this enhanced technology and munitions, or would you be willing to cut back, if necessary, on the procurement rate of some of the platforms—planes and tanks and so forth—designated for NATO in order to give greater priority to the munitions.

General ROGERS. When I mentioned by priorities I listed people first, then doing better with what we have, modernization and finally greater force structure. But I would be prepared to cut out some of the platforms from the budget which appear duplicative in the long term in order to get this kind of capability that we are talking about.

Senator NUNN. Could you furnish those for the record?

General ROGERS. I can give you some ideas, Senator, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. OK.

[The information follows:]

I would hope that none of the modernization programs that have been identified as essential would be cut, because the modernization of our weapons base is a critical element in improving our defensive posture in the European Command. It is difficult to rank order essential modernization programs, because each makes a unique contribution to our readiness to counter the Soviet threat. Among those programs which are essential for funding I can advise that there are some which are absolutely necessary if we are to begin to counter the increased Soviet threat. These would be [deleted]. However, by omitting from this list such programs as [deleted] and several others in no way suggests that they are excess to our needs.

This is by no means a complete list, but one that includes only a few of the modernization programs for which the need for improvement is most compelling.

Chairman TOWER. The bottom line of all of this is that the budgetary constraints we have to choose between among validated military requirements and I think that is a sad situation for the American people, for the future of national security, simply on the grounds of affordability.

I happen to believe we belong to a society that could fulfill all of those validated military requirements and still provide a very comfortable standard of living for our people.

Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, I want to return to this matter of Soviet intimidation of our allies. I really was not able to establish in my own mind from your answers your opinion. Have our allies been intimidated by the Soviet buildup?

General ROGERS. That is why I would not use the term "intimidated" at this juncture.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that not the purpose of Soviet weapons in the first place?

General ROGERS. They are concerned with the Soviet buildup in the thoughtful sections of the European society that has the appropriate information available to it.

Senator HUMPHREY. They are concerned. Well, has their concern increased?

General ROGERS. The others, those who do not have adequate information available to them, are bothered that there may be a war, particularly a nuclear war, but they are pursuing the wrong avenues to deter war or political intimidation. So how they are reacting does lend itself, I think, to their being perceived by the Soviets as failing to have the resolve and will to follow through on vital defense issues which, in the future, may cause us in Western Europe to wake up some morning and find ourselves politically intimidated, economically coerced and blackmailed because we have failed to show the resolve to do what is necessary.

The first test of that resolve comes in December of this year.

Senator HUMPHREY. I, at least, and perhaps others, got the impression from your earlier answers to my question that you place more of the blame on the growing pacifism in Europe, on the administration, and some statements with whose tone you disagree, than you did on the Soviet weapons buildup. Is that your intent?

General ROGERS. Well, that is what they were listening to over there in Europe, Senator, at the outset of this administration. The Soviets were not talking about how strong they were. What they heard was the message from this Nation that "anything you can do we can do better" allusions to nuclear war being confined to Europe, and many Western Europeans were frightened. It was not until November 18, 1981, when the President's speech about the zero-level outcome was beamed to Europe, a speech more important for its tone than its content that they noted that our President is truly serious about negotiating arms reductions.

I say that from having lived there among these people. When that statement was made by him and they received it in Western Europe as he made it, it had a great effect on reducing the belief that many of them had that we had an American administration which was only interested in confronting the Soviet Union and not in trying to negotiate.

The various movements against taking the prudent actions demanded by the real world are still underway; one of the reasons those movements are so active is that their professional organizers have had time to get them organized. But I discount the Soviet dupes and front men when I am trying to get the appropriate message across to the people, and I discount the activists who wait for a cause to come along so they can demonstrate.

But I do not discount the third segment of those movements which is comprised of those thinking adults and young people who are in fact worried and do not know in which direction to turn. I think they are heading in the wrong direction in most instances, to achieve our long-term goal of peace with freedom at lowered levels of arms.

Let us focus on the leaders in the Western nations, those in responsible positions and those who are well informed. Have they been intimidated by the Soviet weapons or not?

General ROGERS. The leaders know what needs to be done, Senator, but——

Senator HUMPHREY. Have they been intimidated or not?

General ROGERS. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are voting on the authorization for defense in 1984. I feel I need to know that. Have they been intimidated or not?

General ROGERS. No; the leaders of the nations have not been intimidated, Senator, but that is not the problem. You take the coalition and minority governments, of which there are several among our allies. You do not have many leaders in such countries who can go out—even though they say to me I know what my country needs to do for defense—get on the stump and tell the people what they must do to improve security arrangements.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, effectively, then, through the political process, the concern about being reelected or maintaining party strength, they have been intimidated. Is that not correct, effectively speaking?

General ROGERS. Whether or not they will be reelected is their concern, in my opinion. There is not that problem with Mrs. Thatcher or Mitterrand or General Evren, because the kind of government they have permits them to lead their people, just as our two-party system lets our President lead in this country.

But take one of our nations which has a governing coalition of four parties. Not only must the Prime Minister get agreement from those four parties to get any legislation through the parliament but he must also get agreement from the two major opposition parties. It makes it very difficult for the leader of that nation, who knows and supports what needs to be done for defense, to get his people to make the added sacrifice for security arrangements.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that not the result of the Soviet weapons buildup and, in particular, the deployment of these SS–20 missiles? If not, then I will not be worried. If you do not perceive it that way, then I will not be worried. You are the expert.

General ROGERS. Come on, Senator. Just because a leader cannot speak out because he wants to remain in power does not mean he is necessarily intimidated by the Soviet Union. But that should not have any impact on whether or not we ought to put those GLCM's and PII's on our soil to deter the use of the Soviet SS–20's, and I am optimistic we will.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, between you and me we certainly have not established much of a record for our colleagues, particularly on this committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, to examine with respect to greater expenditures in NATO. That is what I have been trying to do here, but without any success.

Admiral HOWE. Senator, may I just give you a slightly different perspective on this?

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. I am sorry.

Chairman TOWER. Let Admiral Howe comment. He is here from the State Department.

Admiral HOWE. Just to give you a little State Department insight on this thing, I agree with much of what General Rogers has said, but I also agree with much of what you have said.

Clearly what this administration has done is to try to make our global friends as well as our own citizens aware of the threat that we face, and it certainly is represented by those 1,053 SS–20 warheads the Soviets have put in. It is also represented in their conventional strength and what they are doing in strategic programs as well.

Senator HUMPHREY. Something has changed in the last 18 months.

Admiral HOWE. If I may finish——

Senator HUMPHREY. Has it not?

Admiral HOWE. Lots of things have changed and will continue to change.

Senator HUMPHREY. I mean European opinion.

Admiral HOWE. No; let me just say I think you have to look at this globally. You have to look at what this means to the Soviets. When Secretary Shultz testified before this committee last week, the new change in the balance we think has emboldened them and added to the risk taking on the Soviet side, and you see that more out of the area than in Europe.

But with regard to Europe itself, certainly with the election of Chancellor Kohl, as just one example, in which he ran on a platform of strength, a platform favoring deployments to counter the Soviets threats, and I recognize there are other factors entering into any political equation, I think you saw an example of a response favorable toward increasing our strength and not being intimidated.

I would say also in Japan, where you have deliberate intimidation of the Japanese by the Soviet Union that Prime Minister Nakasone and the Japanese have become incensed by that kind of treatment and there is a treatment that no, we will not be intimidated. We will pull together and rally and unite to do what is necessary for strength.

Over there they surely recognize the threat in Asia as well as Europe.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. Let me continue, Mr. Chairman, with Admiral Howe. I would like to ask him a question that I wish Helmut Kohl had the opportunity to answer.

Admiral Howe, I would be curious whether or not it is your opinion or that of the agency that the rather heavyhanded efforts by the Soviets to interfere in the German elections were counterproductive.

Admiral HOWE. Well, Senator, I can only give you a personal judgment on that. I think there are may different opinions. My own personal judgment is that that, as we have had in our own country over the history when foreigners have tried to interfere with our domestic elections, that that is a very counterproductive thing to do, and that people rise up in response to that kind of activity.

Whether it actually affected how people would have voted or not I am not expert enough to know. But I feel there was a mood of repugnance at that kind of interference.

Chairman TOWER. It is one of those intangibles in politics that you cannot quite measure.

Senator WILSON. General Rogers, in your excellent summary of your presentation here, I though you gave greater emphasis to the importance of our having a much improved capability to attack the enemy rear and cut off his second echelon.

Did I understand you to say that you thought that could well be decisive in the early stages of any effort by the Warsaw Pact to move upon the West?

General ROGERS. What I believe I said, Senator, was that that might well be the determinant as to whether or not we could defend successfully conventionally and thereby not have to resort to the initial use of nuclear weapons by our side, which is the second of the three responses envisioned in our flexible response strategy but not the preferred response.

What I am trying to do is to push us back to the first, the preferred response, which is direct defense to defeat an attack or force the burden of escalation to be borne by the other side. We require the second response now, where we must respond with deliberate escalation and I am trying to change that posture during this decade.

Having the ability to reduce to manageable proportions the numbers of Warsaw Pact forces that get to our forward line of troops might well be the determinant, I think will be the determinant as to whether or not we can succeed conventionally.

We must have sufficient strength to hold the initial echelon first, of course, before we can reach back deep. But that is all in the force goals, too.

Senator WILSON. General Palastra, with respect to the Pacific Command, do you see a situation that would permit reductions in force levels if that choice were forced upon you by congressional action reducing the budget? If you were compelled to do that, have you prioritized where those reductions would occur?

General PALASTRA. Senator Wilson, the prioritization that has taken place in the Pacific Command has been essentially in matching what are admittedly limited resources with the several tasks that we have been assigned to perform, and of necessity allocating in priority our forces to the first priority task, which is to defend the United States, its States, territories, and possessions from attack by the Soviets in a global conventional war.

We have disposed the forces in what we think is the optimal way in order to be prepared to defend the United States against any Soviet attack. In deploying them that way, we have chosen, as Senator Tower commented upon earlier, to deploy them well forward in the Western Pacific. For good and sufficient reason, it is preferable to initiate your defense against a strong enemy as close to his territory as possible, and to allow yourself the maximum amount of room for fighting the battle. In this case across the Pacific, even though there is a relatively short route from the eastern parts of the Soviet Union through the Aleutians and Alaska into the vital lines of communications of the United States.

In attempting to determine where we could reduce forces, I would be forced to say that what we have now is barely enough to give us slightly over a 50–50 chance of being successful in executing that priority task of defending the United States. A reduction

in those forces would place in jeopardy our ability to execute that defense successfully.

Senator WILSON. Excuse me. Did you use a percentage figure just now?

General PALASTRA. The percentage was approximate. I said with what we have available currently, we give ourselves just better than an even chance of successfully executing that defense against a conventional attack by the Soviets.

Senator WILSON. Does that mean that your manning level according to your own table of organization is short?

General PALASTRA. Specifically, that will vary by location and type of units. Without getting into precise details, the U.S. forces of the 8th Army in Korea, are not manned at 100 percent of wartime requirements and in a majority of cases are augmented by Korean augmentation to U.S. Army units to permit us to execute those missions in peacetime.

Those are the initial combat forces. The support forces are manned at even lower levels and require considerable augmentation on the part of not only Korean augmentees from the Korean army but Korean service corps, and civilian labor type forces.

While we have made significant improvement over the past 2 or 3 years, due in large measure to the actions of Congress in funding personnel pay entitlements and making the services attractive to good people, we still have some shortages that concern us in the skilled technicians for radar systems and battle systems in the Navy, in experienced aviators in both the Navy and the Air Force flying units.

And we are working to overcome those shortages.

Senator WILSON. What is the level of sustainability for those units in Korea?

General PALASTRA. The sustainability of the force has improved also over the last couple of years, but it is not yet at the point where we would like to see it.

Senator WILSON. Is it comparable to NATO?

General PALASTRA. I think it is comparable to NATO and in some ways we are in probably a little better shape in terms of how many days of supply and level of effort-type munitions and supplies that are available. In threat-oriented munitions like air-to-air missiles we are in considerably poorer shape.

Senator WILSON. I would ask this of General Rogers and General Palastra. Do either of you yet know enough about what happened in Lebanon to be able to compare our readiness with that of the Israelis?

Chairman TOWER. General Rogers, do you want to tackle that one first?

General ROGERS. The only thing I am sure of at the moment is that Western equipment in the hands of the Israelis performed better than Soviet equipment in the hands of the Syrians.

There are some factors which are very difficult to measure. I think when the returns are all in, such things as the sense of mission the Israelis always have had and have inculcated into their forces; the very tough, stringent training the Israelis conduct; the initiative they display; the capability to take equipment we furnish them and improve upon it and make it even more sophisticated;

and the tactics they used. I think all of those factors played a part in the Israeli victory.

I just do not know when we expect to have all of that information available to us.

Chairman TOWER. General Palastra, do you have anything to add?

General PALASTRA. I think General Rogers covered it admirably, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Well, I think that just about wraps it up. General Rogers, do you have any peroration you would like to deliver before we close the proceedings this afternoon?

General ROGERS. No, sir. The thrust of my comments are included in the last couple of pages of my statement, where I would request this committee to continue to hang tough, Mr. Chairman, on those items, as you did before.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question. I would ask the General to add to my education. Who is Sir John Slesor?

General ROGERS. He was the head of the Royal Air Force at one time. I think he puts it pretty well.

Senator WILSON. I think so, too.

General ROGERS. What he said is particularly applicable today in Western Europe.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

[Questions submitted for the hearing record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER

GLCM DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS

Senator TOWER. The Air Force military construction request for fiscal year 1984 includes $34 million for GLCM facilities in the Netherlands.

Why should the Congress approve this request [deleted]?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] The $34 million in fiscal year 1984 is needed [deleted]. Denial of these funds [deleted].

IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Senator TOWER. Within the last year, there has been considerable discussion of taking advantage of emerging technologies to improve conventional defense of NATO Europe. The committee does not fully understand the extent to which the air-land battle concepts to employ these new technologies have been accepted by NATO and the procedures for joint research and development and acquisition programs to field the required weapon systems.

Has NATO formally adopted the air-land battle doctrine?

There was much criticism of this doctrine in Europe last year. What was the nature of these criticisms?

Given the nature of the air-land battle doctrine, it would seem that all NATO national forces operating in the Center Region would have to employ this doctrine. Is this correct?

If so, is it realistic to expect all NATO national forces to procure the advance technology weapon systems necessary to implement this concept?

General ROGERS. Allied Command Europe has developed its concept for follow-on force attack (FOFA) which I approved in the spring of 1981. It is based on conceptual thinking of several nations and subordinate commands. Although it coincides with some features of the U.S. Army's airland battle doctrine, it also differs in some aspects from that doctrine which has been developed for worldwide operations.

Under NATO Long Term Defense Planning procedures I have forwarded to the NATO Military Committee (MC) the Guidelines for the ACE concept. SHAPE is developing the Mission Need Documents which will be forwarded to the Conference of NATC Armament Directors for their decision as to the manner in which required weapons and supporting systems will be provided.

The criticism of last year was directed at the conceptual U.S. Army's Air Land Battle 2000 (ALB 2000) which a number of Europeans believed was the same as the ACE concept for FOFA. The criticism was directed at those aspects of ALB 2000 which are not applicable to the defense of NATO and which were of concern to those persons who had confused FOFA with ALB 2000.

Senator TOWER. What procedures have been established to maximize U.S.-NATO Europe research and development and acquisition programs of emerging technologies for improved NATO conventional defense?

Dr. HOEHN. Within NATO, the Conference of National Armaments Directors and its subordinate bodies, since their inception, have devoted a considerable portion of their work toward the application of new technology across the full spectrum of military equipment and systems.

As a result of the Secretary of Defense proposal to NATO in December 1982, NATO has undertaken a major initiative for development of a programmatic plan of action to exploit emerging technologies with coordination and harmonization of efforts in NATO being provided by the Executive Working Group under its chairman, the Deputy Secretary General. This group will ensure that Defense Ministers review progress at the NATO Ministerial meetings.

Related to this, the CNAD is working with the NATO Military Authorities and member nations on CNAD Priority Areas of Activity which focus on the most pressing and significant military needs of the Alliance. Other actions aimed at identifying key technologies for application to systems have included the NATO Defense Research Group's publication of the Long-Term Scientific Study on the Implications of New Technologies for Land Operations in the Central Region (short title: LO/2000); as well as the expansion of Panel 1 of the NATO Defense Research Group to focus attention on new high payoff technologies. Finally, the CNAD has set up an ad hoc group of the representatives of the National Armaments Directors to investigate how to improve CNAD's structural ability to exploit emerging technologies and to coordinate CNAD actions to identify key emerging technologies.

The NATO Military Authorities are evaluating the military implications of emerging technologies generally in the area of applicable military requirements, tactical concepts, long-term planning guidelines and mission needs, particularly for those technologies which provide the greater benefits. In formulating their force proposals for 1985–1990, they will take full account of the application of emerging technologies.

Cooperative research, development and acquisition also take place within the context of bilateral and multilateral agreements outside the NATO umbrella. Such agreements tend to reflect military needs perceived by the nations concerned.

We also agree with the Roth-Glenn-Nunn amendment that emerging technology can be exploited more effectively through greater defense industrial cooperation within Western Europe, and between Western Europe and North America and are consulting with our allies on a structure to accomplish this.

### NATO DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

Senator TOWER. Section 1122 of the 1983 Defense Authorization Act expressed the sense of the Congress that a cooperative Defense-Industrial effort within Western Europe and between Western Europe and North America should be established. This section is known as the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment.

Would you please exlain the actions that the Department of Defense has taken in response to this policy statement by the Congress?

Dr. HOEHN. As noted in the preface to the Secretary of Defense's Ninth Annual Report to Congress on "Standardization of Equipment within NATO", the Department of Defense is endeavoring to intensify its consultations to establish a structure for defense industrial cooperation within the NATO Alliance. We will seek a structure for effective cooperation through increased competitive developments, expanded military trade or shared production, and lifetime logistical support for the military equipment of the Alliance. These and other elements will be designed to eliminate unnecessary duplication and permit equitable sharing of the burdens and benefits of Alliance defense. We recognize in this regard, and we will pursue this point with the European Allies, that they must organize their defense research and development, their industries and their market on a scale more nearly comparable with that of the U.S. Otherwise, the structure for cooperation cannot be viable. In this we have the support of our defense industry as reflected in a recent Defense Science Board report to the Secretary.

This structure must evolve through consultations and negotiations with our Allies. We will examine means to best pursue its establishment—means which will

accommodate the interests of the military, industry and labor—and through close work with the Congress, assure that the policy has the full support of the American people.

Senator TOWER. Would you agree that a major policy initiative will be required from the United States if improved NATO Defense industrial cooperation is to be realized?

Dr. HOEHN. Clearly, we need to increase the intensity of what has been an ongoing effort in this important area. In this regard, I expect that David Abshire, upon assuming his post as the new U.S. permanent representative to NATO, can fulfill an important role in the selection of further steps we can take toward meeting the intent of the Amendment.

Senator TOWER. Is the Department of Defense preparing such an initiative? If not, why not?

Dr. HOEHN. As I previously indicated, the Department of Defense is currently working the problem and plans to expand the scope of its efforts in conjunction with elements of the Department of State.

### PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER OF MANPOWER CEILING

Senator TOWER. The Defense Appropriations Act that specified a ceiling on the number of U.S. troops in NATO Europe provided that the President could waive it "upon a declaration to Congress of overriding national security requirements." Has the Defense Department made a recommendation to the President on whether or not he should exercise this waiver authority?

Dr. HOEHN. We intend to recommend to the President that he waive the ceiling, for overriding national security requirements, as to the number of troops (1,380) associated with deployment to Europe of the ground launched cruise missile.

### WIESBADEN BRIGADE

Senator TOWER. During the Senate's consideration of the manpower ceiling for NATO Europe, Senator Nunn, Senator Percy, and I worked very hard to prevent the forced inactivation of the 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division at Wiesbaden, West Germany. The Army has now decided to inactivate this important unit in fiscal year 1984.

Do you believe that "the 4th of the 4th" should be inactivated?

What effect will the inactivation of this unit have on the defense of the Central Army Group and West Germany?

General ROGERS. I do not believe the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division should be inactivated. If the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division were not inactivated in fiscal year 1984, and the troop strength ceiling were to be continued in fiscal year 1984, USEUCOM would be in the position of having to trade-off some other capability for the 4th of the 4th. [Deleted.]

### MANPOWER CEILING IN EUROPE

Senator TOWER. The manpower ceiling that will go into effect at the end of this fiscal year for NATO Europe allows 5,200 less personnel than had been projected by the Defense Department.

What changes will have to be made in the services' manpower plans to accommodate this ceiling?

Would you comment on the effect that this lower-than-expected end strength will have on our military capability?

More important, what would be the effect if the ceiling were extended through the next fiscal year at the same level?

Could the new weapon systems to be deployed in Europe during the next few years be manned by drawing upon personnel in less important activities?

General ROGERS. Since the European troop ceiling was not enacted until December 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Departments were not prepared to identify (during fiscal year 1983) the units, additional resources, or stateside basing locations necessary to move units from Europe to CONUS to make room in Europe for priority strength growth (such as GLCM). An additional consideration was the fact that units redeployed to the States would remain there permanently even if the troop ceiling were not continued beyond FY83; therefore, the troop strength ceiling is being met in FY83 primarily through personnel management. This means that the troop units in Europe will not be at as high of a fill level as they normally would have been, since some personnel vacancies that occur are not refilled. At the

same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are analyzing the problem and will provide the Secretary of Defense with their recommendations on this matter.

[Deleted.]

While we are looking for what might be considered as less important spaces as trade-offs for priority projects, the numbers that can be identified as low priority do not and cannot match the amount required.

Senator TOWER. The manpower ceiling that will go into effect at the end of this fiscal year for NATO Europe allows 5,200 less personnel than had been projected by the Defense Department. What changes will have to be made in the services' manpower plans to accommodate this ceiling?

Dr. HOEHN. Secretary Weinberger will recommend to the President a waiver of the ceiling in respect of the troops (1,380) associated with deployment of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile. That apart, he has directed that the Services take reductions proportionate to the numbers of their forces stationed ashore in Europe by managing the manning levels to meet the adjusted ceiling.

Senator TOWER. Would you comment on the effect that this lower-than-expected end strength will have on our military capability?

Dr. HOEHN. We will attempt to minimize the impact of this ceiling on our military capability, but obviously some units will be understrength. This will further complicate General Rogers' efforts to improve the readiness of our forces in place in Europe.

Senator TOWER. More important, what would be the effect if the ceiling were extended through the next fiscal year at the same level?

Dr. HOEHN. This ceiling does not allow us the flexibility to respond to changing conditions and needs of our forces in Europe. Today we face a growing Soviet threat to Europe—in both conventional and nuclear terms. The US must proceed with high priority programs for force modernization and enhanced readiness to meet that growing Soviet threat. Additionally, the troop ceiling sends precisely the wrong signal to the USSR. For effective deterrence and successful negotiations on arms control, we must not appear to pull back from programs for force modernization. It also complicates our efforts to encourage greater burden-sharing from our NATO allies by undermining our argument that we should all do more for defense. With crucial milestones ahead on INF deployment, continuing US commitment to force improvements is especially important during the coming year.

Senator TOWER. Could the new weapon systems to be deployed in Europe during the next few years be manned by drawing upon personnel in less important activities?

Dr. HOEHN. All of our personnel in Europe perform essential combat, combat support, or combat service support functions. Therefore, we cannot reduce manning in one area to increase manning in another area, without adverse impact upon our military capabilities.

### UPGRADE OF TURKISH AIR FORCE BASES

Senator TOWER. The Defense Department has requested $66.7 million to improve Turkish Air Force Bases. Could you describe the purpose of this project?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

Senator TOWER. If these air bases are to support Turkish and American aircraft in the performance of NATO missions, shouldn't their improvement be eligible for NATO Infrastructure funding?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

### JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORTS

Senator TOWER. Japan has been strongly criticized for failing to accelerate its efforts to strengthen its defense. Does the Japanese government share our assessment of the threat in East Asia?

General PALASTRA. The Japanese share the United States assessment that the Soviet Union is the major threat to the peace and security of East Asia. Both nations also share a concern over the regional threat posed by North Korea. The nature of the threat posed by the unrelenting build up of Soviet military forces has come into focus among the various ministries and agencies that formulate the Japanese "government" assessment. Recent statements by Prime Minister Nakasone are indicative of the similarity in the United States and Japanese perceptions of the threat. The Japanese military leadership fully understands the nature of the threat. The build up of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, introduction of Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles in the Far East, and the deployment of troops and modern equipment to the Kuril Islands, especially the Japanese northern territories, have motivated a

growing awareness among other parts of the government, the private sector and the public regarding the threat posed by the Soviets to Japan's vital interests. However, in spite of this common perception of the threat, the Japanese do not fully share the United States view of the immediacy of the threat. There is some inclination to assess Soviet intentions rather than military capabilities, and to point out economic and political weaknesses facing the Soviets. Nevertheless, since the end of World War II, the Japanese have regarded the Soviet Union as posing the most plausible and significant potential threat to Japan. The degree to which the United States and Japan share the assessment of the threat in East Asia appears closer today than it has ever been.

Senator TOWER. What more can be done by the United States Government to convince Japan to allocate the funds necessary to accomplish the defense missions it has accepted?

General PALASTRA. Our emphasis should continue to be on quiet, steady, government-to-government dialogue with the GOJ to enhance Japan's awareness of the extent and the immediacy of the growing Soviet threat. Yet we must avoid the appearance of United States interference in Japan's sovereign right to establish defense policy, lest our efforts create a counter-productive public reaction. Our own efforts must emphasize the United States Government concern over the unfavorable military imbalance in Northeast Asia.

Senator TOWER. How can the Congress best support this important effort by the executive branch?

General PALASTRA. Congress has already done much by way of its demonstrated commitment to maintaining United States forces in our forward deployed posture. Without this United States presence, our allies would be unlikely to make a meaningful commitment to defense in light of such a numerically powerful adversary. Congress can further support our efforts by stressing the need, the urgency and importance of Japan providing for its own self defense. We should also emphasize the United States commitment to free world defense when meeting with Japanese officials in Japan or during visits to Washington by high level GOJ representatives.

### MANPOWER CEILING FOR PACIFIC COMMAND

Senator TOWER. I understand that the Senate Appropriations Committee initially recommended a ceiling on U.S. troops in Europe because it was unaware of the increase in the number of our personnel there. What has been the trend in the number of United States military personnel stationed in the Pacific Command during the last 5 years?

General PALASTRA. The Pacific Command has had an increase of 3 percent or approximately 9,300 United States military personnel during the last 5 years.

Senator TOWER. Would a ceiling on the number of U.S. personnel stationed in Japan succeed in encouraging the Japanese government to accelerate its defense efforts?

General PALASTRA. While U.S. forces stationed overseas add credibility to our resolve as allies and treaty partners of equal importance, they are there for the security of the United States. Japan views its current defense effort as a defensive partnership with the United States rather than encourage greater efforts; a deliberate effort to curtail or limit U.S. presence could very well spark a similar response on the part of the Government of Japan through an erroneous perception of a reduced threat. Our greatest prospects lie in the direction of greater defense cooperation; not necessarily a greater number of U.S. troops, but definitely greater U.S.-Japan interaction in all areas of defense cooperation. On the other hand, a U.S. signal that hinted of a possible reduced U.S. commitment could produce either a drop in interest in defense or perhaps a go-it-alone approach less in harmony with U.S. interests in the area. Not to mention the signal it would send both to other allies and adversaries.

### OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS

Senator TOWER. The Continuing Resolution included a number of general provisions, which affect foreign countries, in addition to those concerning specialty metals and POMCUS Division Sets 5&6.

Of those, which are considered to be the most troubling to U.S. relations with her allies in Western Europe?

Dr. HOEHN. The specialty metals and POMCUS provisions you have cited are, of course, of very special concern in terms of their impact on our relationships and programs in NATO, and we are seeking urgent remedies via our fiscal year 1983 Supplemental Request.

There are, however, several other general provisions of the fiscal year 1983 Continuing Resolution that are especially troublesome to our relationships with European NATO allies and Canada.

One of these is Section 761 of the Resolution, which bars us from providing inpatient medical care in U.S. military hospitals to foreign military and diplomatic personnel and their dependents in the United States on the same basis as provided to U.S. personnel, i.e., at nominal cost. This requirement that we obtain full cost reimbursement is contrary to two NATO-wide agreements, and it has engendered considerable protest from our allies since it was first written into law in 1980. To date, other NATO nations have continued to provide nominal cost medical care to U.S. personnel stationed outside the United States, but some have indicated that they will soon begin to reciprocate the current U.S. practice.

Our best estimate is that recovering full cost from all foreign personnel in the United States earns less than $2 million a year, of which only a portion is attributable to NATO personnel. We believe that the current provision should be deleted or, at least, modified to exempt NATO personnel in accord with prior agreements.

Another provision which restricts our ability to comply with prior undertakings is the Prohibition in Section 766 against transfer of technical data on the manufacture of large calibre cannons. A number of allied and other friendly countries, among them Switzerland, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany are manufacturing or have manufactured U.S.-designed large calibre cannons under earlier agreements. These countries have now encountered technical problems or desire to upgrade their products by modernization measures, which would be in our security interests. Since this restrictive provision became law in the fiscal year 1982 Defense Appropriation Act, we have been unable to assist these countries with technical data. We would like to see the language modified to permit us to provide data on revisions and updates, but not for initiation of production.

LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON DEFENSE COOPERATION

Senator TOWER. In the Continuing Resolution, the Congress took a number of unfortunate actions that have seriously troubled relations between the United States and her allies in Western Europe. These actions include the restriciton on purchasing equipment from abroad which contains specialty metals; the deletion of funds for the U.S.-West German Wartime Host Nation Support program; and the prohibition on funding for the transportation of equipment for POMCUS Sets 5&6.

How important are the U.S.-West German Wartime Host Nation Support programs and POMCUS Division Sets 5&6 to NATO's wartime fighting capability?

How would you respond to critics that argue that the U.S.-West German Wartime Host Nation support is simply a U.S. foreign aid program for the Federal Republic of Germany?

To what extent does the prepositioning of equipment required by POMCUS Division Sets 5&6, limit U.S. military capability elsewhere in the world?

General ROGERS. In 1978, the United States made a commitment to reinforce NATO with 10 Army divisions within 10 days. This commitment was predicated upon prepositioning the six division sets of POMCUS equipment in Europe and increased host nation support. [Deleted.] The ability to reinforce Europe with 10 divisions does not in itself guarantee success. If we are to commit U.S. forces to the defense of Europe, we must be able to support them. As you are aware, our services, especially the Army, have serious shortages in combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS). Many of these support type units, needed in the critical early stages of a major conflict, do not now exist in the U.S. force structure to include reserve components. Additionally, they are likely not to exist in the future due to the Congressionally mandated "tooth-to-tail" ratios and current restrictions on military end strength. Recognition of this U.S. shortfall is the basis of the U.S.-FRG Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement wherein the FRG would provide approximately 93,000 German civilian and military reservists on a share cost basis. These FRG forces will support both U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force combat units at a cost far less than we could achieve using active or reserve component units. Critics who liken the program to foreign aid have obviously missed the point that these German units support U.S. combat forces . . . not German or other NATO forces. In conclusion, I view both the POMCUS and WHNS programs as essential elements of the U.S. defense program for the security of Europe. [Deleted.]

Senator TOWER. In the continuing resolution, the Congress took a number of unfortunate actions that have seriously troubled relations between the United States and her allies in Western Europe. These actions include the restriction on purchasing equipment from abroad which contains specialty metals; the deletion of funds

for the U.S.-West German Wartime Host Nation Support program; and the prohibition on funding for the transportation of equipment for POMCUS Sets 5&6.

How urgently does the Department of Defense require relief from the effects of these provisions?

Dr. HOEHN. We consider it vitally important to our readiness programs within NATO and to our cooperative relationships with our allies that very prompt remedial action be taken in each of the areas you have mentioned. The congressional decisions made with respect to POMCUS 5&6 in the adoption of the Continuing Resolution are threatening to disrupt and delay a program which is essential to the rapid reinforcement of the U.S. and allied troops in Europe and to which our NATO Allies have already made substantial material contributions. Similarly, the failure to include in the Resolution funding for the U.S. contribution to the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement with the FRG threatens to set back the current timetable for German contributions and for the implementation of this precedent setting burden-sharing arrangement. Finally, the current specialty metals restrictions are the source of very strong concerns on the part of allied governments and are threatening to disrupt defense trade relationships which have historically benefitted the United States in economic as well as security terms.

For this reason we have urgently sought relief on each of these issues in the Supplemental Budget Request now before the Congress.

Senator TOWER. With regard to specialty metals, Senator Heinz and I cosponsored an amendment to the 1983 Defense Department Appropriations bill which would have allowed the Department of Defense to purchase defense items, parts and components which contained non-U.S. origin specialty metals from certain allies. Would the Department of Defense support such a provision this year in lieu of the more restrictive language contained in the Continuing Resolution?

Dr. HOEHN. President Reagan's request for supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1983 for the Department of Defense contained a request for a return to the original Specialty Metals exemption which existed prior to December 1981. Secretary Weinberger has testified recently to both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in support of such full relief on specialty metals. We understand that in light of the pending International Trade Commission action which will likely result in remedial action to protect our specialty metals industry, the appropriation committees are giving favorable consideration to the administration's request. Therefore, we are optimistic that with the appropriate action being taken in the commercial arena, where 96-97 percent of the specialty metals are used, it will not be judged necessary to continue the restrictive language on defense trade. Should this action be considered insufficient for full relief by the Congress, then we would be most appreciative of your support in reaching a satisfactory compromise which would be less restrictive than the current language.

### BURDEN SHARING

Senator TOWER. On page 4 of your statement you indicate that SHAPE calculates that to meet commitments to force improvements, as set out in the current Force Goals for 1983–88, an annual average 4 percent real increase in defense spending per nation would be required.

To what extent has this 4 percent goal been accepted within the Alliance?

Are there any efforts underway to see that each member of the alliance will meet this 4 percent goal?

Given the inability of some of our allies to meet the 3 percent goal established in 1978 do you believe that our allies can meet this 4 percent goal?

General ROGERS. The 4 percent figure is my estimate of the average annual real increase in defense spending per nation that would be necessary if all nations of the Alliance were to meet fully their 1983–88 Force Goals. NATO ministers agreed to the 1983–88 Force Goals in May 1982 which indicates a commitment in principle to increase spending as needed to meet those goals. We will not know until later in the year to what extent each individual nation is meeting its share of the Force Goals. Efforts to ensure that each member does meet its share of the Force Goals are part of the continuing dynamics of the Alliance. Burden sharing and shared benefits are what NATO is all about. The determination of exactly what constitutes a "fair share" for each member is the subject of almost continuous discussion and debate.

I believe our Allies can meet the 4 percent increase needed to implement fully the 1983–88 Force Goals if they resolve to do so. For 1983, the real increase amounts to an average additional sacrifice of only 23 dollars for every citizen in the Alliance—only 11 dollars for each citizen in the Western European Allied nations.

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

Senator TOWER. General Rogers had indicated that maintenance of service end-strength levels would be his first priority during consideration of any defense spending reductions. In addition, on page 15 of his statement he indicated that "The third European Command priority is essential modernization."

If the Congress were forced to cut important modernization programs which specific programs would you wish to see be given priority?

General ROGERS. I would hope that none of the modernization programs that have been identified as essential would be cut, because the modernization of our weapons base is a critical element in improving our defensive posture in the European Command. It is difficult to rank order essential modernization programs, because each makes a unique contribution to our readiness to counter the Soviet threat. Among those programs which are essential for funding I can advise that there are some which are absolutely necessary if we are to begin to counter the increased Soviet threat. These would be [deleted]. However, by omitting from this list such programs as [deleted] and several others in no way suggests that they are excess to our needs.

This is by no means a complete list, but one that includes only a few of the modernization programs for which the need for improvement is most compelling.

BURDEN SHARING

Senator TOWER. On page 8 of your statement, you indicate that, "When all factors are weighed, I believe that our European allies as a group are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the common defense burden."

Some of my colleagues will be startled by this statement given the fact that in 1982 the NATO countries (excluding the United States) achieved real growth in defense spending on only 1.0–1.6 percent while the United States increased its defense spending by 7.5 percent.

Given this disparity why do you believe that our European allies are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the common defense burden?

Over the long term, how has the relative burden of defending Western Europe shifted between the United States and her allies?

Since 1970, what have the overall trends been in terms of real resources committed to defense spending by the United States and other NATO member states?

Some of our allies have made the point that they are unable to increase defense spending because of the poor state of their domestic economy.

Is this a vaild argument, given the real increases that the United States has achieved in defense spending, while the U.S. economy has been in poor shape?

General ROGERS. As I alluded to earlier, it is probably not possible ever to obtain unanimity on just exactly what constitutes every NATO nation's fair share of the defense burden. I believe that in an overall sense my statement is accurate. Should war break out tomorrow the great bulk of the ground and air forces that would come under my command and that would be used to blunt a Warsaw Pact attack would be furnished by our European Allies. The entire civil infrastructure of the European Allies is potentially available to contribute to the war effort. Troops of many Allied nations are conscripted for service and are not paid as well as our own personnel of the all-volunteer force. That means that a smaller percentage of the defense budget in those nations is devoted to personnel costs than is the case in the United States. Further, many of the Allies make "hidden" contributions to the overall defense effort by providing valuable real estate for casernes, training area, and air bases (900 such military facilities for the United States alone). That real estate represents a loss to the tax base of those contributing countries. Factors such as these are not possible to quantify, but they certainly increase the value of the Allies' contribution to the common defense.

The 7.5 percent real increase in defense spending by the United States is required to discharge its security commitments on a global basis, not just those to NATO. The entire defense budget of the West European nations is directed towards the defense of NATO.

One measure—and it is only one measure, and an incomplete one at that—of the long term trend in the shifting of the relative defense burden is that in 1971, the total defense spending by non-U.S. members of NATO represented about 37 percent of Total Defense Spending. In 1980, that figure had risen to about 43 percent with the U.S. percentage dropping off commensurately.

As I mentioned before, I believe that our Allies can make the necessary increases in defense spending, even in these difficult economic times. What needs to be done is for all nations to do more for defense arrangements, for which the United States has set the model during the last 2 years. But there is no doubt that the leaders in

many Allied nations are coming under heavy domestic pressure to reduce defense spending.

MISAWA AIR BASE

Senator TOWER. The United States and Japan have agreed to jointly fund the airfield improvements necessary to deploy two squadrons of American F-16s at Misawa Air Base. How will the forward deployment of these aircraft to Misawa strengthen our capability to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies in Northeast Asia?

General PALASTRA. Our primary mission is the defense of the U.S. Within that, the addition of U.S. land-based tactical air in Northern Japan will be a major step in countering an existing quantitative and qualitative dominance by the Soviets currently in the critically important Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific area. [Deleted.]

These aircraft, currently programmed as F-16A/B fighters, have increased range and combat capability over that of their F-4 series predecessors. These qualities afford the theater commander a full range of air-to-surface and air-to-air designed operational capabilities (DOCs) for selective employment in a contingency. Potential missions include long-range interdiction of enemy ground and seaborne targets; joint/combined defense of U.S. personnel, facilities, and maritime assets; maritime surveillance, etc. [Deleted.]

Finally, these aircraft and the personnel to support their operation will represent a visible display of U.S. resolve in this vital geographic area—both to our allies and to the Soviets. [Deleted.]

Senator TOWER. About three-fourths of the cost of improving the Misawa airfield will be paid by Japan. Why can't the Japanese fund the entire cost of the project?

General PALASTRA. [Deleted.]

Projects which deal with modifying or altering existing facilities pose a special problem for the Government of Japan; Japanese law requires they bring the entire structure up to current construction standards. This generally makes the cost of such a project extremely high and a poor investment considering the finite amount of host nation Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funds available for all U.S. construction requests. Finally a portion of the U.S. MILCON is needed in direct support of the F-16 weapon system, entailing installation of equipment unique to U.S. specifications and critical to the operation of the aircraft. The total construction plan proposed for the Misawa project represents the most economical trade-off between MILCON and Japanese FIP funding.

Senator TOWER. Would Congress' refusal to approve the U.S. share pressure Japan to assume responsibility for the entire cost?

General PALASTRA. The Japanese have indicated that their agreement in principle to support the F-16 deployment [deleted] U.S. refusal to share a portion of the deployment cost, especially costs related to those constructions GOJ feels politically untenable, would most likely be taken as a signal of less than full U.S. support for the initiative and could result in a similar refusal to support the deployment. By not picking up a lesser percentage of the construction cost, we could in effect forfeit Japanese funding of the major portion of this force addition so valuable to our own forward deployed strategy.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

SECOND ECHELON ATTACK DOCTRINE

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, in an August 1982 article in the Armed Forces Journal, Colonel Trevor Depuy was critical of the "second echelon attack" doctrine. He stated: our first priority for fighting, however, must be the first echelon. No NATO resources should be diverted to attack the second echelon before it is committed, until or unless we know that we are sufficiently strong to defeat the first echelon without these resources."

Are you familiar with Colonel Dupuy's article and what is your response? For the record, would you have your staff review this article and provide a detailed response?

General ROGERS. Yes, I am familiar with Colonel Dupuy's article. With respect to the argument you cite, I am in full agreement that our first priority for fighting must be the defeat of the first echelon. It makes little sense to divert scarce resources away from the first echelon battle if NATO forces are in danger of being overrun by the first echelon. That is why I point out in my statement that to improve our conventional capacity, the first thing we must do is to bring our current

forces up to the established ACE standards for manning, equipping, training, sustaining, maintaining and reinforcing. If, however, we can defeat the first echelon, but not delay and disrupt the follow-on forces which would be inevitably committed, NATO will still be in danger of facing forces so sizable that we might not be able to defeat them. One cannot view the first echelon and follow-on forces in isolation. They are a single force, linked by a common plan whose elements are separated only by relatively small measures of time and distance. NATO's warfighting strategy must consider the threat posed by that single force. Thus, the requirement to deal with follow-on force complements the requirement to defeat the first echelon forces. I believe that NATO can make a credible initial conventional defense if there is: (1) adequate warning time, (2) timely and appropriate political decisions which permit ACE Commanders to take proper actions promptly, to include reinforcement of deployed forces, and (3) [deleted]. The keys to maintaining this initial defense are: (1) development of the capability to disrupt and destroy the Warsaw Pact's follow-on forces (thereby, moving the war into their territory), and (2) development of the capability to sustain NATO's forces so that high intensity combat operations can be maintained until hostilities are ended on terms favorable to NATO. Each of these factors is critical if NATO is to be able to defend itself against a conventional attack with conventional means.

### WAR RESERVE STOCKAGE

Senator NUNN. What is the current capability of the United States and our allies to support the type of conventional conflict envisioned for NATO center? What are our objectives in terms of ammunition and war reserves and what do we currently have? What is in the 5-year plan and what are the major deficiencies? What is the current objective of our NATO allies and what is the current level on hand?

What is your view of the recent proposal of former Secretary of Defense McNamara and others that the U.S. cut our procurement of ammunition and war stores for NATO since we are so far in front of our allies?

General ROGERS. The NATO minimum stockage objective for war reserves is [deleted] with the exception of the United States. The NATO recognized U.S. stockage objective is [deleted] as our forces must be sustained until the transAtlantic LOC is established. DOD resource planning guidance has supported the [deleted]. The services have attempted to comply with the Defense Guidance. With the exception of Army class VII and some high technology missiles, the service POMs for fiscal year 1984–88 would satisfy [deleted] of U.S. European Forces war reserve requirements if fully funded/implemented. As you are aware, there is a tendency to place the bulk of funds needed to correct a given problem in the program out-years. Thus, while we have gradually improved our theater war reserve status, full realization of the [deleted] level has remained perpetually 5 years in the future. USCINCEUR has no access to specific status of Allied efforts to achieve war reserve objections; however, unclassified sources reveal varying degrees of success depending on the commodity and nation concerned. All free-world western nations are currently experiencing some degree of economic stagnation or recession, making real growth in defense spending a difficult and often politically unpopular choice. It is especially important during these economically troubled times, that the U.S. maintain the goals we are encouraging our allies to achieve. To cut back on our procurement of war reserve material now, particularly ammunition and critical items for U.S. European forces, would be self-deluding, [deleted] in any major conflict and send the wrong signal to both our allies and potential adversaries.

### FORWARD DEFENSE CONCEPT

Senator NUNN. In the recent issue of Army magazine, First Lieutenant Peters wrote a very thoughtful and provocative article on the forward defense concept. Would you have your staff comment on this article both from a political perspective but primarily from a military capability standpoint?

General ROGERS. Lieutenant Peters' article is a well-written exposition of current discussions concerning implementation of the NATO Forward Defense concept, and he makes several valid points. However, he incorrectly suggests that Forward Defense is incompatible with NATO's current thinking, whereby NATO desires the flexibility to carry the war to the enemy's rear by attacking reinforcing units before they trespass NATO territory. Forward Defense remains a valid principle. In essence, it means that no portion of NATO's territory will be abandoned to the enemy. I fully support the principle of Forward Defense. Our commitment to Forward Defense can best be implemented, in my view, by carrying the battle further forward—to the enemy's own territory. We continue, as you know, to evaluate im-

proved methods for stopping and punishing a prospective enemy as far forward as possible in order to preserve the credibility of Forward Defense.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, in 1975 I sponsored an amendment which became law that prohibits an increase in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe except in the event of imminent hostilities. In addition, this amendment mandated a study of the overall concept for use of nuclear weapons in Europe, how the use of these weapons relates to deterrence and strong conventional defense, reductions in the number and type of nuclear warheads not essential for Western Europe defense and steps that would develop a national, coordinated nuclear posture of the NATO alliance that is consistent with proper emphasis on conventional defense forces.

This study, which became known as the Schlesinger Study, was submitted to Congress and many of the recommendations taken up by the NATO high level group. However, it is my view that many of the same questions are still unanswered or unacted on today.

Do you think it is time for an update of the Schlesinger Study?

General ROGERS. Each year SACEUR reviews requirements for nuclear weapons as part of a nuclear weapons requirements study. Over the past five years, new rationale has been developed which I believe will result in valid requirements that will insure ACE's essential nuclear needs are being properly reflected in future reviews of requirements. Furthermore, the NATO High Level Group and the Nuclear Planning Group are actively addressing the nuclear posture in Europe. These groups, in which our State and Defense Departments are actively involved, are in the process of reviewing the theater nuclear force required to maintain a credible deterrence. I am comfortable that these ongoing studies and reviews, with active participation of appropriate allied governments, are providing the results necessary to serve the purpose which the Schlesinger Study served. Therefore, I do not believe an update of the study is necessary.

U.S. FORCES IN NATO

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, what has happened with U.S. forces in NATO since the implementation of the Nunn "tooth-to-tail" amendment in 1975? (This amendment required the reduction of 20,000 support troops with a permissive add-back of 20,000 combat troops.) What is the current U.S. combat-to-support ratio and how has this changed in the last 5 years? What are the projections for the next 5 years?

General ROGERS. At the time of the Nunn Amendment of 1975, you stated that the combat to support ratio was 49/51, according to your figures. Similarly, your figures showed that this ratio remained fairly constant at about 52/48 during the period 1976–1980. The Department of the Army, however, computed the ratio as 62/38 during 1976–1980, with the difference being the method of computation. You counted combat support (CS) forces such as artillery, signal, engineers and military police as "providers of combat support" rather than "consumers of logistic support" as viewed by DA and USAREUR. [Deleted.] By 1982, the ratio was 62/38 (source: your report on this matter). The current ratio as reported to Department of the Army in the USAREUR Essential Force Package Report is 67/33. By Army doctrine, the optimal ratio is 53/47. The USAREUR goal is leaner than that, with the objective in the next 5 years being 58/42. It is difficult to predict how closely this goal will be met as we are still working with the European troop strength ceiling problem, and this ceiling will have an impact on the final ratio. I remain concerned, however, that we may have reduced too much "tail." In addition to known CSS shortfalls in the Central Region, we currently lack the ability to support U.S. divisions committed to the NATO flanks. USCINCCENT shares similar concerns, as we double-count many of the same CONUS-based active and reserve component forces for support of our respective theaters. This issue demands a relook.

CONTRACT RESEARCH ON NATO DIVISION OF LABOR

Senator NUNN. Dr. Hoehn, the February 24 issue of Defense Daily on page 296 carried a report of a Pentagon study to examine alternate roles for NATO members and included five major elements to include: (1) determine aggregate NATO conventional defense requirements; (2) determine for each major NATO nation or region the available resources and special defense requirements and capabilities; (3) determine achievable NATO-wide improvements in defense capability and reductions in costs; (4) establish a timeframe in which a "revised NATO division of labor" would

take effect; and (5) derive a new combination of individual national defense contributions that will constitute the new NATO division of labor.

Is that report accurate and who is conducting this study? Does the study contain the five major elements described above? What is the timetable for completion and are there any plans to make the results available to Congress?

Dr. HOEHN. Yes. The Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, is procuring competitively a research contract for a study entitled "Options and Prospects for Alternate Divisions of Labor in NATO." The five major elements you named will be contained in the study. The winner of the competition has not yet been determined, but we expect that the award will be made and work will begin by the end of June. The study will take 10 to 12 months to accomplish, and when it is completed it will not have standing as an official DOD position. Should some results of this study become incorporated in DOD policy regarding NATO, such findings would, in that context, be released to Congress.

### INTELLIGENCE AND C2 FOR ATTACK OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES

Senator NUNN. Dr. Hoehn, what is the current capability in the intelligence area needed to implement the AirLand Battle (deep strike/second echelon) concept, what are the problem areas, and what programmatic initiatives are needed? What problems, if any, exist in the intelligence fusion area?

Dr. HOEHN. It is my judgment that we are two-thirds of the way to a technological revolution in being able to see and hit deep targets such as Warsaw Pact follow-on or second echelon forces. [Deleted.] The missing third for full exploitation is a revolution in command and control, which includes near real-time processing of sensor information, fusion or correlation of intelligence data, direction of combat air and ground forces against prioritized targets, and the survivable communications necessary to integrate this process. Field commanders need capabilities, proven in realistic operational testing, to handle increased data flows from enhanced reconnaissance capability and to convert that real-time information promptly into attack orders against fleeting targets. The fiscal year 1984 Defense Budget request includes approximately $63.9 million in RDT&E for the Joint Tactical Fusion Program ($59.0 million Army and $4.9 million Air Force) which is designed to help improve fusion capabilities.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, with the recent Belgium announcement concerning Hawk and Patriot, how seriously do you assess the air base air defense problem in central Europe?

The United States and the FRG are exploring cooperative arrangements for air base air defense in Germany. Would you favor a competitive evaluation of available systems aimed at selecting the most capable system for this mission?

General ROGERS. Effective air base air defense consists of an integrated, complementary family of air defense systems which includes Air Force interceptors, Army ground based medium-to-long range area air defense systems, and short range air defense (SHORAD) systems at critical installations.

[Deleted.]

NATO is a cooperative venture and competitive evaluation of all available systems is essential. What we must insure is that the system, or family of systems, selected meets all specified operational requirements.

### EXPLOITATION OF ASSAULT BREAKER TECHNOLOGY

Senator NUNN. Dr. Hoehn, between 1980–82, the Department demonstrated the assault breaker technology to detect, track and engage armor at ranges of about 100 km. Do you feel the potential demonstrated in this development is being fully exploited in the fiscal year 1984 budget?

Dr. HOEHN. The fiscal year 1984 Defense Budget request includes funding for the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System of $68.9 million for the Army and $90.5 million for the Air Force and for the Joint Tactical Missile System, $50.2 million for the Army and $9.9 million for the Air Force. The Joint Missile program includes work on munitions, including SKEET—a sensor-fuzed submunition—and a Terminally Guided Submunition. As with most technologies, budget limitations generally preclude maximum exploitation; one always has to balance total requirements against total resources. If resources were less restricted, I personally believe it would be possible to deploy a missile, as well as other delivery systems, for delivery of wide-area submunitions by [deleted] if not earlier.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, the issue of the 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry division has figured prominently in congressional deliberations on NATO the last several years. We have corresponded on this subject. Do you still hold the view that

the 4th of the 4th is an important part of the NATO's central region defenses and , if so, what is the planned replacement since fiscal year 1984 Army budget planned for this unit to be inactivated?

General ROGERS. The capabilities of the 4th brigade of the 4th Infantry Division represents an important component of U.S. ground combat power in Europe. Current U.S. manpower forces consist of four divisions and three forward deployed brigades for a total of 15 brigades. As the Army moves into its essential modernization program with systems such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System, DIVAD, AH-64 Attack Helicopter, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the M-1 Tank, the Congressionally mandated European strength ceiling will require the U.S. Army to inactivate several major combat and support units between fiscal year 1984 and fiscal year 1988.

[Deleted.]

### WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT

Senator NUNN. How important is the Wartime Host Nation Support with the Federal Republic of Germany and what would U.S. requirements be without this? Is this type of agreement compatible with the views of some that our allies should shoulder a greater portion of the burden of common defense?

General ROGERS. Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) from the Federal Republic of Germany is essential for the United States to reinforce NATO rapidly and effectively with sustainable combat forces.

[Deleted] without WHNS from Germany the US would have to forward deploy additional active CS/CSS units and equipment to achieve comparably responsive support for the deploying combat divisions and associated Air Force units. In order to sustain the planned US 10-Division D-Day forces the FRG has agreed to provide 93,000 Reservists plus an estimated equivalent of 100,000 civilian labor spaces. Use of U.S. reserve or active duty support troops would be at 10 to 40 times the cost of the German WHNS alternative. WHNS from Germany is a classic example of a U.S. ally assuming greater share of the common defense burden. Traditionally within NATO this logistical support has been considered a national responsibility. The U.S.-GE WHNS Agreement represents a major breakthrough because, for the first time, a NATO ally has agreed to pay a portion of support costs for U.S. combat units. In summary, critically needed and cost effective sustainment of US combat forces will enhance the credibility of the forward conventional defense of NATO.

### TECHNOLGY TRANSFER PROBLEMS

Senator NUNN. Are there any short-term legislative initiatives that can be taken to address technology transfer problems that we are all concerned about?

General ROGERS. I would be pleased to see you take any legislative or other measures that would make it more difficult for the Warsaw Pact to acquire critical Western military-relevant technologies. Protection of our technological lead for national security should continue to be a matter of major concern to the Congress as it is to the U.S. military. I do not have specific legislative initiatives in mind. I certainly do not underestimate the difficulty involved in legislating control measures over technology transfer, but I do endorse efforts to deal with this important matter.

### LONG-TERM DEFENSE PLAN

Senator NUNN. How well is NATO doing implementing the long-term defense plan and what is your view on how United States can, if needed, revitalize this effort?

General ROGERS. I believe the LTDP has led to considerable improvement in NATO's defense posture [deleted]. So there has been progress.

As you may know, the LTDP as a separate program has been phased out. Many of its requirements have been incorporated in other planning processes, such as Force Goals. It is important that NATO build on the progress that we made under LTDP. We need to ensure that the analytical advantages the LTDP brought to the planning process are not lost in the transition. We also must continue to point out, as Secretary Weinberger and others have been doing, that many of the actions begun under LTDP have not been completed. [Deleted.]

### JOINT INTERDICTION PROGRAMS SECOND ECHELON ATTACK

Senator NUNN. Dr. Hoehn, a recent Armed Forces Journal article reported that OSD has established a new office on "Joint Interdiction Programs" to provide some

coordination and emphasis across service lines and to have the "deep strike" system available for a 1986 and 1987 IOC.

What is the status of this high level OSD office?

What programs are in the fiscal year 1984 budget in procurement and R&D and what are the IOCs? What is the likelihood these IOCs will be achieved with the funding level requested?

Were you involved in the preparation of the emerging technologies presentation by Secretary Weinberger to the NATO ministers?

In your view, are there any programs that could be accelerated and/or added to the fiscal year 1984 budget to support the second echelon attack doctrine General Rogers has supported and Secretary Weinberger has outlined in his NATO presentation?

Dr. HOEHN. In December 1982 the USD(R&E) announced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the Services OSD's intention to establish overall program oversight over a Joint Interdiction Program to include the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS), the Joint Tactical Fusion Program (JTFP), and portions of the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Program. Because the development programs cut across Service lines in some areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, using two mechanisms, is providing a development and acquisition strategy and a coordinating function. The two mechanisms being employed are the Interdiction Executive Board (IEB) and a Program Coordinating Office (PCO).

The requirements have a combined character in that the concepts originate in the alliance in Unified Theater Commands and in the Services. On the other hand, development and acquisition programs are executed by the Services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the lead in pulling together the concepts, doctrine, tactics and requirements, and have designated Readiness Command as the agency for this activity. The Services and Unified Command are full participants in providing REDCOM with their inputs and views.

The Services will be as they have been, responsible for the execution of research, development, engineering, production and fielding of the individual systems which form the parts of this integrated structure. This has been and will remain their traditional role.

This management structure is in place and is functioning well.

The fiscal year 1984 Defense Budget request includes $159.4 million for JSTARS, $60.1 million for JTACMS, and $63.9 million for JTFP. The IOCs for these are [deleted]. These programs are likely to meet the IOCs with the funding levels requested.

With respect to the Secretary of Defense initiative in NATO on taking advantage of emerging technologies to improve conventional defense, I chair a working group of representatives from DOD offices, with State Department participation, that prepared the paper the Secretary provided to the Allies last autumn. This working group is preparing additional papers on the application of emerging technologies and is backstopping activity in NATO on this initiative.

In looking at the emphasis given to various program areas, one always has to balance the total requirements against the total resources that may be available. This was done in preparing the fiscal year 1984 Budget request. I personally believe that as we look to the future, we need to work toward early deployment into the field of emerging systems able to see deep and to hit enemy first echelon and follow-on forces, using submunitions, munitions, and weapons delivery subsystems tailored to attack various kinds of targets. We also need to exploit fully the potential to improve command and control to deal with targets in near real-time.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

### BURDEN SHARING

Senator LEVIN. On page 6, Dr. Hoehn states, "A summary evaluation, on the basis of various quantitative burdensharing measures, suggests that the U.S. contribution to the NATO and Japanese total defense effort is somewhat more than its fair share." This does differ from your own assessment on page 8 of your statement regarding NATO. You said:

"When all factors are weighed, I believe that our European Allies as a group are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the common defense burden."

How can you explain the difference between your conclusion and that of Dr. Hoehn?

General ROGERS. Your question points up the difficulty, which I mentioned earlier, of reaching unanimity on just exactly what constitutes a "fair share." There are a number of factors that are simply not quantifiable with any degree of accuracy when assessing each nation's contributions; an example is the contribution by allies of real estate for casernes and airfields that are thus exempted from commercial use and, thereby, from the tax base. The difference between my assessment and Dr. Hoehn's suggests that I have given greater weight than he to some of those unquantifiable factors. (I would also point out that in the DOD report on "Allied Contributions to the Common Defense," dated March 1982, which is the latest such report available to date, there is the statement on page 3: "Using this formulation, the non-U.S. NATO allies in aggregate appear to be shouldering roughly their fare share of the NATO and Japan total defense effort.")

Senator LEVIN. How can you reach this positive conclusion, when in 1982, we had growth in defense spending after inflation of 7.5 percent compared to the Europeans 1.0–1.6 percent? How can you say that, when in 1979, 1980, and 1981, we increased our defense spending after inflation by 3.45 percent, 4.9 percent and 4.1 percent while the Europeans did abysmally—2.2 percent, 2.7 percent and 2.7 percent?

Our increases came from a much larger base, which makes the disparities in defense spending increases even more unfair for the American taxpayer. Our increases have ranged from 52 percent to 650 percent more than your allies' increases. How can you defend your statement?

General ROGERS. The increases in defense spending that you cite for the United States came in the past few years, and followed several years of declining defense spending by our country in the post-Vietnam War era. In those same years, the Allies were increasing defense spending, by modest amounts but steadily. Further, I would suggest that those U.S. increases were not solely for NATO purposes, but were also directed towards the fulfillment by the U.S. of the collective vital interests on a global basis. But I would caution against attempting to reach a conclusion as to the "fair share" of each NATO nation based on a single indicator such as defense spending. There are many factors, some of which are not readily quantifiable, that should be considered in determining contributions to the common defense. When all of the factors are taken into account, I think the Allies as a whole are shouldering a fairly equitable share of the burden.

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, last year I asked you how you could expect our allies to increase the defense spending yearly after inflation by 4 percent—what you say is needed to improve NATO conventional defenses—if so many of them were failing to meet even their 4 percent commitment. You answered:

"I believe that there is reason to hope for increased Alliance defense spending in the future because I believe that the nature of the threat which we face as an Alliance is becoming more evident . . . The example which the United States has set in its provisions for defense is needed to show the way."

We have been setting an excellent example now for the Europeans for the past 4 years. Even when we cut our rate of increase below the President's request, it still is much higher than that of our allies average. Thier poor performance completely contradicts your optimism and theory of leadership by example, wouldn't you agree?

General ROGERS. I would agree that some member nations' performances in recent years have not measured up to my hopes. As I have pointed out earlier, a portion of any real increase in U.S. defense spending is directed, not towards NATO, but towards the responsibility for securing vital interests worldwide. I think it is very important to take the long-term view in working together with our Allies to secure our own national interests. We should not become discouraged by or overreact to short-term disappointments. In this vein, it is important that the United States continue to set the example for the rest of the Alliance.

Senator LEVIN. Last year, at the initiative of myself and my committee colleague, Senator Quayle, Congress amended this reporting requirement to impel the executive branch to be more aggressive in seeking increased defense contributions from our allies. We added language requiring a description of what additional actions the President intends to take should its ongoing efforts to obtain increased allied defense contributions fail. In this description, we required the President to address at length whether US troops overseas should be repositioned as part of this effort to obtain increased allied defense efforts.

It is clear that this administration's efforts to obtain increased allied burdensharing are not working—the situation is becoming worse according to your own statement. Is the administration considering repositioning U.S. troops within Europe or

Asia as a way of demonstrating to those allies not bearing their fair share of the burden that they must do more? If not, why not?

Dr. HOEHN. U.S. actions to decrease its contributions to NATO, such as troop withdrawals from Europe, will not help to increase the allied defense contribution. The need for an increased defense effort has been made very clear to our allies. There is no evidence to indicate that U.S. troop withdrawals would spur our allies to do more on their own behalf. Indeed, all indications are that a withdrawal would have the opposite effect and adversely affect US defense interests. To many Europeans, a unilateral withdrawal would convey the impression that the United States no longer considers the Warsaw Pact threat a serious problem. U.S. admonitions to the allies to do more would be met with considerable skepticism. For other Europeans, a unilateral US withdrawal would lead to the conclusion that a successful forward defense is not achievable, thereby increasing the likelihood that accommodation would be sought with the East. Rather than reduce its commitment to the common defense, the United States must lead by example. Indeed, the United States cannot afford to reduce its commitment to allied defense—as a vital matter of U.S. national security—while the Soviet threat to Western interests continues to grow.

Senator LEVIN. Dr. Hoehn, last year when Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci testified that he expected that the weighted average annual increase in defense spending for our NATO allies would increase from the dismal 1.6 percent to 2.1 percent projected for 1982 in last year's burdensharing report. Your own statement documents how wrong he was, since on Page 6 you say current estimates indicate a real spending increase in 1982 of an average of 1.0 percent to 1.6 percent for our NATO allies.

(a) What accounts for this disparity between your projections last year for 1982 and allied defense spending performance for that year? Why have the allies done so poorly?

Dr. HOEHN. We constructed the projections for 1982 based on estimates prepared up to 6 months before Governments had completed national budgets for presentations to Parliaments. There was still considerable political and economic uncertainty as governments prepared their budgets in this period of worldwide recession and soaring inflation. Projecting inflation alone within 1 percent for 6 to 18 months in advance can be very uncertain. It is for these reasons that the 1982 report noted that the projections for 1982 were highly tentative.

Senator LEVIN. When did DOD have its first indication that allied defense spending actually would decline below its own projection in 1982, and what did it do at that point to try to prevent such an occurrence?

Dr. HOEHN. Our first estimates of allies' performance became available during the NATO 1982 fall review. We used these estimates in our approach to the allies during the fall defense review. However, we work with our allies on a continuing basis year around to encourage their greater contribution to the common defense efforts.

Senator LEVIN. Your statement on page 6 also projects that average allied defense spending increases for 1983 "are tentatively projected to be only in the range of one percent." (emphasis added) "In the range of" is a NATO codeword phrase used to cover up shortfalls from defense spending increase goals. How much less, on average, do you expect our allies to increase their defense spending in 1983? What is the projected 1983 average? Provide country-by-country breakdown for the record.

Dr. HOEHN. The following chart displays current country-by-country estimates of the percent change in real defense spending for 1979 through 1983. These figures—some of which are still subject to change—show real increases in defense spending for most countries, and weighted average increases for all non-US NATO nations combined of 2.2 percent for 1979, 2.7 percent for 1980, 2.7 percent for 1981, and between 1.0 percent and 1.6 percent for 1982. The weighted average increase for 1983 is tentatively projected to be between 0.7 percent and 1.0 percent.

Estimates reported to date for 1982 indicate that three or four countries (Canada, Luxembourg, the UK and possibly France) achieved increases in the 3 percent region. [Deleted.]

## NATO DEFENSE SPENDING [1, 2]

[Percent change from previous year in constant prices (excluding inflation)]

| | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | [Deleted] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 2.2 | 2.0 | 0.9 | −6.6 | |
| Canada | −0.9 | 5.1 | 3.1 | 3.0 | |

## NATO DEFENSE SPENDING [1, 2]—Continued

[Percent change from previous year in constant prices (excluding inflation)]

| | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | [Deleted] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.6 | |
| France | [3] 2.5 | [3] 3.7 | [3] 3.6 | [3] 1.5/3.0 | |
| Germany | 1.8 | 2.3 | 3.2 | −0.2 | |
| Greece | −2.9 | −8.4 | 22.9 | −5.0/−1.1 | |
| Italy | 2.6 | 4.9 | −0.5 | 2.7 | |
| Luxembourg | 3.5 | 16.3 | 4.8 | 4.0 | |
| Netherlands | 4.2 | −1.7 | 3.3 | −1.9/2.1 | |
| Norway | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | |
| Portugal | 2.9 | 10.1 | 1.5 | −2.9 | |
| Turkey | 2.6 | 2.0 | 1.8 | −7.2 | |
| United Kingdom | 3.0 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 3.8 | |
| United States | 3.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 7.5 | |
| Non-U.S. NATO [4] | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 1.0/1.6 | |
| NATO Total [4] | 3.1 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 5.2/5.5 | |

[1] All of the figures depicted in this table are based on the NATO definition of defense spending and are the best estimates that can be made on the basis of information now available.

[2] National fiscal years agree to calendar years except as follows: Canada and UK (April–March), U.S. (October–September). Turkish data through 1981 are based on a March–February fiscal year. In 1983, Turkey will convert to a January–December fiscal year. The Turkish figure for 1982 covers a 10 month (March–December) transition year.

[3] DOD estimate.

[4] Non-U.S. NATO and NATO totals reflect weighted average growth rates developed using 1981 constant prices and exchange rates.

Senator LEVIN. Dr. Hoehn, last year I singled out the West Germans as a perfect example of an ally not bearing its fair share of the common defense burden. When I criticized the projected 0 percent increase projected for 1982, Deputy Secretary Carlucci predicted it would be much more by year's end. On the contrary, statistics I received Friday from the Defense Department show that the situation became worse. Now Germany is expected to show a net decrease in defense spending after inflation in 1982 (to −0.2 percent) over 1981. What accounts for West Germany's poor performance?

Dr. HOEHN. Last year we projected the real increase in German defense expenditures to be in the −1.4/0.7 percent range. Our more recent estimates are for about −0.2 percent. The Germans claim they are increasing expenditures for critical items such as R&D, procurement, and non-personnel O&M by more than 3 percent in real terms. This is possible because of real decreases in military pay and allowances. We are not entirely satisfied with this explanation and we continue to emphasize in appropriate fora the need for the Germans and other Allies to assume a larger share of the common defense.

Senator LEVIN. Last year, the SASC enacted restrictions on money it authorized for military construction in Germany to implement the Master Restationing Plan to move U.S. troops closer to the East German border and closer to likely invasion routes. No money was to be obligated until the Germans had agreed to an equitable cost sharing arrangement.

It took the Germans almost 12 months just to name a delegation to begin negotiations on the Restationing Plan? What progress has there been so far on reaching satisfactory cost sharing arrangements? Your statement refers to these talks but provides no details.

Dr. HOEHN. Since March 1982, there have been four meetings of a working group or Committee of Experts, and two meetings of a Senior Level Committee. The experts have identified the technical and administrative problems associated with the MRP, and have agreed upon the allocation of responsibilities to either Germany or the United States to resolve the problems. The experts did not agree upon a cost sharing arrangement for the facilities required for the restationed troops. During the most recent meeting of the Senior Level Committee in mid February 1983, the U.S. delegation described the benefits of the MRP to both countries and told the German delegation that we would be seeking a cost sharing agreement in 1983.

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, latest statistics from DOD show that the usual poor performers in NATO defense spending—Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands—continue their past patterns. These are among the richest nations in NATO. What are you doing to obtain larger rates in growth in defense spending

from these nations, whose adherence to the 3 percent commitment is virtually nonexistent?

General ROGERS. I am emphasizing the need for increased defense spending to meet the requirements of the 1983–88 Force Goals. I am doing this in public fora, within NATO councils, and in private discussions with Allied leaders, and I am doing it at every opportunity.

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, your statement says that if the Congressional limit on troop levels in Europe continues beyond 1983, you might have to reduce force structure or delay deployment of new equipment to our troops overseas.

Provide for the record what force structure you would have to cut, or deployment of new systems you would have to delay, in the next 2 years, if the overseas troop limit is maintained. Please identify the additional manning needed in each case, and why it cannot be obtained through reduction in headquarters personnel?

General ROGERS. USEUCOM is currently examining a number of options for meeting a troop strength ceiling. None of the options are palatable. We are examining growth requirements to reaffirm their importance in relationship to trade-offs required, and we are examining existing force structure (to include headquarters requirements) to identify possible trade-offs. We will submit our findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when our study is completed. It should be noted here that reductions in headquarters usually do not provide many spaces, especially in relationship to the size of the problem. [Deleted.]

Regarding headquarters requirements, it has been the case in the past that Congress exercised its responsibility to raise and maintain the military by authorizing the Services to have a specified end strength. The Services then sent those personnel to wherever required to accomplish assigned missions. With the EUCOM troop strength ceiling, the flow of personnel into and out of Europe will result in every increase requiring a trade-off. Activations and inactivations would have to be planned so that the ceiling would not be violated. This type of management requires additional supervision and management which translates into additional headquarters personnel.

[Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, on page 18 of your statement, you refer to Congress' dilemma of how to reduce overall federal spending. You urge that we look elsewhere than the defense budget for such reductions.

You have said that NATO nations need to average 4 percent increases after inflation annually to improve the Alliance conventional defenses adequately. Yet the President proposes a 10 percent increase after inflation.

Recognizing the budgetary overlaps and difficulties in isolating out those costs just associated with our NATO commitments, why shouldn't we try to do that and limit those to only a 4 percent growth rate after inflation in fiscal 1984?

General ROGERS. The estimated real increase per year for the United States to meet its agreed Force Goals for 1983–88 is 3.9 percent. If, on top of meeting its NATO Force Goals, the U.S. is going to fulfill its commitment to secure the collective vital interests of its Allies on a global basis, then the annual real growth rate must obviously be greater than 4 percent. What that higher figure must be can only be determined by the administration.

### JAPAN BURDEN SHARING ISSUES

Senator LEVIN. General, Admiral Long's statement discusses Japan's efforts to share the common defense burdens she and the United States have under our Mutual Security Treaty by saying "Japan is moving in the right direction." In contrast, Dr. Hoehn's statement says "Japan, by most measures, is doing considerably less than its fair share. Japan is the only nation specifically mentioned by the DOD witness, so its burdensharing performance must be particularly disappointing to the executive branch. General, how can you explain the contradiction between Admiral Long's statement and DOD's assessment?

General PALASTRA. Admiral Long has consistently stated that he feels Japan can and should do more for its own defense. The emphasis on defense in Japan's latest budget, while all other programs decreased, indicates the government's growing concern posed to its security by the massive buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East. While expenditures for defense are less than we hoped for in absolute terms, the emphasis is in the right direction when compared to the across-the-board retrenchment in the GOJ spending. Prime Minister Nakasone has also indicated a possibility that the current one-percent of GNP limitation on defense spending may need to be exceeded, indicating that GOJ officials are thinking in the right direction, although the requisite political support may yet be lacking.

Senator LEVIN. For 1983, Japan increased defense spending by only 6.5 percent, a decrease from its 7.75 percent increase for 1982. How is that moving in the right direction, since one could suggest that is movement in reverse?

General PALASTRA. Though not to the extent we had hoped for, nonetheless, in view of a much larger GNP, Japan's defense budget increased considerably over last year as it has each year since 1980, and that is movement in the right direction. A decreased defense budget would certainly be "movement in reverse." Realizing that only the personal intervention of Prime Minister Nakasone on behalf of increased defenses precluded a sizably reduced level of funding, I feel it safe to say the emphasis within GOJ is in the right direction. Our immediate task is to convince the GOJ of the need to accelerate efforts in that direction.

Senator LEVIN. On page 11, Admiral Long discusses how our urging Japan to do more for its own defense must be sensitive to concerns other Asian nations have about increased Japanese military capability. Is it not true that Japan could significantly increase its annual defense spending without creating offensive capabilities which would threaten the rest of Asia? Is it not true that the Japanese have so far to go to increase their self-defense capabilities just to meet their commitment to defend the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from the home islands that they could spend between 1.5 percent and 2 percent of their GNP annually between now and 1991 and still not threaten other nations with offensive capabilities?

General PALASTRA. Japan has a long way to go in defense building before the Japanese self-defense forces would pose a serious threat to any neighbor. Yet the difference between offensive and defensive capability is more one of employment than hardware, and it is largely a matter of perception on the part of Japan's neighbors. Some of Japan's neighbors perceive Japan to be on the verge of a big defense build-up, especially with regard to SLOC defense forces, when those SLOCs point at their countries. In addition to assurances by the USG to those neighbors that we are urging Japan to build a strictly defensive force, it is essential that we continue to reinforce our words with actions of the type that show Japan and the U.S. are bound together in a defense partnership wherein the U.S., inter alia, provides the offensive capability and nuclear umbrella. The presence of U.S. forces in Japan, our expanding combined exercise program with the JSDF, and initiatives such as the proposed F-16 deployment to Misawa are vital in reassuring those neighbors that Japan is not on a go-it-alone military resurgence. These activities are indicative of the continuing alliance relationship which seeks to deter would-be aggressors.

Senator LEVIN. How can Japan be moving in the right direction to improve its self defense capabilities when its 1983 defense budget represents the following:

Procurement of fewer F-15s for homeland air defense than were in both the 1982 and 1980 Japanese defense budgets, when an even lower percent of a lower GNP was devoted to defense;

Fewer major aircraft procured than in both 1980 and 1982;

Lowest numbers of ships to be procured in the last four years?

General PALASTRA. While these statistics are in themselves correct, they must be taken in the context of an annually expanding GOJ defense budget. These three particular categories of hardware are competing with other programs for a share of a finite budget. Rather than focus on specific pieces of equipment, our concern should focus on the overall trends of GOJ defense spending. We must continue to stress a need for increases across the board for needed hardware and critically short readiness and sustainability assets. In this broader perspective, Japan needs to move much more quickly to build adequate defenses.

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that the 1983 Japanese defense budget delays achievement of the defense improvement objectives set in the now outdated 1976 official defense program outline. Even more must be done now, but Japan is falling even further behind. How is that progress?

General PALASTRA. At the current level of spending, the GOJ would not be able to achieve even the modest goals of the 1976 National Defense Plan Outline (NDPO), which was drawn up well before 1,000nm SLOC defense was included in the tasks Japan decided to cover for its own defense. Japan must achieve early accomplishment of these goals and then focus on the added responsibilities that have arisen since the NDPO was drafted. The scheduled accomplishment of the NDPO will require greater and accelerated expenditures.

Senator LEVIN. DOD is seeking money to construct facilities at Misawa Air Base in Northern Japan for the assignment of F-16s there. DOD maintains that 70 percent of the costs associated with F-16 deployment to Misawa will be borne by the Japanese. Is this in writing; how can we be certain this will come about; why shouldn't Congress enact into law language similar to that put in the fiscal year 1983 MilCon Act for Germany and Master Restationing projects that money author-

ized cannot be obligated until there is an agreement between the United States and Japan on an equitable cost sharing arrangement and that agreement is transmitted to Congress?

General PALASTRA. The GOJ has agreed thus far to support the F-16 deployment in principle, and it has indicated a willingness to include this mutually beneficial project in the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) for host nation construction. The GOJ is awaiting an indication from the Congress of a US commitment to support this joint initiative before it will make a further commitment in terms of any specific funding. The Japanese have provided assurances that they intend to support the Misawa deployment. I do not believe any special language in the authorization is necessary. Although the FIP has been expanding annually by 20-25 percent and we have significant flexibility in our prioritizing our FIP requests, it's possible that specific restrictions on Japanese spending for construction could inhibit that flexibility in their observance of the letter of the law. It could strain the existing amicable relationship and disrupt the favorable upward trend we now enjoy.

Senator LEVIN. Here is a partial list of forces Japan must acquire to defend the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles. Does DOD agree that at a minimum, these are needed?

3-4 squadrons with about 100 more F-15's//same, 6-8 squadrons with about 200 F-15's//same, 2 squadrons with 8-10 AWACS equivalent aircraft and 10-14 KC-10 equivalent tankers//half this capability, 3-4 squadrons with 60-90 jets//same, 3-7 SAM groups with Improved Hawk and Patriot missiles//same, 10-12 subs/8-10 subs, about 20 frigates/destroyers//10-12 frigates/destroyers, about 130 high performance P-3C aircraft to replace entire existing force//about 50 P-3C's, 25,000 active + about 30,000 reservists//same, and thousands of tons of ammo, 1,000's of mines, torpedoes, air-to-air missiles.

General PALASTRA. I cannot speak for the accuracy of this unsubstantiated list of forces, and indeed a number of estimates for Japan's defense needs have arisen over the past several years. The purpose of the SLOC defense study now in progress is to determine Japan's minimum sea lane defense needs. I must defer from speculating on any list of forces until we see the results of that study.

### READINESS ISSUES IN NATO

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, on Page 9-10, you discuss the importance of adequate funding for training (flying hours, steaming days, battalion field days), maintenance capabilities and spare parts, all of which come from the Operations and Maintenance parts of the defense budget.

Are you concerned that the percentage of the defense budget devoted to O&M is declining, while that devoted to the non-readiness areas—mainly big ticket procurement of strategic weapons—is increasing? Are you concerned that the new conventional weapons we are fielding will not be adequately supported by field maintenance, logistics and spare parts, and that our personnel will not have enough training for them, because of this shift in budget priorities away from the readiness parts of the budget?

General ROGERS. If that shift occurs, it will be the cause of much concern.

Senator LEVIN. The Navy's flying hours per combat aircrew are declining in fiscal year 1984 from the fiscal year 1983 level, and they have been declining since fiscal year 1981. Isn't the progress in the wrong direction, based on the emphasis you place on realistic combat training?

The depot maintenance backlogs of all the services are growing in fiscal year 1984, rather than decreasing from fiscal year 1983. Does this concern you, given your statements about adequate maintenance and spare parts? Do you think we should be buying fewer big-ticket items if that diverts funds away from fixing the forces in being and providing them with adequate training and maintenance and logistic support?

General Rogers, it appears that the achievement of our war reserve goals for fiscal year 1987 has slipped by at least 1 year, ostensibly due to budget pressures. You have been very outspoken about your sustainability deficiencies in NATO. Wouldn't it be wiser to restore this program to its timetable—or even accelerate it—instead of spending large sums for big-ticket weapons which will not be available until many years into the future or will be dedicated to much lower priority missions such as air defense against the unlikely possibility of Soviet nuclear bomber attacks against the United States?

General ROGERS. I agree, Senator Levin, that emphasis must be placed on those programs which enable us to do better with the forces we already have. The readiness of our forces is a major concern and the operation and maintenance account is one of the most important elements of readiness. O&M is the source of resources for

many readiness elements. Training is but one example. I believe additional operational training is important and support increasing the number of field days/steaming days/flying hours. Likewise, I believe it makes little sense to procure equipment and then provide inadequate maintenance resources to keep that equipment operational. To do better with our forces in being, however, we must not only meet ACE standards in the areas of training, maintaining, sustaining and manning our forces, but also equipping them. Our forces must have modern weapons which can compete on the battlefield. In my opinion the proper orientation of our priorities at present is to emphasize the programs which provide adequate numbers of trained men and women, provide them with decent working and living conditions, improve force readiness and provide the ability to sustain our forces in combat. Some modernization is essential, particularly of intermediate-range nuclear forces and those conventional force elements which improve capability to attack enemy follow-on forces. The program balance I would urge is one in which our present forces are modernized where essential, but careful attention and necessary emphasis is given to insuring the weapons systems—both existing and new—are adequately supported by field maintenance and logistics capabilities, that reserves of spare parts and equipment are available to repair or replace damaged or destroyed equipment in wartime, and that equipment—existing or new—is manned by men and women who have both the know how and desire to get the most effectiveness out of it.

READINESS ISSUES IN PACOM

Senator LEVIN. Are you concerned that the percentage of the Defense Budget devoted to O&M is declining while that devoted to the non-readiness areas—mainly big ticket procurement of strategic weapons—is increasing? Are you concerned that the new conventional weapons we are fielding will not be adequately supported by field maintenance, logistics and spare parts, and that our personnel will not have enough training for them, because of this shift in budget priorities away from the readiness parts of the budget?

General PATASTRA. I am concerned that O&M funding may not be maintained at sufficient levels to ensure adequate steaming and flying hours; to conduct exercises to maintain high levels of combat readiness; and to fund spare parts replacement programs. I have continually stressed the importance of adequate O&M funding and have communicated this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is imperative that proper attention be given to sustaining the force, which includes reducing depot maintenance backlogs, funding spare parts programs, and funding war reserve items in the areas of equipment, repair parts and clothing. Integral to these O&M shortfalls are deficiencies in support of new weapon systems introduced to the forces. we are strained now in achieving quality support for current weapons, and modernization of those systems currently in inventory. We must continue to balance budget priorities to insure adequate O&M support for both new weapon systems and those in the inventory.

Senator LEVIN. The Navy's flying hours per combat aircrew are declining in fiscal year 1984 for fiscal year 1983 level, and they have been declining since fiscal year 1981. Isn't this progress in the wrong direction, based on the emphasis you place on realistic combat training?

General PALASTRA. Yes, based on budgetary constraints we have been forced to compromise on the level of flying hours per combat aircrew in fiscal year 1984. These reductions have been necessary to attain the most acceptable level of operations and procurement. Reduced flying hours are acceptable over the short term, however, in order to improve the combat readiness of our forces, we must increase the number of flying hours allotted to our combat aircrews.

Senator LEVIN. The depot maintenance backlogs of all the Services are growing in fiscal year 1984, rather than decreasing from fiscal year 1983. Does this concern you? Do you think we should be buying fewer big ticket items if that diverts funds away from fixing the forces in being and providing them with adequate training and logistics support?

General PALASTRA. We are concerned about the backlogs in depot maintenance activities, and in the shortfalls evident in spare parts programs in each Service. Anything that diverts funding from correcting these problems is of major concern to my component Services, but I cannot say I am against funding what you refer to as "big ticket" items. I think we must achieve the proper balance in our funding programs to ensure continued support of these systems in the inventory and to continue to introduce new or improved systems to enhance our combat capabilities and readiness.

Senator LEVIN. It appears that the achievement of our war reserve goals for fiscal year 1987 has slipped by at least one year, ostensibly due to budget pressures. Wouldn't it be wiser to restore this program to its timetable—or even accelerate it—instead of spending large sums for big ticket weapons which will not be available until many years into the future or will be dedicated to much lower priority missions such as air defense against the unlikely possibility of Soviet nuclear bomber attacks against the United States?

General PALASTRA. Force modernization is extremely important to our future combat capabilities in providing for a credible deterrent force. This may require the funding of some very expensive programs. I do not believe that we have to sacrifice programs to maintain and support our equipment and forces. But rather that we achieve a balance to ensure our personnel are trained, equipped and prepared to employ new systems, while we continue to strive for better survivable systems now in use.

Senator LEVIN. In announcing his budget reductions early this year, Secretary Weinberger said there would be cuts in funding for training exercises. How has this hurt the combat readiness of our Pacific Command Forces?

General PALASTRA. We have not yet experienced actual reductions; our concern centers on the potential impact reductions would have in the future. Additionally, the problem continues to be one of sufficient allocations to accommodate increasing requirements. The contribution that joint and combined exercises made to the readiness of our forces is significant. We have combined many of our small-scale uniservice and combined bilateral training events into large-scale, joint/combined exercises. These changes ensure mutually beneficial training for both our forces and our allies, more clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment within the region, and enhance joint/combined readiness. Changes already made to existing exercises have increased strategic lift requirements and desired future enhancement will require even more airlift funding. Still, I know of no better peacetime method of training than regular and frequent participations in realistic exercises. We need continued Congressional support for fullest possible funding of the JCS worldwide exercise program in the future. Less than full funding will result in decreased U.S. forces participation in scheduled exercises and/or inability to schedule exercises that enhance joint/combined readiness.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, General Rogers, for making a long and arduous journey to be here today. General Palastra, we appreciate your presence. Dr. Hoehn, Admiral Howe, thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

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